by Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban

The European Union (EU) is disturbed over the arrest of a leading opposition leader by the Ethiopian government. The EU has subsequently urged the regime to make public any charges against Professor Merera Gudina.

‘‘I urge the Ethiopian Government to make public any charges it has brought against Prof. Merera and I will continue to follow his case very closely,’‘ Chair of the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), Elena Valenciano, said in a statement.

Late last month, Ethiopian security forces arrested the professor who is the chairman of the opposition party ‘Oromo Federalist Congress’ (OFC), shortly after his arrival in the capital Addis Ababa.

I urge the Ethiopian Government to make public any charges it has brought against Prof. Merera and I will continue to follow his case very closely.

Prof. Merera was returning from Brussels where – together with other Ethiopian activists and the Olympian athlete Feyisa Lellisa – he had had a meeting with Members of the European Parliament on 9 November 2016.

Addis Standard @addisstandard

Confirmed –#Ethiopia security forces hv detained leading opposition figure Prof. Merera Gudina, pictured center, upon his arrival

EU Parliament concerned over curfew clampdown

The European Parliament adopted an urgency resolution on the violent crackdown on protesters in January 2016, which requested that the Ethiopian authorities stop using anti-terrorism legislation to repress political opponents, dissidents, human rights defenders, other civil society actors and independent journalists.

Since January 2016 the human rights situation in Ethiopia has not improved at all. Human Rights Watch reports that security forces have killed more than 500 people during protests over the course of 2016.

‘‘Moreover the state of emergency has led to further significant restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and assembly. I therefore reiterate Parliament’s demands as set out in its resolution.

‘‘The European Parliament is aware of the difficult situation in Ethiopia and stresses the need to continue to support the Ethiopian people,” the statement added.

Arrested for flouting curfew rules

The state-affiliated FANA broadcasting corporate however stated on Thursday that Gudina was arrested because he had flouted the State Of Emergency currently being enforced nationwide.

They quoted the the Secretariat of the Command Post as saying Dudina violated an article of the law which prohibited any communication with banned terrorist organizations and anti-peace groups.

“He is under investigation for violating this article,” the Command Post said.

Isaias Afwerki TOP SECRET

The Hidden Truth About Isaias Afwerki- by Assefa Chabo

Per the 2007 Population and Housing Census, Amhara is the second largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Mostof the Amhara population lives in Godner, Gojjam, Wollo and Shewa provinces. However, due to historical reasons significant number of Amhara people are distributed throughout Ethiopia which makes the most widely dispersed ethnic groups in Ethiopia as well. Before the coming of TPLF to power, Amhara people were leading relatively a stable life in different parts of Ethiopia. However, the coming in to power of the TPLF and its consequent introduction of ethnicfederalism has resulted in the surge of anti-Amhara sentiment by the government agents.

TPLF was started as “an anti-Amhara” front. In its 1967 manifesto declared Amhara are its arch enemy that must be crashed. The party has indoctrinated its ideology of hate to its members for close to half a century. The parity’s staunchestcadres havebelieved what is written in their manifesto is true and must be adhered by every part faithfully.

The aftermath of 1991, Amhara people were becomingprimary victims of torture, harassment, displacement and killing. For quarter a century, TPLF unabashed by corruption, tirelessly uses government owned media and other meanness to inculcate anti-Amhara hate among other ethnic groups. The official ideology, Revolutionary Democracy, statedAmhara’s were colonial powers and their struggle is to dismantle Amhara domination. To garner enough support to perpetuate its political hegemony, TPLF encourages others ethnic groups to take revenge against Amhara who are perceived as their former oppressors. This, negative campaign has led to the massacre and displacement of Amhara’s in Harar, SNNP, Gabella and BenishangulGumuz regions.

The Amhara’s being the most dispersed society in Ethiopia and they become easy targets for ethnic cleansing. Untold stories of atrocities are now surfacingout due to prevalent social media activism.Currently, people are protesting the systemic marginalization and brutal crackdown on any dissent.

The TPLFrule are the worst to Ethiopian in general and the Amhara people. The recent protest is the result of an accumulated grievances. It is related to past mistreatment, discrimination, harassment, killing, torture, and economic marginalization.Wolkite identity restoration movement whichis considered as the immediate causes that sparks the regionwide Amhara protest. The forcible annexation ofterritories of Wolkite’s intoTigri Regional statehas caused various human rights abuse including land expropriation and genocide to clear lands to lay a claim.  Areas such as Humera, Wolkite and Tsegedie, better known as fertile belt of the norther region,are areas that have witnessed ethnic cleansing of Amhara’s by the Tigris minority regimes.

The government to economically marginalize and weaken the region has several times redistributed land in region. The expropriation of land was solely implemented in the Amhara region. The redistribution of land, other than creating fragmented arable land that are not sufficient to support domestic needs have created a social conflict between the new owners and the old land lords. Such skewed support to the local elites have in turn created a network of clientele officials that mismanaged the economy. The Amhara region what was once considered as a bread basket of Ethiopia is now known for its inflated safety net programs. The land use now is less than hectare per house hold. Family dependency ratio is unusually high. Therefore, fragmentation of farm land is one Couse of rural poverty. On the other hand, there is no industrial labor market that taps the rural youth. Nowmost rural youthhas started migrating to the capital and even crossed borders to neighboring in the hope of searching a greener pasture.

These army of un employed youth demands change that would promote their desire for change. Unless there is democratic system in place that would create a forum to channel grievances in peaceful and orderly manner popular demands would rocking the system.

It is not late to resolve the problem. The government should initiate public discussion with the aim to provide a forum for the people to air out their concerns. The discussion should include land policy which is now entirely owned and run by the government. This policy contrary to its professed purpose serves as a mechanism to control the rural mass. Other than releasing cooked data the government with the help of international organization has to start a new agricultural census and poverty surveys to redress what has been done in the past 25 years.

Press Release
 
December 06, 2016
 
Ethiopia: End State of Emergency restrictions on political dissent and targeting of human rights defenders
 
The Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE) is deeply concerned with the wide-ranging restrictions the state of emergency decree has enabled, which severely affect freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, association and peaceful protest in Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s close allies and partners in the international community unequivocally condemn the grave violations of human rights in Ethiopia and the misuse of the directive to silence political dissents, to threaten and systematically targeting journalists, bloggers, human rights activists and peaceful protestors across the country.

Since, the six-month nationwide State of Emergency was declared on October 9, 2016, tens of thousands of individuals have been arrested arbitrarily arrested. Dissent and independent reporting on the state of emergency directives has been quashed through the arrest of journalists, bloggers, human rights activists and opposition leaders and their members. On 12 November 2016 the Ethiopian the authorities have announced that they arrested some 11, 607 people since the declared state of emergency was enforced. However, different sources on the ground confirmed that the number of arrests is in reality much higher. According to AHRE, nearly twenty thousand people have been arrested in Oromia region, and over fifteen thousand have been arrested in Amhara region, notably in Gondar and Gojjam.

Our sources on the ground confirmed that most the authority has use harsh treatments in those detention centers, including denying medical treatments while knowing that the location of most of these prison centres are affected by high degree of malaria. Our sources confirmed most of the prisoners are suffering with malaria and other related infection with lack of medical attention. Prisoners are also forced to do some heavy military exercises for the purpose of punishment. The whereabouts of most of the detainees are also unknown, and access to information has been severely limited by a two month long suspension of 3G mobile internet network in several regions, including the capital Addis Ababa.

On 18 October 2016, journalist Abebe Wube, the general manager of ‘Ye Qelem Qend’ newspaper, was arrested in Addis Ababa, by security forces. On 11 November 2016, police detained one of the Zone 9 bloggers and a co-founder of the collective, Befiqadu Hailu, who received the 2015 CPJ’s International Press Freedom Award from his parents’ house in Addis Ababa. It is also reported by CPJ[1] that Befekadu was arrested in relation with an interview that he gave to the U.S. government-funded broadcaster Voice of America’s Amharic service, criticizing the government’s handling of protestors.

On 18 November 2016, former leader of UDJ, Daneil Shibeshi with other two journalists Elias Gebru and Ananiya Sori were arrested by security forces. The outspoken journalist and former political activist Ananiya Sori was arrested following his recent critic against the policy of the government and its reaction during the large protest in the country on a radio debate that was organized by the pro-government media, Fana Broadcasting, in October 2016.

CPJ also reported about the disappearance of Abdi, Gada in its report. Abdi is an unemployed television journalist who disappeared since November 9 and his family fear that he might be arrested. On 31 November 2016, prominent opposition party leader Dr, Merera Gudina, Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) was arrested upon his return from Europe after he delivered a speech to members of the European Parliament, in Brussels, on the current situation of Ethiopia.

Three of the main opposition parties, the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ), Blue Paty and All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) have claimed that a large number of their leaders and members were targeted by the Command Post and arbitrary arrested. It is reported that tens of UDJ members were arrested during and before the state of emergency announced. AEUP reported that around 20 of its members were arrested in the last few weeks. Blue Party also reported to AHRE that 23 of its members including three leaders of the party, Bilen Mesfin, Abebe Akalu (teacher) and Yidnekachewu Kebede (lawyer) were arrested under the order of the Command Post. AHRE also informed about the criminal charge of the Wolqayit Committee members who have been targeted by security forces since the beginning of the popular protest in Amhara region, particularly in Gonder and Gojam, in July 2016. Including Colonel Demeqe Zewude, other members of the committee have faced criminal charge under the 2009 anti-terrorism law of Ethiopia.

In addition, the authorities have not given any information on the thousands who have been arbitrarily arrested since November 2015 throughout Oromia and Amhara regions during and after the protests. There has been no international, independent, and impartial investigation into allegations of the security forces’ use of excessive and unnecessary lethal force to disperse and suppress peaceful protests that costs the life of hundreds. According to Amnesty International recent report released on 18 November 2016 heavy-handed measures by the Ethiopian government risk escalating a deepening crisis that has claimed the lives of more than 800 protesters. [2]  On 4 November 2016, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted a resolution calling for the government to authorize the Commission to conduct a fact-finding mission to Ethiopia.

The state of emergency directive gives ultimate power to the Command Post that has appointed by the House of Representative to enforce the decree, including suspending basic and fundamental political and democratic rights granted under the constitution of the country, the African Charter on Human and People Rights and international standards of human rights.

AHRE strongly urges the Ethiopian government:

• to lift the ban on basic freedoms and fundamental rights that are enforced by the authorities and Command Post following the declaration of the state of emergency;
• to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, journalists, bloggers, human rights activists and opposition leaders;
• to ensure due process of law for those who were arrested before and during the time of the state of emergency and to respect basic rights of prisoners,
• to allow independent and impartial investigation into allegations of gross human rights violation during the enforcement of the state of emergency and since November 2015 when the protest were began.

For further information, please contact:

yaredh@ahrethio.org, +32 486 336 367, Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE)

www.ahrethio.org

https://www.facebook.com/AHREthio.org/?fref=nf

[1] https://cpj.org/2016/11/ethiopian-newspaper-editor-bloggers-caught-in-wors.php

[2] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/ethiopia-draconian-measures-will-escalate-the-deepening-crisis/

According to Professor Zygmunt Bauman, the concept of interregnum appeared for the first time in Titto Livio’s history of Rome where he described the foundation of the city and the role of the first legendary king of Rome- Romulus. Romulus, according to Livio, ruled Rome for 38 years, which then constituted an average length of the life of an average person. In other words, when Romulus died or as Titto Livio suggests was raised to heaven, there were very few people in Rome who remembered a world which did not contain Romulus. On the other hand, the period between his death/disappearance and the appointment of Numa Pompilius as the next king of Rome was the time of panic, of complete decomposition of life, and of complete uncertainty. People were used to the idea that whatever needs to be done and how people need to live comes from Romulus. With the ubiquitous Romulus now gone, everything appeared in flux and nothing looked reassuring. For Titto Livio, this was the first interregnum.

However, sometime in the late 1920s or early 1930s of the last century, Antonio Gramsci gave a different twist to the concept of interregnum in one of the prison notebooks he produced during his long incarceration in the Turi prison when he noted: ‘‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” In the new articulation, Gramsci infused the concept of interregnum with a new meaning, embracing a wider spectrum of the socio-political-legal order, while simultaneously reaching deeper into the socio-cultural condition. According to Gramsci’s new usage, interregnum is a situation in which the old ways of doing things do not work any longer, but new ways of doing things have not yet been designed and put in place.

Detaching the idea of interregnum from its habitual association with the interlude of transmission of hereditary or electable power, Bauman argues that Gramsci attached it to the extraordinary situations in which the extant legal frame of social order loses its grip and can hold no longer, whereas a new frame, made to the measure of newly emerged conditions responsible for making the old frame useless, is still at the designing stage, has not yet been fully assembled, or is not strong enough to be put in its place.

I contend that the current political crisis in Ethiopia can best be described as the condition of interregnum. For a keen observer of the current Ethiopian political debacle, it is increasingly becoming clear that the condition cannot be sufficiently explained away as a usual political hiccup that can effectively be dealt with through routine measures. Far from technical and administrative, the crisis is of systemic and structural in nature that requires serious systemic and structural change, which means that the current system is showing serious pathological signs and becoming obsolete as to be able to effectively respond to the exigency of the time. In other words, as posited by Gramsci, ‘the old is dying.’ In order to make sense of how we got here, however, it is important to briefly recapitulate the trajectory of this system that is fast turning into decay and obsolescence.

It is to be recalled that the demise of the military regime was brought about through a protracted armed struggle spearheaded by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Reconstituting itself under the umbrella of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the TPLF-led EPRDF assumed control of power, ushering in a new political dispensation in 1991. In line with the demands of the new global order reshaped by the West following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the EPRDF government positioned itself (at least in form) as the champion of multi-party democracy and accepted market liberalization and reforms called for by what is infamously known as the Washington Consensus. It restructured the Ethiopian state by adopting a federal system that gave premium to ethno-linguistic cleavages. Thus, in the new political dispensation, ethnicity became the primary mechanism through which access to power and resources was to be mediated. Notwithstanding a vociferous opposition from a segment of the society, there was obviously a significant segment of the society that was willing to go with the ‘flow’ for at least two reasons. First, the issue of national self-determination had for long been popular among the elites of the various ethno-linguistic groups who saw the new political order as an important step in addressing this very question that had eluded the previous Ethiopian regimes. Second, most people saw the new order as fait accompli and were willing to give it the benefit of the doubt.

The EPRDF feverishly promoted its image as the government of the marginalized, the oppressed, the downtrodden and the underdogs; it promised that it would bring into the center the various ethnic groups that had hitherto been condemned to the political and economic peripheries by empowering them to manage their own affairs and take charge of their own destiny. It cited the new constitution as the guarantor of such promises. At the time, such flowering rhetoric sounded like a soothing music to the ears of the various ethnic groups. To the disappointment of many, however, the euphoria did not last long. The new political dispensation being the outcome of an armed struggle rather than a democratic political mobilization, it was from the very beginning beset by asymmetrical power relations. As the armed struggle had been spearheaded by the TPLF, the political organizations that constituted the new governing coalition were themselves creatures which the TPLF brought into existence in anticipation of its impeding military victory. In other words, the new governing front (EPRDF) was constituted from the start by a coalition of unequals.

What made the situation even more absurd was the way the remaining five peripheral regional states were treated in the regime’s power calculus. As with the main coalition partners, the parties that would control these five regional states were organized along ethnic lines. However, the process of organizing such ethnic-based political parties that would ostensibly control their respective regional states was virtually controlled by the TPLF-led EPRDF. Although the EPRDF did not want the ethnic-based parties that would control these regional states to be part of its party structure, it shrewdly planned to use them as its proxies in exerting control of their respective regional states under the name of ‘allied parties.’ In the new political dispensation, it could therefore be argued that there were three hierarchical levels in the party power structure: the nucleus party (TPLF), the three parties in the governing coalition (ANDM, OPDO & SEPDM) and the allied parties that would ostensibly control the five peripheral regional states. Since both the parties in the governing coalition and in the ‘allied’ category owed their very existence to the nucleus party, their continued access to power and resources was predicated more on their loyalty and deference to the nucleus party than their loyalty to the constituencies they purportedly represented. It was clear from the very start that such built-in asymmetrical relations of power would have a detrimental impact on the evolution of a genuinely democratic order.

As witnessed in the subsequent years, despite its publicly expressed commitment to a democratic order, what has practically defined the regime’s behavior is what I call ‘victor mentality.’ There has been an unofficial but widely shared conviction among the members of the nucleus of the governing party that their organization had dearly paid in the removal of the military junta, and, hence, they were entitled to control the lever of power. The other members of the coalition tacitly accepted the claim without much fanfare. Elections were, thus, used as an instrument for legitimizing such sense of entitlement. As a result, elections became predictable and uneventful rituals designed to give credence to an otherwise autocratic political order in the eyes of the citizenry in general and the donor community in particular. On the ground, however, key political appointments and dismissals practically fell under the discretion of the victor rather than the will of the electorate, making the rhetoric of empowerment and self-governance ring hollow. When elections failed to serve such preconceived legitimizing role, they would cease to be anything of value to the regime as witnessed during the 2005 elections whose outcome was set to upset the status quo.

Following the political crisis in the aftermath of the 2005 general elections, the regime was aware that its duplicity and political chicanery with respect to instituting a genuine democratic order had been exposed for what it is and, hence, business as usual would no longer be tenable. In search of being relevant, it took a radical shift towards embracing a developmental politico-economic model where it thought it would base its legitimacy purely on economic performance while providing a lip-service to its commitment to democracy. Except its public pronouncement of the fact that its developmental model is tempered with democracy, the regime has not bothered itself much as to how the potential incompatibilities between the two could be reconciled. But what was obvious was that delivering a sustained economic growth was seen as a matter of life and death by the ruling elite. This new reorientation in turn necessitated stricter centralization of policymaking and political control although the administrative structure still remains decentralized. To the chagrin of its critics, the reforms that were initiated to this end have delivered an impressive economic growth for more than a decade (save the disputes over the officially endorsed growth figures) and contributed to observable expansions in social and infrastructural sectors.

However, the policy pursued and the economic ‘miracle’ registered also gave birth to another serious problem, i.e., it has contributed to the creation of an oligarchical power structure within the ruling elite; and such self-serving power structure runs from the center right to the peripheries. Being part of the oligarchical class and with the realization that their power did not primarily emanate from the ethnic group they purportedly represented but from their loyalty to their handlers and from playing their ‘cards’ well, ethnic political elites have increasingly turned despotic, engaging in corruptions and egregious abuse of power. But in as long as they remained subservient to the demands of their handlers and ‘behaved’ well in a manner reminiscent of Malcolm X’s characterization of the “house nigga,” the predatory behavior of the ethnic elites was not that much of a concern to those who controlled the structure of the oligarchy.

In order to obfuscate the matter, the regime tasked its propaganda machine with the responsibility of feverishly promoting the economic ‘miracle’ it has achieved and how it has predictably been taking the society to the ‘promised land.’ Intoxicated with its own narratives, the propaganda machine turned a blind eye to a critical scrutiny of its development discourse in terms of the breadth and depth of the claimed growth and its equitable distribution. It is no-brainer that owing to the low level of the initial starting point, no matter how much one would try to mask the reality with the narrative of double-digit growth, measured in absolute terms, the volume of the growth has obviously been very modest. More importantly, the much touted economic growth has not been widely shared among citizens. As noted earlier, political elites, party and party-affiliated enterprises, and politically well-connected individuals or groups have been the ones who have disproportionately benefited from the reported growth. For the broader section of the society, dreams have turned into nightmares, disillusionment has replaced hopes, and life has increasingly become unbearable. The phenomenon has further been exacerbated by the onset of the recent drought and the resultant food shortage that has affected millions of citizens.

On top of the democratic deficit, this glaring disconnect between the official discourse of economic growth or the Ethiopian renaissance, for that matter, and the lived experience of ordinary citizens across the ethnic divide has dramatically increased the rift between the regime and the citizens. The very economic model the regime hoped to be its last source of legitimacy has eventually lost its initial credence in the eyes of the citizenry. Now, the regime is left with neither electoral nor performance legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. Thus, the recent political crisis, though triggered by conjunctural factors, is mainly the result of the crisis of legitimacy of the politico-economic order.

According to Gramsci’s articulation, interregnum is a situation in which the old ways of doing things do not work any longer, but new ways of doing things have not yet been designed and put in place. In the meantime, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. As has been discussed above, the politico-economic order the EPRDF put in place following the demise of the military junta seems to have reached a point where it has lost its traction. As the continued popular protests and skirmishes indicate, citizens appear to have lost faith in the system and are unwilling to be governed in the old ways anymore. They are demanding fundamental change that is compatible with the exigencies of the time. On the other hand, a new frame that can effectively replace the dying structure has not yet been designed. As a result, in this time of great uncertainty and decomposition of life, we are observing the emergence of a great variety of morbid symptoms from different directions.

From the side of the system on the ropes, for example, despite the fact that there is an acknowledgement of government failures for the eruption of the protests, there is either a willful denial or a serious misreading of the fundamental causes of the crisis. From the perspective of the incumbent, the root cause of the political crisis has to do with lack of good governance- largely understood as the lack of efficient, transparent and accountable service delivery-, but denies that it has anything to do with macro-level structural and systemic issues. If service delivery were carried out efficiently, transparently and accountably, everything would be hunky-dory. In order to get to such a desired outcome, personnel or cabinet reshuffle in the manner of weeding out the ‘bad apples’ and bringing in a ‘new’ force with the ‘right’ knowledge and skills would be imperative. The problem with such a prescription is that it has been repeatedly tried in the past but with little or no breakthrough. And citizens are sick and tired of the already familiar failed mantra and worn out voodoo magic. They are looking for an overhaul of the system and not just the treatment of the symptoms. Amidst this, violence has continued unabated and the government has responded by declaring a state of emergency; it now seems that never the twain shall meet.

On the opposition side, there are bewildering cacophony of voices aired with regards to making sense of and charting the way out of the crisis. For some political groups that organized themselves along ethnic lines, the current crisis is attributable to the failure of the incumbent in strictly committing itself to its constitution which has categorically provided for the institution of a multiparty democracy and a federal system structured along ethnic lines. The way out of the crisis is removing a minority-controlled government and instituting a genuinely democratic system within the confines of ethnic based federal arrangement. For some other identity-based political groups, the crisis ought to be made sense of within a broader historical context where the current predicament can be explained as the continuation of the internal colonization of ethnic groups by the Abyssinian ruling class and, hence, the crisis can only be resolved by instituting a system that guarantees national self-determination. Other groups espouse the notion that the current minority regime is nothing but oppressive and exploitative regime that has taken a deliberately designed divide-and-rule policy as its insurance and thereby put the integrity of the Ethiopian state at risk. Hence, the only viable solution to the current debacle out to be predicated on an unwavering commitment to a genuinely democratic political order as well as to the maintenance of the integrity of the Ethiopian state. For those who advocate Ethiopian nationalism, identity-based political grouping is primarily responsible for the current mess we find ourselves in and, hence, we should turn away from such primordial conceptualization of ethnicity and its attendant identity and focus on supra-national and civic based Ethiopian identity. And in between these are opposition political groups (though could be taken as outliers) who prescribe constitutional monarchy as a remedy to the current ills all the way to those who recommend the disintegration of the Ethiopian state as a precondition for ensuring national self-determination.

Owing to such disparate and bewildering diagnoses of and prescriptions for the current crisis, the political opposition seems in a predicament akin to the condition of the descendants of Noah at Shinar who set to build the biblical tower of Babel but failed to build the structure because they could not understand each other as their language turned gibberish; and this affirms my central thesis that, as it stands now, Ethiopia appears to be in a state of interregnum.

The author is the former dean of the school of journalism and communication at Addis Ababa University and can be reached at: berhanwota@gmail.com

Jawar Mohammed on Amhara Resistance

“We have come to feel in Cairo, it is Europe or death!”

by Reuters

(This is part of a special report on the sinking of a migrant ship in April. Read it here: http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/migration/#story/60)

By Stephen Grey and Amina Ismail

CAIRO, Dec 6 (Reuters) – In Egypt, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been the target of bitter criticism and even violent protest this year.

Protests at the agency’s Cairo headquarters – including one man setting himself on fire – have been led by Oromos, the single biggest ethnic group in Ethiopia.

The Oromos say the UNHCR – which by agreement with the Egyptian government has responsibility for determining asylum applications in Egypt – has routinely rejected their asylum claims. The Oromos claim the UN agency has been hostile to their allegations of discrimination, persecution and even torture by the government of Ethiopia. Protests and a government crackdown in Ethiopia have left 140 (the government estimate) or 314 (Human Rights Watch) dead since July and pushed thousands of people to flee the country.

UNHCR said the criticism is unfounded. It conceded there had been delays to processing applications but said those were caused by a shortage of resources.

It was “absolutely not true to say we reject everyone,” said Tariq Argaz, a UNHCR spokesman.

Nevertheless, an increasing number of Oromos in Cairo have tried to get to Europe this year. Almost half of the estimated 150 Ethiopians who drowned in a sinking on April 9 joined the voyage straight from the UNHCR protest, according to relatives and survivors, who said the UN agency effectively pushed them to risk the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean.

“We have come to feel in Cairo, it is Europe or death!” said Arafat Abdulrahman, an Oromo who lost several friends in the April disaster. He set off for Italy himself and arrived safely in July.

SELF IMMOLATION

Muaz Mahmud, the Oromo migrant who lost his wife Duniya and their two-month-old baby in the shipwreck, is furious with the UN. “If our case had been taken seriously we would have waited for the UN to make a decision,” he said. “We wouldn’t have dared to leave. But we lost hope.”

Mahmud, 25, said he fled Ethiopia after being arrested for protesting. He said police had tortured him with electric shocks. “‘You don’t have the right to speak,'” he said they told him. “‘If you want to be silent and live silently, you go ahead and live silently.'”

Mohammed Seid, public relations director of Ethiopia’s Office for Government Communications Affairs, said no law-abiding citizens had reason to fear the government.

“Ethiopia is governed by rules,” he said. “Opposition activity that is not criminal in nature, or does not involve violence, is not illegal in Ethiopia.”

Seid said that Oromos who make it to Europe or the United States often lie to win asylum. “In their bid to find shelter, or be handed green cards, residency status or have their asylum bids accepted, any pretext is claimed,” he said. “But the main reason is economic … Traffickers lure them through false promises of easy wealth.”

In late April, UNHCR in Cairo agreed to work with Oromo groups to resolve the growing dispute there. But 40 or so refugees remained camped outside the agency’s office. In July, Getu Ayana, 26, doused himself with petrol and lit a match. Another migrant, Asli Nure, tried to put out the flames. Her clothes caught alight, and both died. According to other Oromos, the self-immolation was in protest at the high number of rejected asylum claims.

Argaz, the UNHCR spokesman, said staff helped get the two medical attention. He said every refugee application is treated on its merits and processed in a transparent and fair way.

Abdo Mohamed, chairman of the Oromo Sons Refugee Association in Cairo, said frustrations remains. “The UNHCR have promised to work on this issue but they are still rejecting people,” he said.

(Edited by Simon Robinson)

 by Hamaa Loolaa

Addis Abeba Dec. 07/2016 – It is now more than a year since the Oromo Protest for justice and democracy began in Ethiopia. It reverberated throughout Oromia and exposed the regime’s use of brutality to suppress and silence dissenting voices. But instead of waning, the struggle gained momentum when the Amhara youth in Gondar and Bahir Dar came out not only to demand justice for themselves but also carrying slogans asking the regime to stop the killings, arbitrary imprisonments, the torture and forced disappearances of  innocent Oromo civilians.

Such protest is not only the first of its kind to vehemently challenge the quarter century uncontested rule of the TPLF dominated EPRDF in Ethiopia, but also has significantly shifted the overall power balance, mindsets and political dynamics in the country.  It also inspired other peoples of Ethiopia to rise up for their rights and engaged all Oromo from east to west and from south to north irrespective of age, gender or religion. (The streets in Oromia were overwhelmed by hundreds of thousands of protesters including a 77-year-old grandmother who went out with her stick in a brave act of defiance against the regime’s brutality.)

Because the protest has, beyond its initial call against land dispossession, evolved into a struggle for freedom, a resistance against injustice, and a longing for a dignified life, no amount of force or of coercion was able to suppress it, let alone stop it. A year on, it is now safe to conclude that this nationwide protest has already planted itself in the hearts and minds of millions of oppressed people as the most significant event of the year.

The protests and the public debates that followed have also impacted others’ views on the long-standing plights of the Oromo and the Amhara, the two largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Prior to these protests hardly anyone understood, much less publicly recognized, the sacrifices paid by the Oromo and the Amhara to live a dignified life in their own country. Above all, it exposed how successive regimes in Ethiopia have marginalized, denied and robbed these two groups of their ability to develop and flourish as human beings in their own country.

What a demanding public exposed

Inspired by these protests, currently, Ethiopians all over the country are asking their government to protect and respect their economic, social and cultural rights as well as their civil and political rights. But at the same time, the government’s response is helping the people of Ethiopia to realize that it has almost no leadership capacity to respond to their demands. Ethiopians now see that their government is dysfunctional and its leadership in crisis; what exists and functions is a dissonant leadership that exacerbates conflict, driving the society into a downward spiral from frustration to resentment, and perpetuates antagonism and hostility.

Throughout the year, the ruling party has demonstrated no notable leadership capacity; not one political leader has spoken authentically to the hearts and the minds of the people in order to solve the common problem amicably. Instead of making an effort to lead through this crisis and face the challenge by creating an accommodating environment for all Ethiopians, the ruling party cliques have remained empty demagogues who keep on sending divisive messages and wielding their power by fear-mongering techniques.

Beyond the call for freedom and justice, the Oromo and Amhara protests, as well as the defiance in various parts of the country including from the people of Konso in the south and Tigray in the north, have exposed the truth about EPRDF’s leadership capacity, which was mystified by ‘*seventeen years of relentless struggle and tested leadership to defeat the largest military in Africa*’. It is now clear that it is nothing more than an empty ideological rhetoric and a means to frighten, belittle and silence people who ask difficult questions and challenge the system. But that doesn not mean than the rest of Ethiopians do not recognize and appreciate the sacrifices and the agony the Tigray people have paid for seventeen years to oust the military dictatorship. However, it is not hard to see that the TPLF, which was born out of this struggle and had led this protracted war to victory, and the regime it dominates, have turned out to be an authoritarian regime.

There for good or bad

 Although the yearlong nationwide protests led by the Oromo and the Amhara, as well as others to various degrees, have exposed the regime’s inability to bring in meaningful political leadership, for good or bad, the TPLF dominated EPRDF is the government in power which, for now, will determine the course of actions to respond to the current struggle for justice and democracy.

There is a possibility that the TPLF dominated EPRDF might take one of the following two courses of actions. Both have a potential to direct or misdirect the current call for democracy and justice in two mutually exclusive directions.

First course of action: road to democratization and peace

The first direction and course of action the TPLF dominated EPRDF may consider is the road to democracy and sustainable peace. However, reversing the current dire political condition and responding to the needs of the people requires it to recognize and understand the need for change; it requires embracing the change and transformation the people want to realize through a democratic process.

Hard as it may be, the following course of actions should precede any other course of action to start the democratization process.

Restore the constitution – build trust and confidence of citizens around the constitution by making it a practical document. Arguably, this means the regime itself should begin respecting the constitution and lead by example.

Scrap laws and policies which are against the constitution and which prevent citizens from exercising their democratic rights enshrined in the constitution. These include, but not limited to, scrapping the Anti-Terrorism Law, which is so far mainly used to silence citizens and violate their rights than persecute suspected terrorists; amending the draconian press law, which is so far used to violate citizens’ right to freedom of expression and access to information; scrapping the Civil Society and Charities Law, which is prohibiting the growth of independent civil society organizations which are the pillars of non-state actors in the development of democracy and human rights in the country.

Release all political prisoners unconditionally.  Obviously, once the laws and procedures, which often undermine the constitution, are lifted there is no reason to keep people in prison.

Reform, among others, the justice system, the police, security forces and prison administrations as well as the election board, the anti-corruption commission, the human rights commission, and the state-controlled media.

Possible impact

 The ruling party would lose nothing for taking this revolutionary action. In fact, it would help it to breath; to objectively address its current leadership crisis and reemerge as a legitimate political force. It would also provide it with the opportunity to think strategically.

Change is a natural state, which we cannot completely control or make predictable.  It is overwhelming and chaotic, but rewarding at the end. The most important step to start the process of change is by being bold, letting go of the old and rigid ways of thinking and governing. The regime in Ethiopia has to come out of its fear of change and see the bigger picture; it should relax its grips on old practices, which did not contribute to its own growth or to that of the rest of the country for the last 25 years.

There is no question that by taking such bold actions, the TPLF dominated EPRDF has a comparative advantage over other political groupings currently operating in the country. As it has shown in the past it can rehabilitate itself quicker than others and appear as a viable political organization in the years to come.

Above all, this action ensures the continuity of the democratization processes by engaging citizens to determine their own future and relieves the existing state-citizen tensions. If this is done, the healing process, as well as the peace and reconciliation process will be relatively easier.  Ultimately, this approach also guarantees the existence and continuity of Ethiopia as a nation home to all its citizens.

Implications for a protesting nation

This peaceful democratization process can bring change and transformation to the people of Ethiopia in general and the Oromo in particular, who are the largest ethnic group in the country and have been the driving force of the nationwide protests. As a result, the Oromo struggle for democracy and justice might fall under one of the following two scenarios.

First is the scenario in which Oromo elites, by the virtue of being a middle class, by affiliation to any Oromo-related organization, or by their prior personal experience come together and create a consortium, a democratic front, or a party to lead a meaningful struggle. This may, in turn, render irrelevant disorganized struggles, which often hamper or even take hostage the Oromo struggle for freedom and justice.

The physical and emotional separation and distance of the Oromo elites from the struggle on the ground may at times prevent them from sensing and living the struggle itself. Unless the democratic process on the ground creates room to accommodate all dissenting voices both from within and abroad, those who have the leadership capacity and the necessary political know-how cannot provide adaptive leadership or have the empathetic capacity to connect to the mass, particularly with the young generation that is both leading and shouldering the brunt of the struggle.

The second is a scenario in which the need to phase out the old and replace it with the new thinking and political organization both within the country and abroad takes precedence.  The Oromo Protest and the current awakening is a painful form of labor to give birth to a new dynamic and profound political organization fit for the 21st century.

For this new Oromo organization to be born and to become the vanguard of the struggle, all old Oromo organizations, which were and still are trying to contribute under different names and ideologies, have to die a natural death and give way to new thinking and new possibilities. The new will have the energy and capacity to unify and transform the Oromo to a higher level and lead the struggle to victory. Like the TPLF, all Oromo organizations which existed for decades and have tried to contribute, albeit less successfully, have reached their maximum limit and are in need of reform.

The struggle between the old and the new is natural – even our cells are continually dying and being reborn. The Safu value, which is unique to Oromo culture and psyche, reaffirms this natural process, which urges the old to peacefully pass the scepter to the new.

Qeerro, the emboldened youth (as the name implies) is currently filling the leadership gap and taking the responsibility of leading the resistance against the current government, even as they are met with brutal responses. The Qeerro is successful in amplifying the struggle to all corners of Oromia and beyond, as well as inspiring all Oromos irrespective of age, religion, gender, class and locality. It has also unified the Oromo under the motto of ‘Tokkummaa’ (oneness or unity) and the ‘Say No’ or ‘Diidnee’ slogan.

Above all, by flying the resistance flag (not the OLF flag) the Qeerro demonstrated that the flag is the sign of freedom for which all revolutionary Oromos sacrificed their lives even long before OLF was created. It has raised this flag because it embodies hope and reminds all Oromos about those beautiful young people who died flying it.  Therefore, to lead the struggle to its final destination, the current Qeerro movement is in the stage of development to come out with the new leadership and organization from within its rank and file. Many think that Qeerro is just the network of youth from colleges, high schools, and elementary schools who are just driven by social media. But the fact is there are engineers, professors, medical doctors, businesspeople, and other professionals who are part of the rank and file of the Qeerro.

When the situation is ripe and there is a favorable political environment, the Qeerro can easily transform into a political organization. It is this organization and leadership of the Oromo which can navigate the ship towards freedom through the storm and onto its final destination. It is time this passion gets a new leadership it deserves.

Status quo: The second course of action for TPLF/EPRDF

The above scenario is in the event that the ruling party takes the course to democratize through reform. The second course of action is about maintaining the status quo. But it is a dangerous choice; a choice of war. It is about TPLF/EPRDF refusing to bring change from within itself and the country as a whole.

This is also a choice that looks for easy answers; but it is not the easy way out of the current quagmire. It is easy because it does not require critical thinking and having difficult conversations.  This course of action is a decision to repress and silence the current cry for democracy and human rights through the barrel of the gun. It is about war and involving its armed force, intelligence, federal police and militia in the internal issues of the country to brutally suppress the uprising. By doing so, it will only intensify the conflict to a higher level and bring human and property losses to the level the country and the people of Ethiopia can no longer endure.

Unfortunately, this is what we are witnessing today; military forces killing, arresting and torturing citizens on behalf of a regime in power. The impending consequence is that they will never be regarded as a national army delegated to protect the constitution, and will be labeled only as the enemy of the people.

In addition to its military solution to the conflict, TPLF/EPRDF is getting into its age-old habit of manipulating and drawing other nations and nationalities into a civil war; perpetuate religious conflict in different places by pitting one religion against the other; and create conflicts between rural people/farmers and urban dwellers. But it should be known that this will benefit no one, including the ruling party itself.

What is next?

Inspired by the yearlong Oromo and Amhara protests the rest of Ethiopians have made it loud and clear that they need a fundamental change; they have been saying so for 25 years, too. Ethiopians have tried with all their might and used every means possible to make their voices heard and have time and again proclaimed a moment of reckoning for a paradigm shift. Alas, instead of objectively and purposefully responding to this popular demand, the government is stuck into its old tactics of blaming, accusing, and intimidating people.

Now in a frantic act to quell and pacify the protests and silence the voices of the oppressed, in October this year the government declared a state of emergency for six months. However, the state of emergency is doing more harm than good and its implementation is driving millions to the edge of bitterness. The sooner the ruling party realizes that such techniques are only good to temporarily pacify rising public demands, the better. The only road to bring lasting solution is the road that begins by protecting the constitution and striving to build a democratic country with respect for human rights and the rule of law. This is also true for opposition political organizations, which are operating both in the country and abroad.

The underlying cause for the current protest and uprising is the struggle between the old and the new. The old is trying to do everything in its capacity to extend its life while the new is striving to shape and realize the new world it is envisioning.

For the good of all, the old (self and system) has to be courageous enough to accept and let go of its old organization, thinking, and power; it has to accept the inevitable.

The people of Ethiopia in general and the Oromo youth in particular, are determined to leave the past behind and move forward. They don’t want to be chained to and distracted by the past, which contributes less for the wellbeing of today and humanity of tomorrow.

Only when the old gives way to the new do citizens develop trust and confidence in a political system and themselves to take the responsibility of contributing to a democratic society and prosperous nation.

I therefore find it outrageous that the TPLF/EPRDF arrested Dr. Merera under the most shameful pretext of attending a conference sponsored by the European Parliament and for expressing his views on the human atrocities taking place in the country he loves and the society he served for numerous decades. Unlike many of us who left Ethiopia, Dr. Merera stayed and fought back a system that has learned nothing from the fall of previous dictatorships in Ethiopia. Rightly, his arrest has generated global outrage and demands for his immediate release.

In a statement on December 1, 2016, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL said this:

“The arrest of Merera Gudina is an outrageous assault on the right to freedom of expression and should sound alarm bells for anyone with an interest in ending the deadly protests that have rocked Ethiopia over the past year. This is a move that will exacerbate, rather than ease, the underlying tensions currently simmering in the country. Instead of resorting to further repression and clamp-downs, the Ethiopian government must urgently and meaningfully address the human rights grievances that are fueling unrest.”

On December 2, 2016, the Washington Post reported that “A top opposition politician from Ethiopia’s Oromo ethnic group who criticized the country’s state of emergency at the European Parliament has been arrested…Police arrested Merera Gudina and three others in Addis Ababa late Wednesday shortly after his return from Brussels.” Why? Dr. Merera criticized the Ethiopian regime for arresting “tens of thousands” under the pretext of a State of Emergency. This State of Emergency is nothing less than a “license to kill, wound, maim, arrest.” Estimates of arrests range from a low of 20,000 to a high of 60,000 Ethiopians in the Amhara and Oromo regions alone. At least 700 innocent lives have been lost; and tens of thousands have been “forced to disappear.” More than 130 jails have been filled with political prisoners; and an undeclared “civil war” is raging in Gondar, Wollo and Gojjam. Sadly, this is likely to expand over the coming months.

The regime’s real motive and excuse for arresting Dr. Merera is that he “communicated with banned terrorist organizations.” By all measurements, any person or group that opposes the TPLF controlled regime is an enemy of the party, state, government and Constitution; and is therefore a terrorist. Any person who attends a conference with others accused of terrorism is equally an enemy; and therefore a terrorist. Think of this. Anyone who opposes the regime is a terrorist. By definition the vast majority of Ethiopians are terrorists.

The arrest of Dr. Merera epitomizes the severity of Ethiopia’s problems and deepens them further. The more people the regime arrests, the greater the chances of a country-wide resistance. This is because the regime has closed all peaceful dissent and political space.

I call on the global community, especially the European Union and European Parliament as well as the United States to be bolder; and to stop shoring up one of the most hated regimes on the planet.

Equally, it is time for Ethiopian opposition groups to set aside their differences, unify their resources and force the dictatorial regime to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible.

Last but not least, I join all those who demand the immediate release of Dr. Merera and other political prisoners.

Alemneh Wasie Awaze News— Donald Trump TIME Person of the Year

ESAT Daily News Amsterdam December 07,2016

To Your Excellency, Hailemariam Desalegn, the Prime minister of Ethiopia

Your Excellency,

Few months ago, I heard you saying “the government [Ethiopian] wants to reform an electoral system which has excluded the opposition.”  You also claimed that your collision party, EPRDF has received 51% of the overall votes in all 9 states (Kilil). If you had only 51% of the overall vote, why we didn’t see some opposition members sitting in the parliament after the last election? Your intention of “…reforming the electoral system so the voices of those who are not represented can also be heard in the parliament” looks at least sarcastic if not joke. No doubt, the voices of those who are not in the parliament now would have been heard there if they had opportunity to convert the remaining 49% in winning spree, given fair and square environment to compete. According to your statement, “Because of this electoral system 51 percent of the overall vote is enough to win across the board.”  I remember that you were standing next to the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel who was listening.  Believe me or not, I was wondering what she was thinking when hearing these statements. She knows how difficult winning is and what 51% means as she had a slim majority in her Bundestag of Germany (a national German’s parliament). In the 2013 national election, Chancellor Merkel’s sister parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria, won 311(49.4%) of the 630 parliament’s seats with 45.3% of the popular vote. Eventually, the Chancellor has to find a partner party since she was short of majority seats by her own party. If the elections are fair and square, with binary outcomes such that you win or lose (assuming existence of some opposing parties to compete), the percentage of your parliament seats shouldn’t be far from the percentage of the popular votes your party won.  As the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree, the percentages of the popular votes shouldn’t be far from the percentage of the parliament seats. I am not taking it lightly when I say the percentage of seats you won cannot be far from the percentage of the popular vote you claim; I really meant mathematically impossible.

Your Excellency,

As you know, numbers don’t lie. Unlike politics, you can’t twist numbers, change or amend the outcomes. For any given input, there is output that is pretty much known. Before completing your Bachelor in Civil Engineering at AAU, I assumed that you had at least a course in probability (there was before); and if that is the case, I hate to preach the choir about probability. The probability of receiving 100 % of the seats in Ethiopian parliament with 51% popular vote is next to zero; unless the election is rigged, unfair or no opposition showed up in almost all 547 districts of representative. To make things very simple, if you had 51% popular vote on the average, the probability of your winning a seat in any of the 547 districts of representative is 0.51, and the probability of losing a seat is 0.49. That said, the probability of winning all 547 seats of the House of People Representatives is the same as multiplying 0.51 by itself 547 times or equivalently, (0.51)⁵⁴⁷  ≈ 0, a very small number. To make it much understandable, let me take in to consideration, a higher probability of winning a district, say 90% of the popular vote; however, sweeping all the parliamentary seats is impossible. The probability of winning all is the same as multiplying 0.9 by itself 547 times or in mathematical term, (0.9)⁵⁴⁷ = 0.00000000000000000000000009347, a very small chance. Let me put it this way; winning the American Powerball jackpot lottery back-to-back for three times has approximately the same odds of winning all the parliamentary seats in Ethiopia with 90% chance of winning a seat (popular votes).  Winning all seats can happen only if your government manipulates the boundaries (gerrymandering) of all the 547 districts of the country by favoring your desired outcome. I think you got the idea. For the sake of argument, let me think of a scenario where there was no opposing party in half of the districts. That is a possible scenario in a country where political opponents have difficulties to campaign freely or have limitation on needed resources. Under such scenario, let us say you were the sole political entity to campaign around and win half seats without opposition and that is about 273 seats. Similarly, let us agree the remaining half seats were allocated after fierce but fair competition between you and the oppositions. If I take your words on the popular votes at 51% for EPRDF and allies, then you are expected to win another 140 seats, about 413 seats altogether.  That left about 133 seats for opposition and where is it?  EPRDF’s attempt to convince the world on sweeping all seats of the parliament with 51% popular votes is an absolute lie; but, numbers never lie. Legitimately, the probability of achieving 100% parliamentary seats is very hard in not impossible. Really impossible! Even by relaxing the chance of winning the popular votes to 90%, the probability of sweeping the 273 seats (half the parliament) is not much better than zero, with actual probability of only 0.0000000000003223. To make comparison, the odds of winning the Powerball jackpot is 1 in 292 million (the probability of winning the Powerball is 0.000000003425); winning the lottery has about ten thousand times better chance than sweeping the 273 (half of all) seats for EPRDF. Mathematically, it is not as easy as usual politics. A statement that says “we had 100% of the parliamentary seats with 51% of the popular votes” is difficult to support mathematically. Especially, in a place where the election was far from fairness, which as full of intimidations and jam-packed with harassments, this statement has no merit. This should be the fact on the ground as numbers never lie.

Prime Minister Hailemariam,

I am not politician nor I would like to be one; I am a math junkie who has a problem to sit down and watch when numbers are twisted and misused to gain political scores. Yes, politician love to use numbers to misinterpret outcomes and show rosy results and that is fine. But, I have never seen numbers being twisted to the extent you contradicted yourself in a single event.  I don’t understand why you wanted to reform the current electoral system that we haven’t gotten a chance to test. Frankly speaking, on the paper, I don’t even see a problem with the current electoral system, which is pretty much consistent with the idea of “majority rule”, a fair system if minorities have a room to exercise their constitutional rights. The German Chancellor, who stood next to you, was elected to become a Chancellor based on a system that embraces “majority rule”. In Ethiopia, the problem is not the electoral system; the problem is the systematic process instituted just to exclude all others who are against your political philosophy. Before boarding the EPRDF’s wagon late in the game, I believe you took your time to analyze and study the good, the bad and the ugly of this party. You never dragged into the party as adolescent, when adventure overtakes a rational thinking nor as a “cool thing” that worthwhile to join pressured by friends. I think you took your time by slicing and dicing the ups and the downs of being part of such political crowds. If you joined the crowd, with the goal of doing the right thing whenever you get a chance, that day has been arrived long ago! Although I am far away from Ethiopia, I have witnessed through time that the EPRDF is intolerant with thin-skinned senior leaders. Since its inception, your front has never been known as open and inclusive, rather it known to hunt down and destroy its adversaries with no room for alternative idea. The deep-rooted belief of “my way or the highway” may take us back to Tigray, the place where hundreds of other Ethiopians were slaughtered because either they were different or they were against ethnocentrism ideology of the front. That was then and I sure we are willing to forget and forgive if things go the right way. You are now in the driver’s seat and you are expected to change the “old boys’ club” and maneuver the country away from the systematic oppression and hidden inequality. Save the people from favoritism, nepotism and the sick practice that reveals some as more equals than others in their own country! Be smart and win the people’s heart by peaceful means; look around and learn from the past. Perhaps, I suggest you go back to the drawing board and try to undo what has been done in 2015 election, a fair and square election that encompasses all. You need to invite fellow Ethiopian with open arms to let them participate in the country’s political process today, not tomorrow. Ethiopia has to be for all Ethiopian, a land for all her citizens, with full right to reside anywhere in the country, with the right to coexist peacefully respecting each other. That is a birth right that cannot be negotiated! Period!! I am sure you know how unfair the past election was, but it is up to you to correct the future. I don’t want to see the country slowly or abruptly sliding into chaos, violence and civil unrest. Believe it or not, no one will come out of that as a winner, rather all lose. It doesn’t take an aerospace engineer to understand that violence is a bad game that has no winner. We witnessed what has happened to other nations in Africa, Mideast and Europe; we have seen nations that are languishing in wars with no end in sight. When it comes to our, enough is enough! We were busy fighting each other for hundreds of years, as a result, we have very little to show the world as compared to our existence on the land. If you realize, our history has been war and violence, artifacts and civilization erected by a predecessor destroyed and eradicated by incoming powerful successor.

It is up to you, the prime minister of the country to change course and calm the anger of the people.  There has been too much of greed taking over the country, there are too much of selfishness and corruption that has been blown up under EPRDF and on your watch. The country has become a land of the selected few, who have the means to send their children abroad for primary schooling whereas; millions of others work harder in the same country just to get by. Today, many Ethiopian are left out or left behind as year-to-year dependent of foreign aids. I think we can do better! We lost our pride then now our humanity. Thanks to the EPRDF for skewing the wealth distribution towards few elites, favoring its cronies and ignoring the vast majority. That has to change today.

Prime Minister Hailemariam,

Your political organization alone has been in power for the past 25 years, now it is time to try something new. Change has to come to Ethiopia without killing more and without killing each other. The people have suffered a lot with more poverty today than it has been 25 years ago. As it has many milliners if not billionaires, Ethiopia also has more people without basic needs now than ever before.  The Gross Domestic Product growth that you are bragging about day-in and day-out is a rosy picture that looks nice from distance. But, who is growing, who is benefiting?  And who is losing? Please take your time to look around and answer them for yourself. Nowadays, millions of Ethiopians are spectators (YEBEYI TEMELKACH) of the few others. Millions have difficulties to survive in a place they were born; others chose to take their chance with the Mediterranean sharks, although getting to the sea is not an easy task. Whether we like it or not, the fate of this country is determined by its people and you have a chance to facilitate that now by starting a peaceful transition of power, which belongs to the people of Ethiopia. It is up to you to make it or break it, but the latter has a devastating consequences. The choice is yours, either you follow the footsteps of your predecessor and drag the country into a sea of violence or you do the right thing and make Ethiopia a shining city on the hill. If Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia can do it so can you! I think Americans appreciate George Washington not because of his first presidency, rather for his will to transfer power without a single bullet. It is not too late be the first George Washington of Ethiopia!!!!

It is time to reclaim Ethiopia for all of us

I, for one, will not stand by as the country we call home is tossed to and fro in the ethnic or sectarian battlefield of the ambitions and interests of a few vying groups. The competition— rather than cooperation—continues until whomever comes out on top takes over to dominate in a recycling of dysfunction that has been repeated again and again in Ethiopia. 

Once in power, that ethnic or sectarian group suddenly wants to claim leadership over the same Ethiopia they had rejected and over the same Ethiopian people who had been forgotten or devalued during their own struggle for power.

Why do we, the people of Ethiopia, continue to repeat the same mistakes— repeatedly? Is it habit, tradition, fear, deception, intimidation, ignorance, selfishness or ambition that drives Ethiopians to continually form their own sectarian huddles, perpetually leaving others out, including those they claim to represent? 

As always, it distracts attention away from the most important issues and changes the focus to the actions and reactions of different stakeholders. In the process, the nation as a whole is forgotten. I assert, it is time to learn from our mistakes. It is time to use this conflict to transform our nation and future rather than to allow ourselves to be set-up for failure once again.

The Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia (SMNE) was formed in 2008 for exactly this reason. There was a lack of inclusion and a disregard for the rights, security and well being of all. Instead, all of us were fighting for ourselves in our own season of need. When this became clear, the SMNE chose to transition from an ethnic-based worldview to one that embraced all Ethiopians as our fellow people, all created in the image of God and of value.

We believed by caring about our neighbors as we cared about our own concerns— as individuals, communities or regions—that we would create the best foundation to achieve the hopes and dreams of Ethiopians from every corner of the country. Since that time, we have been talking about this and acting on it to the best of our ability; yet, we are now witnessing a resurgence in tribal aspirations at the cost of sacrificing bigger and more lasting goals for our country. I cannot be silent.

Ethiopia is the land we all call home and it is a good land. It has great beauty and bountiful resources, but in this land there now live nearly a hundred million people, most of them vulnerable to the crisis before us. We cannot ignore their needs. 

How many Ethiopians still believe that ethnic-based political movements, struggles or ambitions will improve the lives of those outside one’s own collective group? I believe the majority do not; instead, they have seen the tendency among such group to exploit and repress others to their own advantage. We need moral leadership and vision for our country to break this self-destructive cycle without destroying the country in the process.

To reclaim Ethiopia for all, we must reclaim the humanity of others. Are we strong enough to stand against the pressure of tribe when our own ethnic groups condemn us for affirming the rights and value of others outside our own group? This kind of pressure is being strongly exerted within many ethnic groups, despite the fact that I hear from many of these same Ethiopians that they object to tribal politics. Instead, they want to see an Ethiopia where the rights and worth of all its people are upheld; yet, when they are among their own ethnic groups, they are afraid of saying it publicly for fear of condemnation and ostracism.

We must each other to be bold or those intimidating us will win, but in doing so, we all will lose. We also might be pleasantly surprised by the increasing numbers of people who are ready to discard ethnic-based politics, like the TPLF experiment of ethnic federalism, as a destructive and failed policy. 

In light of this, how do we form a common vision for all Ethiopians in the face of extreme peer, political or tribal pressure to follow the party line rather than one’s conscience or logic? The problem is worsened during times of fear when people return to their ethnic-based enclaves for security, acceptance, comfort and protection, thinking that their ethnic groups are the best defense against others. It is especially evident when new groups form in a fear-based or competitive reaction to another group’s loudly proclaimed ethnic agenda. Such actions contribute to instability because no one owns the country or stands up for the broader interests of all the people.

Why is it that Ethiopians, who have lived together for millenniums, continue in this day of age to retreat to narrow agendas when it is a common vision that is most urgently needed to protect their own interests and those of their descendants? Instead, we need an alternative path to a better future for all Ethiopians. How do we reclaim Ethiopia as our shared home? How do we institutionalize the effort to improve the security, wellbeing and justice of all our citizens? What if the interests of these Ethiopians were defended across lines of ethnicity, viewpoint, socio-economic class, disability, age, gender, associations, education, religious belief or regional background? To achieve this will require an organized strategy for development and implementation.

The lack of international support and the lack of interest by the non-involved majority of Ethiopians in this struggle points to our failure to form a non-tribal, inclusive and viable alternative to the TPLF/EPRDF. Until they believe something better can be achieved, their lack of involvement or support will most likely continue. It is time to build such a foundation; not to please foreigners, but to establish a stronger, more institutionalized infrastructure for the genuine transformation of Ethiopia.

This is why the SMNE will move from its primary work in advocacy and activism to a different stage where the primary goal will be to form an alternative platform. This platform would give direction in the development of better, more just and more inclusive governance in the future that would not be based on ethnicity or narrow sectarianism, but on principles of putting humanity before ethnicity or other differences; and secondly, caring about the well being of all Ethiopians, not only because it is right, but also because no one will be free until all are free.

May God help us to avoid repeating our mistakes that have led to such suffering, death and pain because our leaders, and sometimes ourselves as well, have failed to embrace the humanity of all of us. We should not be rivals nor should we be held captive by past grievances; but instead, we must seek healing, reconciliation and justice as a path to genuine unity with our fellow Ethiopian brothers and sisters. May God awaken our hearts for such an Ethiopia. Long Live Ethiopia!

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For more information, contact Obang Metho, Executive Director of the SMNE.  Email: Obang@solidaritymovement.org

State of emergency restores calm but fissures remain in fragile federation

James Jeffrey in Addis Ababa

No longer are bands of young men marauding on the outskirts of the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, trying to set fire to foreign-owned factories. Nearly two months into Ethiopia’s six-month state of emergency, it appears to be having the desired effect: protests rocking its two most populous regions have subsided.

It remains to be seen, though, whether this is the beginning of a sustained period of calm or a temporary break in the most persistent and widespread protests this country has seen since the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ruling party came to power following a revolution in 1991.

At that crucial juncture Ethiopia embarked hopefully on a struggle to emerge in the modern world on its own terms. It succeeded in doing so by employing a unique political model that is “an alloy of revolutionary theories, pragmatic neoliberalism and intrinsically Ethiopian customary practices”, says historian and long-term Horn of Africa expert Gérard Prunier.

While that political experiment has brought significant economic growth to the country, many claim it has failed the Ethiopian people, who are now voicing that fact.

“This government came into being with the support of the rural poor,” says Abebe Hailu, a human rights lawyer who was in college during the student movement that precipitated the 1974 downfall of emperor Haile Selassie, and who lived through the ensuing military dictatorship that eventually fell in 1991 to the rebel-founders of the EPRDF. “Now it is the rural poor that is against them– this is the irony,” he says.

When Ethiopian marathon runner Feyisa Lilesa crossed the finishing line in the Rio Olympics in August he crossed his forearms above his head in a widely adopted gesture to protest his government’s violent crackdown on ethnic protests seething since November 2015, leaving upwards of 600 dead, according to rights groups.

Those protests went against the grain of Ethiopia’s hermetic history, which has long seen numerous uprisings dealt with internally, away from prying eyes.

Ethiopia has long been a land of contradictions. On the one hand, the EPRDF has the most impressive economic and development-driven track record of any Ethiopian government in modern history.

But set against that, during the past two decades it has shunned diversity of political opinion, repeatedly cracking down on opposition parties, putting their politicians in jail or forcing them into exile. The 2015 election produced a parliament without a single opposition representative. Freedom of expression in Ethiopia is strictly curtailed, and as a result an independent civil society no longer exists.

At the same time, Ethiopia’s citizenry is increasingly angry at seemingly never-ending government corruption, while a mushrooming youthful population means the number of young unemployed men across the country irrevocably rises. Many sit idly on streets, their thoughts and frustrations turning toward the centre of power that is Addis Ababa.

“The immediate causes for the various groups protesting are different but they have the same demands: deliver the right kind of leadership,” says Yilikal Getenet, chairman of the opposition Blue Party.

Ethiopia’s smouldering majority

Initially months of protests remained largely within the Oromia region, home to Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo, constituting about 35 percent of the country’s nearly 100 million population.

But then in August violence broke out among the Amhara –at 27 per cent, Ethiopia’s second largest ethnic group – in northern Ethiopia’s famed city of Gondar, a popular tourist attraction because of its ancient castles.

Violence even came to the usually serene lakeside Amhara town of Bahir Dar, another popular tourist destination and weekend getaway known for its palm-lined avenues and island monasteries. An initially peaceful anti-government demonstration there on August 7th escalated to violence after a security guard fire into a crowd, leaving at least 30 gunned down by security forces.

At the same time as the Amhara protests, co-ordinated demonstrations occurred in more than nine towns in Oromia, resulting in about 100 deaths, according to Human Rights Watch.

The most recent tragedy came a week before the state-of-emergency declaration on October 9th, when more than 100 people drowned or were crushed to death during a stampede following clashes between police and protesters at a traditional annual Oromo festival at the volcanic lake town of Bishoftu, about 50km southeast of the capital.

Together the Oromo and Amhara represent more than 60 per cent of Ethiopia’s population, hence their resentment of an EPRDF perceived as having been usurped for 25 years by one of its key founding entities, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is drawn from an ethnic group that makes up only 6 per cent of the population, and which in addition to government dominates business and the security services.

“The TPLF has manipulated the multi-ethnic federation to divide and rule forever,” says Birhanu Lenjiso, an Ethiopian research fellow at Radboud University in the Netherlands. “The people are now asking for genuine multi-ethnic federation in the country.”

Addis Ababa, the hub of political power and the engine of Ethiopia’s economy, which exists as an autonomous city state within the federation, is surrounded by Oromia. Overall, the city has remained relatively cocooned from the tumult. But that hasn’t stopped some talking of its iconic Meskal Square in the heart of the city waiting to serve as its Tiananmen Square.

Comeback kid stumbles

Ethiopia has long been a development darling in the eyes of the international body politic. After the world was shaken by images of Ethiopian famine in 1984, the country turned around its fiscal fortunes and it now has one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

Against the abject failure of international assistance in Somalia, Ethiopia is often held up as a heartening example of indigenous government and international partners succeeding in reducing poverty and mortality rates.

But many critics say the statistics that have wowed the international community have hidden the more complex reality in which most Ethiopians, while not as susceptible as in the past to famine and disease, are still utterly stifled in their lives’ endeavours.

“The oppressed stay silent but eventually you reach a critical mass and then it boils over,” Yilikal says. “Hundreds have been killed but they keep protesting. They go to protests knowing the risks. So what does that tell you?”

Ethiopia, famously described by historian Edward Gibbon as the country that slept a thousand years while the world ignored it, has now firmly plugged itself into the global network. Satellite dishes dotted all over residential areas in towns and cities beam in news from around the world– including from Ethiopian diaspora news channels that are potently anti-government – while mobile phone ownership and access to the internet follow a steep upward curve.

“More than 50 per cent of the Ethiopian population was born under this government,” says Robert Wiren, a French journalist writing about the Horn of Africa for the last 15 years. “This young population does not compare the present system with its predecessors but receives news from abroad which contradicts the governmental rhetoric. People in the street know that journalists and opponents are jailed, that the security forces kill demonstrators. There is a real danger of ethnic hatred against the Tigrayans.”

Matters aren’t helped by the fact that wealth from the surging economic numbers has failed to trickle down to the vast majority of Ethiopians, who eke out the daily grind while wages stagnate, and inflation and living costs rise.

All the while, rank corruption results in a select few monopolising lucrative deals in the economy, to be then observed splashing out on oversized shiny pick-up trucks and drinking bottles of Black Label whiskey in the capital’s swanky new hotels, which seem to pop up daily.

“Since Ethiopia’s economic growth is due to a centralised driven process, a lot of non-Tigray people suspect the Tigray elite to be the only beneficiary of the economic boom,” Wiren says.

An Ethiopian never forgets

History always matters, but especially in Ethiopia, where people take the long view. Ethiopians cherish their history – one of the world’s oldest Christian traditions; the only African country that wasn’t colonised – and recall and tell the associated stories spanning the centuries; at the same time they remember the tragedies and atrocities committed among the country’s various ethnic groups, all of which exerts a powerful influence on the present.

“What’s happening [now] is a combination of everything: historical marginalisation and present marginalisation,” says Merera Gudina, chairman of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress Party. “It’s a revolt against minority rule and its policies.”

The EPRDF was preceded by two authoritarian centralised regimes: emperor Haile Selassie and then military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam. Both were viewed as Amhara-centric, and the federal constitution created by the EPRDF in 1991– and held by many, including critics of the government, as an effective fit for Ethiopia’s more than 80 ethnic groups – was meant to mitigate that fact, accommodating Ethiopia’s diversity and competing claims.

But from the start, the EPRDF has been criticised for allowing the TPLF to hog the limelight and power in the new Ethiopia that has existed since 1991.

“The TPLF has trapped itself by ethnicising political life without accepting a real autonomy for every regional state,” Wiren says. “It is an open secret that behind each regional state leader there is a kind of unofficial political supervisor.”

This style of governance has alienated especially the Amhara (who recall when they used to call the shots) and the Oromo (who feel they have always been excluded, first by the Amhara, and then by the Tigrayans).

“They only know how to talk, they never listen,” says one Addis Ababa resident. “You have a group of Tigrayans in government deciding the fate of 100 million people who aren’t allowed to say anything.”

Hobbled opposition

A major problem for the country’s protest movement is the lack of an organising body to guide it and of a central leadership to engage on its behalf with the EPRDF.

The political opposition in Ethiopia is in disarray. It has suffered and been weakened through government harassment, but has also been criticised for not matching its anti-government rhetoric with discussions of effective policy.

“What does the Ethiopian public want? Firstly peace, secondly stability, thirdly prosperity,” says one Addis Ababa-based foreign politico. “In most cases the Ethiopian opposition have conflated opposition with opposite. When asked for details of the programme for achieving those three needs they revert to type and complain about how difficult it is to be in opposition.”

To compound matters, ever since opposition MPs squabbled in the aftermath of Ethiopia’s crucial 2005 election – the country’s first genuine contest – with some choosing not to take their seats due to allegations of vote rigging, the opposition has remained split among myriad parties that appear unable and unwilling to coalesce into a single effective voice for today’s protests.

At the same time all sides, from government to opposition, whether in Ethiopia or acting overseas, appear hobbled by how the vocabulary of Amharic, the lingua franca of Ethiopia, doesn’t lend itself to terms such as negotiation and compromise. The polarisation of US politics pales in comparison to the mire found in Ethiopia: here you are either with the government or against, there can be no middle ground.

Nevertheless, many point out that it is the EPRDF, as the holders of power, who need break the deadlock.

“They must bring all concerned Ethiopian opposition political groups both home and abroad to the negotiation table,” says Endalk Chala, a prominent Ethiopian blogger studying in the US, who is unable to return to Ethiopia following the arrest in Addis Ababa of his fellow Zone 9 bloggers. “That is what I call a reform and all the rest is nonsense.”

Holding the Horn together

Geopolitical considerations mean Ethiopia is held by the likes of the UK and US to be an important peace and security bulwark in the Horn of Africa, a region troubled by failing states.

Ethiopia also provides large numbers of troops to the internationally funded African force battling al-Qaeda-linked militants in Somalia, as well as to peacekeeping forces in South Sudan and Sudan. Then there’s Ethiopia’s crucial economic role in the region.

“Ethiopia is the region’s locomotive,” says Dawit Gebre-Ab, senior director of strategic planning for the neighbouring Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority. “With its expansion in manufacturing, Ethiopia could become the China of Africa.”

Djibouti, another key part of the West’s anti-terrorism apparatus in the region, in addition to guarding one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, relies for a significant proportion of its GDP on business with Ethiopia.

To Djibouti’s south, Somaliland is banking on a €400 million refurbishment of its underused and underdeveloped Berbera port to alleviate its economic woes, with the next-door market of Ethiopia’s continually growing population– Africa’s second largest, and set to reach 130 million by 2025 –forming a key part of its ambitions to keep it safe from the fate of Somalia to its south.

Were Ethiopia’s internal fissures to worsen, its hitherto economic juggernaut might well be impeded –unsettling the region’s hitherto stabilising process of economic integration –or even derailed.

“Ethiopia has been the only reliable country in the Horn of Africa,” says Lidetu Ayele, founder of the opposition Ethiopia Democratic Party. “If Ethiopia is not strong, other countries will suffer. This government has used the threat of regional terrorism to its own advantage, but that threat is very real.”

Stepping back from the brink

“People need to be calm and patient,” Abebe says. “And we need acceptance by the government about making real reforms.”

The government conducted a significant cabinet reshuffle at the end of October, bringing in non-party-affiliated technocrats to deliver change, while promising reforms. But for a country with a millennia of centralised, autocratic rule, that’s much easier said than done.

Since 1991 western observers and governments have been calling on the Ethiopian government to deepen its commitment to democratic reforms, but it hasn’t previously shown much interest in listening. Hence many aren’t convinced of either the government’s sincerity or ability to make this happen.

“This government has failed the people not once but 1,000 times, and they’ve broken promise after promise,” says Merera, who, like many others, notes the left-wing revolutionary genesis of the EPRDF. The prevailing accusation is that this ideology still guides the party, which as a result remains fundamentally anti-democratic, believing in a Leninist single-party approach, and is thereby unable to countenance reform.

Opinions about where Ethiopia is heading cover a range of scenarios. It is feasible that a renewed uprising could prove successful, or its attendant pressures result in the internal disintegration of the EPRDF. Both appear unlikely, however, certainly in the short-term. Honed by decades of experience fending off rebellions, Ethiopia’s security apparatus is ruthlessly effective – hence the apparent success of the state of emergency. If judged necessary, an even more blistering government crackdown can’t be ruled out.

Ethiopia doesn’t have to fear, according to observers, a military coup: the army is professional, well trained and its higher echelons respect the constitution and harbour no ambitions to rule. But how they might react to some of the worst-case scenarios predicted – Ethiopia descending into civil war or a failed state torn by ethnic strife – is another matter.

Most observers suggest the best way to avoid the worse case scenarios would be to, at a minimum, release all political prisoners, unshackle the media and allow freedom of expression, and begin reforming key institutions that have been found wanting, such as Ethiopia’s judicial system.

When it comes to the EPRDF’s future role in all this, opinions vary. Some say it has lost every shred of legitimacy and must immediate make way for a transitional government. Others say is not feasible nor in Ethiopia’s best interests. Rather, the EPRDF should, in addition to carrying out meaningful reforms, establish a new electoral commission that would guarantee the next local elections in 2018 and national elections in 2020 were freely contested.

“That is the best course of action as it would provide a solution that isn’t orchestrated by the government but which is chosen by the Ethiopian people,” Lidetu says.

Addis Standard

Addis Abeba Dec. 09/2016 – When the government unveiled a draft of its second National Human Rights Action Plan (NHRAP II) before the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR) in early November, lawmakers were told that the objective was to improve the human rights condition in the country. Chiefly, NHRAP II would develop a comprehensive and structured mechanism to advance the respect, protection, and fulfillment of human and democratic rights, which are explicitly guaranteed by the country’s constitution, according to the draft. Furthermore, the draft, which was then referred to the appropriate standing committee, would draw on “valuable lessons” from its predecessor that was implemented between 2013 and 2015.

The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, (EHRC), the government-sponsored body designated with the mandate to oversee human rights in the country, has brought the draft for consultation with stakeholders on 29th November and while briefing the HPR, Yibekal Gizaw, head of the NHRAP II Secretariat at the Federal Attorney General’s office, said that among the objectives of the second action plan are objectives that show the importance of human rights for sustainable development within government entities, building public awareness about human rights issues and addressing the concerns of vulnerable groups. At the event, Addisu Gebregziabher, head of EHRC, expounded that NHRAP II would work to ensure the constitutionally-granted human and democratic rights of the people of Ethiopia.

The draft was tabled at the Parliament more than a month after the current six-months sweeping State of Emergency was declared following a yearlong protest particularly in Oromia and Amhara regional states that posed the ultimate challenge on the legitimacy of the government. The State of Emergency gives all the right and might for a special command post composed of the nation’s security apparatus to squash many human and civil rights that are otherwise guaranteed by the constitution.

But if its predecessor (implemented without the excesses of a state of emergency) wasn’t one deserving much accolade in reaching its target of promoting and safeguarding citizens’ deserved human rights, it’s worth asking if the second edition (in a country under martial law) would be anything more than a lip service.

The impotence of NHRAP I

When the NHRAP I came into being in 2013 mainly aiming at coordinating the activities of relevant governmental and non-governmental organs so as to improve the implementation of human and democratic rights guaranteed in the Constitution, some loved to see it as a political commitment on the government’s side for the enforcement of human rights. The plan, specifically, intended to “indicate the strategic guidelines to promote human and democratic rights in the country,” set forth “comprehensive, structured and sustainable” means “to respect and protect” human rights, raise public awareness and designate “strategies on how the government could work in collaboration with NGOs legally allowed to work on human and democratic rights, development partners, civil societies and other international stakeholders.” It includes close to 60 recommendations to cover gaps in sectors such as education, health, and culture.

Unfortunately, an overall assessment of its implementation could easily reveal that a great deal of its promises never materialized; many of its objectives were not realized. “We need a lot of proclamations and also guidelines for the protection of the rights of the people, for the accused persons, for the persons in prison and so on,” Berhnau Hailu, the then Minister of the Ministry of Justice had said. “For example, we have mentioned in the document the importance of a guideline on the use of force by the police.” However, a legislation that was meant to govern the proportional use of force proclamation has never materialized. Some of the legislations that were supposed to be drafted and then passed in its time span were simply rolled over to its follower.

Worse than that, in the years when the action plan was expected to promote the human rights condition, things have taken a wrong turn. In various places throughout the country, protesters raising questions of equality, justice, and rights have been met with brutal repressions. Hundreds were killed and maimed in the last one year only; thousands were arbitrarily jailed; and the whereabouts of hundreds more remains unknown.

An inquiry committee into the earlier phases of the protests in Oromia and Amhara regions organized by the EHRC early last year released a report which to a large extent absolves the excesses of security apparatus by asserting that the force used by the police were “proportional.”

In short, NHRAP I was futile.

Different plans, same results

The declaration in October this year of the six-months State of Emergency, which shortly preceded NHRAP II, was followed by the arbitrary arrest of more than 11, 000 Ethiopians, including prominent politicians, journalists, bloggers and rights activists, making the document not worth the paper it is written on. For Ethiopians, with or without the imposing state of emergency, which suspended most parts of the constitution especially parts dealing with rights issues, expecting anything different from the second edition will be an exercise in naiveté.

In theory, NHRAP II deals with civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and rights of vulnerable groups. It even includes the right to clean environment and the right to development. Most importantly, it raises issues like the right to life, the right of the security of person and prohibition against inhuman treatment, rights of persons arrested, persons held in custody and convicted prisoners, the rights of persons accused, right of access to justice, right of thought, opinion and expression, and freedom of association among other rights. While these issues discussed in the draft of the action plan are music to the ears of many Ethiopians, as is sadly often the case in Ethiopia, they might just remain a pie in the sky. There are two compelling explanations for that.

First, the expected enforcement legislation might not come to see the light of the day (Just like the first phase) resulting in an absence when it comes to its practicality.

Second, even with a successful granting of a legislative shield, Ethiopians will probably still endure the suppression of their human rights by a security apparatus immensely powerful to be bound by the limitations of the law. Citing that the action plan encompasses 23 human and democratic rights, Yibekal of the NHRAP II Secretariat claims the document “shows the commitment of the government” to ensure the prevalence of human rights in the country.

However as many Ethiopians know it too well, these are words thrown around to please western allies, who will once again bankroll its so-called implementations. When it comes to remaining faithful to its own words, the incumbent in Ethiopia isn’t one to be counted. AS

South Korea’s parliament has voted to impeach President Park Geun-hye over a corruption scandal.

The motion passed by 234 votes to 56, meaning some members of Ms Park’s ruling Saenuri party voted in favour.

Hwang Kyo-ahn, the country’s prime minister, has become interim president.

Thousands of people took to the streets in recent weeks demanding Ms Park’s removal. After the vote, she again apologised that she had “created this national chaos with my carelessness”.

At the heart of the crisis is the relationship between Ms Park and a close confidante, Choi Soon-sil, who stands accused of using her connections to gain influence and financial benefits.

She is custody, facing charges of coercion and abuse of power.

Prosecutors say Ms Park had a “considerable” role in the alleged corruption, which she has denied.

What did Ms Park do?

Ms Park and Ms Choi have been close friends since the 1970s, when Ms Park was acting as first lady after her mother was killed during an assassination attempt on her father, then the country’s military strongman. Ms Choi’s father was a cult leader who had become Ms Park’s mentor.

It is alleged that after Ms Park became president in 2013, Ms Choi, 60, used their friendship to pressure powerful corporations into donating to two foundations she controlled and then siphoned off funds for her personal use.

On Tuesday the corporations’ leaders were grilled by MPs on whether they made the donations in exchange for political favours.

Ms Park has also come under fire for allowing Ms Choi inappropriate access to government decisions, something which she has repeatedly apologised for.

What happens now?

The parliamentary vote means Ms Park – South Korea’s first female president – has been suspended. The case now goes before the Constitutional Court, which has 180 days to make a final ruling.

If at least six of the court’s nine judges approve the decision, Ms Park will become the first sitting South Korean president to be deposed in the country’s democratic era and a new presidential election will be held within 60 days.

In 2004, parliament impeached President Roh Moo-hyun, who was suspended for two months.

However the court overturned the impeachment vote and Mr Roh was reinstated.

Who is Ms Park’s replacement?

Image copyrightAFP

Hwang Kyo-ahn, a 59-year-old who spent most of his career as a prosecutor, is now acting-president.

He had earlier served as justice minister, before becoming prime minister in June 2015,

In 2014, as justice minister, Mr Hwang oversaw the banning of the Unified Progressive Party, which was accused of holding pro-North Korean views.

The move was criticised by the human rights group Amnesty International.

ESAT Daily News Amsterdam December 09,2016

Esat Radio Fri 09 Dec 2016

ESAT News (December 9, 2016)
Former Ethiopian Prime Minister Tesfaye Dinka passed away on Thursday in Virginia, United States, where he lived in exile after the fall of the military regime.
The 77 year-old former diplomat served his country in a number of capacities. He also worked at the World Bank and other international institutions before his retirement.
Dinka was a graduate of the American University in Lebanon and an alumnus of the Syracuse University in New York.
Dinka, who took over the premiership in 1991, led the negotiating team of the former military government at the London Peace Conference where his government, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, the party now in power in Ethiopia, were negotiating on the fate of Ethiopia after 17 years of civil war.
Dinka wrote a book titled “Ethiopia During the Derg Years: An Inside Account” but unfortunately passed away before the publishing of the book. According to Tsehai Publishers, his book will be released next month.
Dinka is survived by his wife, four children and four grand children.

by Prof. Messay Kebede
I recently watched a video recording in which Jawar Mohammed gives a complacent and professorial explanation about the ongoing Amhara resistance. See http://www.zehabesha.com/video-jawar-mohammed-on-amhara-resistance-must-listen/#comments. Actually, the term “resistance” betrays the gist of his explanation, since he is telling us that the resistance represents the rise of a new political phenomenon in Ethiopia, namely, “Amhara nationalism.” Immediately, one gets confused: all those Oromo elites who for decades denounced and are still denouncing the Ethiopian political system did so because it was, so we believed, the instrument of Amhara nationalism imposing its hegemony on the non-Amhara peoples of Ethiopia. It was news to me that a nationalist Oromo portrays Amhara nationalism as a recent phenomenon emerging from a long oblivion and still struggling against the Ethiopianized Amhara elite to affirm itself.

Be that as it may, Jawar assigns two causes for the emergence of Amhara nationalism. The one that he calls “external” is, of course, the TPLF systematic policy of marginalization of the Amhara. The policy did not only undermine the political and economic standing of the Amhara, it also translated in the appropriation of Amhara territories by Tigray and the Sudan respectively. Some such policy of outright marginalization and enmity could not but arouse a nationalist reaction.

The second reason, identified as “internal,” for the explosion of Amhara nationalism is the reaction against the Amhara elite and its long-held position denying the Amhara identity in the name of Ethiopianism. In the face of this systematic effort to stifle their national identity, the people finally revolted and reclaimed their nationhood to defend their interests and their legitimate place within the Ethiopian society. In other words, the present explosion of Amhara nationalism is an overt rejection of both Ethiopianism and the pro-Ethiopian ideology of the Amhara elite.

As such, the movement is a grass-root reaction that is genuine and democratic. Notably, it is free of the expansionist and domineering goal of the Amhara elite. Its main purpose is to be recognized as a national community so that it can defend its sovereignty and national interests. According to Jawar, this entry into the political scene of Amhara nationalism is welcomed by Oromo nationalists: as marginalized and dominated national groups, the Oromo and the Amhara can now become allies in the fight against Tigrean hegemony.

To begin with, the whole analysis is based on an alleged opposition between Ethiopianism and Amhara nationalism, which opposition derives, in turn, from a deliberate confusion between ethnicity and ethnonationalism. Let it be clear: the Amhara movement is not in the business of inventing a new nation. Notwithstanding their hegemonic position in the past, the Amhara see themselves as part of a multiethnic state. The movement does not carry a shred of secessionist tendency; on the contrary, it is the most solid and advanced rampart against secessionist forces.

Clearly, Jawar harbors one major intention, which is to raise dust on Amhara resistance so that we see what is not there. In speaking of Amhara nationalism, Jawar’s argument arbitrarily identifies it with his own version of Oromo nationalism. He thus reads Amhara resistance with the eyes of an ethnonationalist Oromo, who sees nothing in Ethiopia but “a prison house of nations.” Such is the danger of a mind obsessed with ethnonationalist ideology: it never sees what unites people; it see only what separates them.

As I was watching the video, I thought for a moment that Jawar’s sudden admiration for Amhara resistance could be something positive. Admiration usually leads to the resolution to model one’s action and belief on what one admires. Since the Amhara are fighting for their democratic rights without any secessionist agenda, I expected Jawar to finally say that the Oromo elite should follow the Amhara example. Unfortunately, Jawar did the opposite: he termed the resistance “nationalist” and modeled it on the ideology of Oromo nationalism even though he perfectly knew the untenability of such an amalgam.

The ultimate strategy of Jawar, like the TPLfites he claims to oppose, is to force everybody into the ethnonationalist box: you cannot be Ethiopian and Amhara, Oromo, Tigre, or Gurage at the same time. Being Ethiopian denies your ethnic identity so that the whole issue is presented in terms of either/or. Jawar supports Amhara nationalism because in becoming nationalist it ceases to be Ethiopian.

Unbelievable as it may seem, in the eyes of Jawar Amhara and Oromo have the same foe, to wit, Ethiopianism. What is more, there is a reward for dropping Ethiopianism: it will save Ethiopian unity. Jawar wants us to have faith in this extreme paradox: you get to save Ethiopia when you are no longer Ethiopian, that is, when you see Ethiopia as a collection of disparate nations.

In hijacking and aligning Amhara resistance with the cause of ethnonationalism, Jawar asks all Ethiopians to identify with an exclusive, overriding identity. He thinks he can be successful where the TPLF failed because his call for a separatist identity comes from the opposition camp. His enemy is no longer the Amhara; it is Ethiopianism. How else is one to destroy Ethiopianism but by advocating exclusive identities with its inevitable outcome of divisiveness?

We must counter the politics of exclusive identity with Ethiopianism as a shared identity. Shared identity goes beyond the recognition and equal treatment of ethnic and religious diversity; it promotes “a plurality of identities, which cut across each other and work against sharp divisions around one single hardened line of vehement division,” to quote Amartya Sen. Only through this work of convergence of identities on a transcending and all-embracing center can we prevent Ethiopia from becoming a collection of disparate and hostile groups.