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ETHIOPIA SECURITY DETAIN PROMINENT OPPOSITION PARTY LEADER DR. MERERA GUDINA

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Merera Gudina's arrest has been criticised by a member of the European parliament
Merera Gudina’s arrest has been criticised by a member of the European parliament

ADDIS STANDARD NEWS:

Addis Abeba Dec. 1/2016 – Security forces implementing Ethiopia’s six-month State of Emergency have last night detained prominent opposition party leader Dr. Merera Gudina, Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), upon his arrival at Bole International Airport.  

Details of what transpired at the airport are sketchy, but sources told Addis Standard that Dr. Merera was first taken by security forces who have identified themselves as members of the command post overseeing the State of emergency at around 7:30 PM soon after his arrival at the airport. He was then taken to his residence along with several members of his family who came to pick him from the airport. “Merera’s residence was locked from all direction by heavily armed men,” a family member who wishes to remain anonymous for fear of his own security told Addis Standard via phone. “It took security forces several hours before they took him to Ma’ekelawi prison after mid-night. No one was allowed in and out of his residence and no one knows what was happening inside,” our source said.

This morning family members were prohibited access to Dr. Merera at the Ma’ekelawi prison located at the heart of the Piassa. One member told Addis Standard that prison guards have denied Dr. Merera’s presence inside the prison, a practice commonly exercised by security guards. “We know that he was taken inside shortly after midnight but we can’t communicate with him,” she said.

Other sources say after his arrival at the airport Dr. Merera first went to his residence with his family members and claim that security forces have only arrived at his residence a few hours later.  But several people contacted by Addis Standard couldn’t substantiate this claim and say he arrived at his residence after he was already detained by security forces upon his arrival at the airport.

Dr. Merera was touring Europe for more than three weeks during which he delivered a speech to members of the European Union Parliament. He appeared at the EU parliament to testify on current political crisis and human rights violations in Ethiopia. Dr. Merera was joined by two other prominent invitees: Dr. Berhanu Nega, leader of the opposition Patriotic Ginbot 7 (G7), which is designated by Ethiopia’s ruling party dominated parliament as a “terrorist organization” and is now actively fighting the regime from the northern part of the country, and athlete Feyisa Lilessa, Olympic silver medalist who gave a significant impetus to a year-long Oromo protest that gripped Ethiopia when he crossed his arms in an X sign at the finishing line.

Pro-government activists were hostilely calling for the arrest of Dr. Merera after pictures of him sitting next to Dr. Berhanu and athlete Feyissa have circulated on Ethiopian social media sites. They claimed that Dr. Merera violated both Ethiopia’s infamous Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP), and the six-month sweeping State of Emergency law by appearing alongside a leader whose party is designated as a terrorist organization.

Our attempts to reach Dr. Negeri Lencho, newly appointed government communication affairs minister, were unsuccessful. However, Dr. Negeri told The Washington Post that “he had no information about the arrest.”

Dr. Merera’s arrest is not surprising, it “signifies the government’s particular heavy-handedness targeting the Oromo people and opposition political parties representing the Oromo,” said a political science lecturer at the Addis Abeba University and Dr. Merera’s longtime friend. “The story of all prominent Oromo opposition party leaders are the same: they all end up jailed,” said the lecturer who wishes to remain anonymous.

Currently, several members of OFC including Bekele Gerba and Dejene Fita Geleta, first secretary general and secretary general respectively are facing terrorism charges. Bekele Gerba was arrested for the second time since 2011, during which he was sentenced to eight years in prison suspected of allegedly belonging to the banned Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Bekele spent almost four of the eight years before he was freed in April 2015 only to be re-arrested in Nov. 2015 following a wave of protests by the Oromo.

The other notable opposition figure serving eight years prison term is Olbana Lelisa, who was arrested along with Bekele Gerba in 2011. Olbana was a high-ranking leader of the Oromo People’s Congress Party (OPC), which has since merged with the Oromo Federal Democratic Movement (OFDM) to form OFC, which is led by Dr. Merera.

Dr. Merera, an associate professor of Political science at the Addis Abeba University before his illegal dismissal last year, first founded the opposition party Oromo National Congress (ONC) as far back as 1996. He has been actively engaged in opposition politics in the country and was once an elected member of parliament. He is a well-known critic of the ruling party.

Fidel Castro’s Legacy in the Eyes of Ethiopians – SBS Amharic

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Fidel Castro’s Legacy in the Eyes of Ethiopians – SBS Amharic
Fidel Castro’s Legacy in the Eyes of Ethiopians – SBS Amharic

Ethiopia: Oromo opposition leader arrested

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Merera Gudina was arrested after he appeared at the EU parliament to testify on current political crisis in Ethiopia.Listen to this page using ReadSpeaker

mrera-gudina-5685-satenaw-news
Merera is the chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress [Barry Malone/Reuters]

A prominent Ethiopian opposition leader from the country’s restive Oromo region has been arrested after he came back from a meeting with members of the European Parliament in Brussels.

Merera Gudina, who is the chairman of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress, was arrested in his house in the capital Addis Ababa, according to media reports.

“Merera arrived in Addis Ababa on Wednesday morning from a trip to Brussels, where he met members of the European Parliament,” Gebru Gebremariam, deputy chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress, told the Reuters news agency.

“Police arrested him in his house the same day in the evening. We haven’t been given reasons behind his arrest,” Gebru added.

Inside Story – What’s fuelling protests in Ethiopia?

Ethiopia’s state-aligned FBC radio said the Oromo leader was arrested for “trespassing the state of emergency rulings of the country”.

A six-month state of emergency was declared in October after almost a year of violent protests, giving the authorities the power to restrict opposition activities and impose curfews. Last month, the government said more than 11,000 people had been arrested since the decree was passed.

Merera was arrested for violating the directive stated under article 2, which prohibits any communication with “banned terrorist organisations and anti-peace groups,” FBC said.

Before his arrest, Merera had appeared at the EU parliament to testify on the political crisis and human rights violations in Ethiopia.

He was joined by two other prominent opposition figures: Berhanu Nega, leader of the banned Patriotic Ginbot 7 group and athlete Feyisa Lilesa, an Olympic silver medalist who carried the Oromo protests that gripped Ethiopia in to international headlines when he crossed his arms in an X sign at the finishing line in Rio.

Merera is being held at the Ma’ekelawi prison, according to the Addis Standard.

READ MORE: Ethiopia – Dozens killed in Oromia festival stampede

Sporadic protests have erupted in Ethiopia’s Oromia region over the past two years, initially sparked by a land row and increasingly turning more broadly against the government.

Merera Gurdina had been vocal about alleged human rights abuses against Oromo people committed by the government

Exclusive: Ethiopian runner Feyisa Lilesa not seeking US asylum

According to New York-based Human Rights Watch, at least 500 people have been killed by security forces since the demonstrations began in November 2015.

Though protests started among the Oromo, Ethiopia’s biggest ethnic group, they later spread to the Amhara, the country’s second largest ethnic group.

Both groups say the ruling coalition is dominated by the Tigray ethnic group, which makes up only about six percent of the population.

The government has blamed rebel groups and dissidents abroad for stirring up the protests and provoking violence.

Authorities have denied that violence from the security forces is systemic, though a spokesman previously told Al Jazeera that police officers “sometimes take the law into their own hands”, pledging an independent investigation.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, the ruling party, in October rejected a United Nation request to send in observers, saying it alone was responsible for the security of its citizens.

Source: Al Jazeera News and News Agencies

Ethiopia backs Kenya in race for AU Chairperson position

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1024x576_351130Ethiopia has disclosed that it will back the candidature of Kenya’s foreign affairs chief in the race to elect the new chairperson of the African Union (AU).

by Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban

Kenya’s topmost diplomat Ambassador Dr. Amina C. Mohamed is one of five candidates hoping to be elected to replace outgoing chair, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Dlamini-Zuma accepted to stay on as chair after the heads of state failed to choose her successor during a summit in Kigali, Rwanda.

She launched her campaign for the post in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa on Tuesday. On Wednesday she met with the Ethiopian Premier, Hailemariam Desalegn, to hand him a message from Kenyan President. She also thanked the premier for supporting her candidature for upcoming elections.

What is in the package of the Kenyan candidate?

She told reporters that in her race to AUC Chairperson she is paying due attention to unleash Africa’s potentials for industrialization, to eradicate poverty, and to create job for Africa’s youth which are stipulated under Agenda 2063.

Enabling a free movement of goods, services and capital from one corner of Africa to the other are also a key priority in her campaign, she added. According to Mohamed, ensuring the benefits of African youth will be her ultimate goal if she wins the chair as leader of the continental body.

The two sides also held talks on peace and stability concerns of the Horn of Africa and ways of strengthening Ethiopia-Kenyan economic partnership. The two neighbours are leaders in the region and are actively engaged in military operations against Somalia’s al-Shabaab insurgents.

Upcoming town hall debate and the five contenders

The five aspirants for the AUC position will face off in a debate on December 9 ahead of their election in January 2017. The Commission sent out invitation last week for the debate which will be in the town hall format at the Union’s headquarters in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa.

The five candidates for the AUC Chairperson position include:

  • Botswana’s foreign minister Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi
  • Chad’s foreign minister Moussa Faki Mahamat
  • Equatorial Guinea’s foreign minister Agapito Mba Mokuy
  • Kenya’s foreign minister Amina Mohamed and
  • Senegal’s Bathily Abdoulaye who is the special UN envoy for Central Africa.

The South African Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has been the AU chairperson since 2012 and did not apply for a second term during the earlier nomination process.

The new elections will be held during the 28th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government from January 30 to 31 at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Tewolde Mulugeta said the insurgents were members of Ginbot 7, which Ethiopia says is backed by Eritrea.

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By: Reuters | Addis Ababa | Published:December 1, 2016 11:43 pm
Eritrea, which borders Sudan and Ethiopia, has been dubbed the North Korea of Africa (HRW)
Eritrea, which borders Sudan and Ethiopia, has been dubbed the North Korea of Africa (HRW)

Ethiopian troops killed 15 armed rebels crossing from Ethiopia’s arch-rival Eritrea over the weekend, and captured more than 70, an official said on Thursday. Foreign Ministry spokesman Tewolde Mulugeta said the insurgents were members of Ginbot 7, which Ethiopia says is backed by Eritrea. He said 115 insurgents had entered Ethiopia’s Tigray region on Saturday and then been attacked by soldiers and local militiamen: “Of the 115, our troops killed 15 rebels and captured 73.”

Eritrean government officials were not immediately available for comment; they routinely dismiss allegations by Ethiopia, which they in turn accuse of seeking to destabilise the region. The two nations often accuse one another of supporting insurgencies in the other country a legacy of years of bitter conflict that has left them with a disputed border.

Eritrea, a former province of Ethiopia, won independence in 1991 after 30 years of war. Seven years later, hostilities erupted again, over the border, and around 70,000 people were killed. A peace agreement was signed in 2000, but enmity continues. Ethiopia wants a full negotiated settlement and Eritrea demands the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from a disputed town. In July, the two countries traded accusations of aggression along their disputed frontier, and each claimed to have repulsed the other and inflicted heavy casualties.

World AIDS Day: How the World Is Still Fighting the Disease 35 Years After Its Discovery

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  • By GILLIAN MOHNEY

Dec 1, 2016, 2:20 PM ETIt has been 35 years since researchers from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention first reported on a mysterious illness that was infecting and killing otherwise healthy young men.

The CDC report from 1981 was the first time that what we now know as AIDS was mentioned in medical literature.

In those early days, little was known about the disease. Today researchers understand a great deal about how HIV, the human immunodeficiency virus, attacks the immune system and leads to AIDS. While treatment, prevention and education have saved many lives, researchers continue to fight the spread of HIV and AIDS and find a cure.

ap_denmark_world_aids_day_hb_161201_4x3_992Jens Dresling/Polfoto via AP Photo
Two Thousand candles were lit in memory of victims of AIDS on World AIDS Day, Dec. 1, 2016 at Gammeltorv Square in Copenhagen, Denmark.more +

Since that CDC report was published, AIDS has claimed 35 million lives globally, according to the the World Health Organization.

Anti-retroviral medications have turned HIV infection from a death sentence into a chronic manageable illness for many. However, fewer than half the people worldwide with HIV get treatment needed to prolong their lives.

Approximately 1.1 million people died worldwide from the disease last year, according to the United Nations.

A huge problem in the fight against HIV is that people can go years without exhibiting symptoms. As a result, 12.5 percent of people in the U.S. with HIV are unaware they are infected, the CDC estimates.

Globally, that figure jumps to 40 percent, according to the WHO.

To combat that problem, the WHO announced this week new guidelines to encourage self-testing for HIV.

People can now test for the virus via a simple oral swab or by pricking a finger in the privacy of their homes.

“Millions of people with HIV are still missing out on lifesaving treatment, which can also prevent HIV transmission to others,” Dr. Margaret Chan, the WHO’s director-general, said in a statement. “HIV self-testing should open the door for many more people to know their HIV status and find out how to get treatment and access prevention services.”

In the U.S., gay and bisexual men of color are at a higher risk of contracting HIV than the overall population. The lifetime infection risk for black men who are gay or bisexual is 1 in 2, according to the CDC.

Worldwide, more women than men are infected with the disease. HIV is the No. 1 killer of women ages 15 to 49, according to the American Foundation for AIDS Research.

Adolescents are also particularly vulnerable. According to one report, 41,000 people ages 10 to 19 died of the disease in 2015.

“The world has made tremendous progress in the global effort to end AIDS, but the fight is far from over, especially for children and adolescents,” UNICEF Executive Director Anthony Lake said in a statement today. “Every two minutes, another adolescent — most likely a girl — will be infected with HIV. If we want to end AIDS, we need to recapture the urgency this issue deserves — and redouble our efforts to reach every child and every adolescent.”

While there are still no cures for AIDS or vaccines proven to prevent HIV infection, there are multiple experimental vaccines in the early stages of testing around the globe. Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), a daily preventive medication regimen, is a way for uninfected people to greatly reduce their risk, and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) is a treatment that can significantly cut the chance of HIV infection in people within 72 hours of exposure.

Additionally, scientists are examining if gene therapy could someday lead to a functional cure for HIV infection.

People are yearning for  solidarity not contradiction [Tefera Dinberu]

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(A Brief Remark on the Article of Dr. Tedla Woldeyohannes, Paulos Milikiyas)

 Tedla Woldeyohannes, holds a PhD in Philosophy from St. Louis University
Tedla Woldeyohannes, holds a PhD in Philosophy from St. Louis University

While Dr Tedla’s skepticism on the trend of the Oromo Movement might be a genuine question that any other Ethiopian would ask, I think that Dr. Tedla seemed to have pushed Oromo elites to incline towards developing Oromo independence. Moreover, Dr.Tedla’s mention of Emperor Minelik II needs elaboration.

The era of Menelik was the era of nation building in most of the world especially in Europe. For example, Prussia under Otto von Bismark was consolidating fragile German states. Italy under Gari Baldi consolidated was into one country from thirteen petty states. There was no nation that had not been able to unite as a strong nation without classical military unification or reunification. After consolidating their nation states, powerful European nations of the era met in Belgium in 1884, 12 years before the battle of Adwa, to make a covenant as to how to make a scramble for Africa. So, France, Great Britain and Italy were racing on East Africa, especially Ethiopia. First an English General Hewett made a mischievous Adwa agreement with Emperor Yohannes IV in the same year by which Italy had to return Massawa for free use by Ethiopia and Egyptian troops had to be given free passage to the Sudan that was under the supremacy of Great Britain. After the troops passed, Massaw was not given back to Ethiopia but to Italy. The betrayal by the English made on Emperor Yohannes had other consequences also. The free passage of Egyptian troops to the Sudan created animosity between the leadership of Emperor Yohannes IV and the Sudanese causing the rise of Durbush power that fought the Emperor at Metema and the loss of  his head and crown on one side, and the consequent Italian occupation of Northern part of Ethiopia then called Eritrea. That was not all. Under the tutelage of the English colonial scheme, Egypt armed and appointed Amir Abdallah on Harar to make him their satellite. Great Britain’s colonial occupation had encircled Ethiopia from the west and south as it had occupied Kenya, too while Somalia fell under Italy’s share. The three powers were aggressively racing to occupy the rest of Ethiopia.

Any genuine person with rational thinking could imagine the fate of Ethiopia if a leadership from Ethiopia could not have resisted that scramble. So, what was the role of Emperor Menelik? What were the alternatives?

If a powerful leadership could not have unified Ethiopians by hook or crook, this country that existed since immemorial could have disintegrated into any colonial boundaries. These big nations and nationalities like Amhara and Oromo would have different fates. It was Emperor Menelik who developed the recognition of the Oromo people by forming petty states into a whole Wellega, Keffa, for example, and the union of Mecha and Tulama, If Emperor Menelik and Ras Gobana did not do this history, the fate of most unsettled Oromo pastorals could have been similar to the Maasai nomads.

If not that of Menelik, and if there was another capable leadership, there is not question that it should have saved the survival of the country through the same method that Emperor Menelik used as unified nations could survive in other parts of the World.

Why do Oromo elites take Emperor Menelik as an occupier just like a colonizer? Emperor Menelik consolidated not only scattered Oromo pastorals into provinces that were governed by their own balabats whose system had extended until 1974 revolution, but his leadership had annexed Gojjam, Begemdir/Gondar, Guragie, Wolayita, Sidama, Keffa, Yemma, Damot, Afar, Tigre, Hadiya, and all other regions that reunited Ethiopia. If Gobana had been the Emperor and did the same, what would this elites think? If Gobana had the role of being the Emperor of Ethiopia or another able leadership had the capability to do so, one would have done the same reunification and would have spoken the same Ethiopian national language since the Yeju Oromo leaders used to speak the same national language about 300 years ago. While everybody knows that Afan Amara could not and cannot be racist as English, French, or Arab language that are used simply as medium of communication.  At times these elites confuse themselves between hatred and  reality. They don’t seem to understand that language is simply a means of communication. Weyane speaks Amharic and exercises its brutality on Amaras; it also speaks Afan Oromo putting the Oromo people under its brutal tenure. Americans developed the English language of their one time arch enemy. Moreover, we can trace from history that most present Oromo people were forced not only to speak Afan Oromo but to be Oromos when Abba dula occupiers compelled previous indigenous people in many parts of  Ethiopia to undergo through mass assimilation processes like moogassa, meedhicha, and harmoa-hodha.

These politicians would not like to raise the fact about forceful occupation of indigenous people in many parts of Ethiopia was a reality before Oromo settlements; however, they would like to reiterate about what happened only 100 years ago. Wasn’t that history before 100 years a common history? Did those occupiers took lands and properties of the indigenous people at will without any blood shed? Was Naftagna limited to Amaras only? Does Amara originally come only from a certain race or from ancestors who were persuaded to speak the language?  If one tries to delve into historical circumstances, one would find no basis of aberration on the integrity of Ethiopians in internal conflicts for power and supremacy on one hand and coherently fighting back foreign aggression on the other hand that brought about common history and fate of the people in the country. 

The concept of nationalism based on contemptuous inception is not progressive; it arrests democratic developments. It nips in the bud the spirit of democracy. An institution that does not follow democratic principles cannot have healthy relationships with peoples, because any people likes to be free and to exercise harmonious relationships with any other people.

 

The concept of segregating Ethiopia into “Oromoia”, “Amara”, etc ethnic structure  is not a manifestation of democracy, but a manifestation of apartheid devised by Weyane racial divide-and-rule treason. This racial scheme will never improve the standard of living of the Oromo or other people but will stifle the harmony of Ethiopians that averts equality. There has never been a place in Ethiopia where Oromo blood had not been shed to survive Ethiopia. So, who is foolish that chooses only a parcel instead of the legitimate whole?  The greatest vision is a Utopian unknown state for nationally oriented political followers. And for few elites it is ego of power, individual or group power instead  that undermines belonging to a great nation with wider geographical and social groups.  Any matured person does not need to be a politician or a scholar to know that a united Ethiopia can be in a better position to resist foreign domination and develop economically. All Ethiopian peoples are forces that support each other and develop together. The integrity of the country is an asset to any Ethiopian from any corner of the country. While all this is undeniable, what nationalist power mongers fear is the warranty to be on power; ironically they do not trust the people since they are not confident to build a real democratic system. Yes, without having the gut to sit and discuss with their opponents, they cannot dare to be part of a democratic system. If they claim to stand for peoples’s equality, justice, peace, and prosperity, they should be realistic to people; they should be genuine to any people and face facts on the ground.

 

“If we desire a society of peace, then we cannot achieve such a society through violence. If we desire a society without discrimination, then we must not discriminate against anyone in the process of building this society. If we desire a society that is democratic, then democracy must become a means as well as an end”. – Bayard Rustin as compiled in Obbo Tadesse Nigatu’s recent article.

Some Oromo politicians still stir the murky old politics of ethnicity and so called Amara chauvinism after 40 years of the demise of the Solomonic dynasty from the earth of Ethiopia. While the people moved in the forefront, no Oromo political organization challenged Weyane except disseminating racial hatred and old rhetoric of national oppression like Doctor Hizquel who ironically proved how Oromo politicians could not progress. (ዶክተር ሕዝቅኤል ኦሮሞ እንደዚህ ይሰደባል በማለት ጭራሹኑ ኦሮሞን ሰድቦ ለተሳዳቢ የሰጠ ያዋቂ አጥፊ) by fanning hatred. Similarly Dr Tsegaye Ararsa also tried to analyze hearsay on Menelik and his relation to the Caucasian race. At this time when people seek solidarity this has no objective other than confusing or changing the attention of the people.  In the same way, Dr Paulos Milkias  bluntly rebuffed Dr Fikre Tollosa’s book on the relationships of Oromo and Amara people. We were expecting his professional comments. However, while he was asking for evidence, Dr. Paulos did not utter any historical facts let alone to touch on what Dr Fikre wrote. There is no substance fact presented by him to disprove the other writer except his repeated “false” and “no scientific proof” phrases. So are these scholars confusing us? Are they  trying to disintegrate our peoples instead of unifying them?

We cannot live in the past. Rumor mongering and fanning hatred is not a progressive outlook and takes us nowhere. This can neither build a nation nor fend of an enemy. People are yearning for  solidarity not contradiction. So, we need to build the future which can only be done by helping each other instead of finding a means of contradicting one another; and in order to do that, we need to think that a bright future is based on what we are doing today.

Tefera Dinberu


U.S. Department Of State About The Arrest Of Dr. Merera Gudina

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During the U.S. Department of State’s daily press briefing, Deputy Spokesperson Mark C. Toner was asked about the recent arrest of Dr. Merera Gudina, the Chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), by the Ethiopian Authorities. Here is the full question-answer portion from the daily briefing.

 U.S. Department Of State About The Arrest Of Dr. Merera Gudina

The U.S. And Ethiopia’s Complicated Alliance

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The U.S. supports Ethiopia with military aid, monetary assistance and bilateral trade. So what makes their relationship so

In October, the U.S. State Department issued a travel warning for Ethiopia. The State Department website says this warning is due to “ongoing unrest that has led to hundreds of deaths, thousands of arrests, as well as injuries and extensive property damage.”

 

obama-hailemariam

All action Bolt wins sixth AOY award – Ethiopia’s Ayana takes female prize

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Andre Lowe

jamaica-gleaner-comsitesdefaultfilesstyles

MONTE CARLO, Monaco:

He’s all about action.

In fact, track and field’s biggest showman sees a bit of Hollywood tough guy Jason Statham, in himself, and as he capped another all-conquering season with a record sixth IAAF Male Athlete of the Year (AOY) award, Usain Bolt showed whether the stage is a track or an actual stage, he is just as entertaining.

Ethiopia’s Almaz Ayana won the female Athlete of the Year award after a season that saw her winning Olympic gold in the 10,000m in a world record 29:17.45 to erase a 23-year-old mark, and bronze, plus the Diamond Race title in the 5000m.

With next year’s farewell season looking more and more like one of Marvel’s after-credit scenes, Bolt’s triple gold-medal haul at the Olympic Games in Rio and last night’s AOY nod at the Salle des Etoiles could be considered the perfect ending to his last full season, his latest in what has been a medal and record-filled career.

“I would definitely be a great action guy,” Bolt laughed when asked by the presenter if his new I am Bolt film meant a career in front of the lenses after he retires. “The next Jason Bourne. More like Jason Statham, I’m not a Bond type of guy. He is too slick.”

It was a light tone in a rebranded and restyled IAAF Athletics Awards, which brought a departure from the heavy note of reform after a year of chaos, which have hung over the IAAF’s most important weekend in recent times.

The exchange was one of the moments that exemplifies the sport’s biggest personality, one whose box office pull will no doubt, leave a void.

Bolt, who told The Gleaner that he will be paying close attention to see who takes over the ‘poster boy’ tag once he exits stage left, also paid homage to fellow male AOY finalists Wayde van Niekerk, who won Olympic 400m in a blistering 43.03 world record, and Mo Farah, the Olympic 10,000m and 5,000m champion.

“This award is very important to me. The fact it was voted on by the fans is very special. I have worked hard over the years to accomplish big things, so, for me, it’s a great feeling,” said Bolt, who was sporting a smart dark suit, burgundy tie and brown shoes. “You always have to respect all the nominees, they have proven that they are great in their own respect, in their own fields.

“It’s a great feeling. I have proven to the world that I am one of my the best athletes in the world. It’s a great thing to accomplish and to end the season in a bang. I feel good about that,” Bolt added.

Feeling ambivalent

Van Niekerk admitted to feeling ambivalent about the experience, accepting that it’s the beginning of the end for an athlete who he has looked up to while being motivated to push even harder in the future.

“It’s sad seeing an amazing athlete like Bolt being on the verge of retiring, someone who I have found so much inspiration and motivation from, but, at the same time, it has given me so much confidence to go out there and put myself forward and be the future,” van Niekerk told The Gleaner.

Bolt’s other AOY awards were presented in 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013.

Elaine Thompson, who was many person’s favourite going into the evening after her 100m and 200m double at the Olympics, was looking to become the third Jamaican to win the female AOY award after Merlene Ottey in 1990 and Shelly-Ann Fraser-Pryce (2013), but was nonetheless pleased to have been considered. Vowed to make a return to the ceremony.

“I have to give God thanks for a wonderful season. To be nominated for the IAAF female Athlete of the Year award is a great honour and even though I didn’t win tonight, I am happy for the season. I am happy for Almaz, I congratulated her on her season and I hope she will continue to do great, and I will continue to work hard,” Thompson said.

Thompson also helped Jamaica to its 4x100m silver in Rio, win bronze at the IAAF World Indoor Championships, and went unbeaten in the 100m.

Poland’s Olympic champion and world record holder in the hammer throw, Anita Wlodarczyk, was the other finalist.

Harry Marra, who coaches Olympic decathlon champion and world record holder Ashton Eaton and wife Brianne Theisen-Eaton – Olympic bronze medal winner in the heptathlon, was presented with the Coaching Achievement award.

Canadian sprinter Andre De Grasse, 200m silver and 100m bronze medallist from Rio, and Belgian heptathlete Nafissatou Thiam were the male and female Rising Star recipients.

Tegla Loroupe won the inaugural President’s Award for her work in the creation of the first Refugee Olympic team, with Greece’s Polyxeni Argeitaki receiving the Women in Athletics award for her efforts towards developing and encouraging greater female participation in the sport.

Source    –   The Jamaica Cleaner

European Union a ‘TERRORIST GROUP’? Ethiopian leader arrested for meeting Brussels bosses

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Ethiopian opposition leader Merera Gudina
Ethiopian opposition leader Merera Gudina

AN ETHIOPIAN opposition leader is being held on terror charges after holding talks with European Union bosses.

By SIMON OSBORNE
Merera Gudina, who leads the Oromo People’s Congress, was detained after returning to Addis Ababa from Brussels where he criticised the government in Addis Ababa for imposing a state of emergency.
Mr Gudina has been at the forefront of protests against land grabs in the Oromiya region and what his supporters have described as a government clampdown on political freedoms.

Women in the troubled Oromiya region of EthiopiaGETTY

Women in the troubled Oromiya region of Ethiopia

Merera Gudina is in custody and an investigation is currently taking place

Ethiopian security official

His deputy Gebru Gebremariam said: “Merera arrived in Addis Ababa on Wednesday morning from a trip to Brussels, where he met members of the European Parliament.

“Police arrested him in his house the same day in the evening. We haven’t been given reasons behind his arrest.”

Ethiopian security officials said Mr Gudina had violated guidelines “by making contact with terrorist groups” during his visit to Brussels.

They said: “Given this violation, Merera Gudina is in custody and an investigation is currently taking place.”

Villagers in Ethiopia's Oromiya regionGETTY

Villagers in Ethiopia’s troubled Oromiya region

More than 500 people died in violent protests against the government until the six-month state of emergency was declared in October.

Demonstrations were initially triggered by anger over a development scheme that opponents said would force farmers off their land.

Foreign firms have often been leased land by the government that locals say was seized from them for little compensation and sold on at great profit.

Merera Gudinanc

Merera Gudina was arrested on terror charges after a trip to Brussels

The government, which scrapped the capital’s development plan after protests erupted, denies imposing political restrictions or illegally taking land.

Opposition parties failed to secure a single seat in parliament in the last elections in 2015.

Open Letter to BEDiSA Group, with regards to Purchase of Tana Beles Project – Located in Amhara Region, Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s Ayana and Usain Bolt win top 2016 IAAF awards

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almaz-ayanaAbdur Rahman Alfa Shaban with IAAF

Ethiopia’s Almaz Ayana has been named the female World Athletes of the Year at the International Association of Athletics Federation’s Athletics Awards 2016, held at Sporting Monte Carlo on Friday.

Ayana had a record-breaking 2015. After recording the fastest 10,000m debut in history in June, the Ethiopian went on to win the Olympic title at the distance in a world record of 29:17.45.

She also took bronze in the 5000m event in Rio, her only loss of the year. Having recorded three of the eight fastest times at 5000m, she ended the year as the Diamond Race winner for that discipline.

I live for the moments when I walk into a stadium and I hear a loud roar and Rio was outstanding. One of the main reasons I’m continuing for another year is because of the fans; they don’t want me to retire. I have to give thanks to them.

Ayana becomes the third Ethiopian woman to win this award, following Genzebe Dibaba in 2015 and Meseret Defar in 2007.

“I don’t have words to explain my feelings right now, I’m so excited,” said Ayana whose award was presented by International Athletics Foundation (IAF) Honorary President HSH Prince Albert II of Monaco. “Really, I’m so pleased.”

Jamaica’s Usain Bolt who won the award five times between 2008 and 2013, was named the best male athlete. With the current accolade, Bold added to his legacy by earning the trophy for a record sixth occasion.

The sprinting superstar successfully defended his Olympic titles in the 100m, 200m and 4×100m, in the just ended Rio Olympics bringing his lifetime tally of Olympic gold medals to nine.

“He clocked season’s bests of 9.81 and 19.78 to win the 100m and 200m in Rio and then anchored the Jamaican team to a world-leading 37.27 when winning the 4×100m,” the IAAF said on its website.

He also went undefeated throughout the whole season at all distances, including heats.

“I live for the moments when I walk into a stadium and I hear a loud roar and Rio was outstanding,” said Bolt, whose award was presented by IAAF President Sebastian Coe. “One of the main reasons I’m continuing for another year is because of the fans; they don’t want me to retire. I have to give thanks to them.”

21-year-old Canadian, Andre De Grasse, was also named the male rising star. De Grasse earned the Olympic 200m silver medal in Rio, having set a national record of 19.80 in the semifinal.

He took bronze over 100m in a PB of 9.91 and anchored the Canadian team to bronze in the 4×100m, setting a national record of 37.64.

Belgian Nafissatou Thiam was named the rising female athlete for the year. She won gold in the heptathlon at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games with a world-leading national record of 6810.

At age 21, only one athlete (Carolina Kluft) has ever produced a higher score than Thiam’s at that age. En route to her Olympic triumph, she set a world heptathlon best of 1.98m in the high jump; higher than the winning leap in the individual high jump final.

Coaching achievement award went to Harry Marra, the US coach who guided Ashton Eaton to his second successive decathlon gold medal at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games.

The IAAF President Award went to Tegla Loroupe, the Chef de Mission for the Refugee Olympic Team in Rio. This award recognises and honours great service to athletics.

The former marathon world record-holder helped select the Refugee Olympic Team after the Tegla Loroupe Peace Foundation held a competition at the Kakuma refugee camp in north-west Kenya.

The Women in Athletics award went to Polyxeni Argeitaki, an assistant professor of athletics at the National Kapodistrian University of Athens. This award recognises outstanding achievements and contributions made to develop, encourage and strengthen the participation of women and girls at all levels of the sport.

The former Greek champion at middle-distance events is the treasurer, council member and president of the scientific committee at the Hellenic Athletics Federation. She has also written more than 50 scientific publications.

 

Ethiopia partially restores mobile internet after 2 month shutdown

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interet_cafeEthiopia has restored mobile Internet services after the service was blocked over two months. The blockage was connected with anti-government protests that broke out largely in the Amhara and Oromia regions.

Local portals reported that mobile service was restored on Friday evening (December 2) after being shut down since October 04. Ethiopia is currently under a state of emergency with some of the rules being a restriction on access to particular social media platforms. Anti government protests in the country are believed to have been largely instigated via social media.

Social media and messaging platforms such as WhatsApp, Viber and Facebook, and Instagram have still been blocked. Main internet lines were also said to be very slow during the period of the internet shutdown.

It is said that this is the longest sustained mobile internet service shutdown that has taken place in the capital Addis Ababa and across the country.

first tweet from a mobile data in , since Oct. 04; but still via a . Let’s hope it slowly comes to normal!

A recent report on access to the internet ranked Ethiopia amongst the worst in the world. In Africa they were ranked along with Gambia, Sudan & Egypt as the worst culprits.

According to the research on the use of the internet, online freedom generally around the world has declined for the sixth consecutive year.

All four African countries considered ‘Not Free’ had internet penetration of between 12 and 36%. Only Sudan did not block social media and other political and social content. But all the others did that and also conducted arrests of bloggers and internet users.

In all, 16 African countries were surveyed by the Freedom House team. The regional spread are as follows:

  • Five in North Africa – Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco
  • Two in West Africa – The Gambia and Nigeria
  • Four in East Africa – Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda
  • Five in Southern Africa – South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Malawi.

The report titled ‘Freedom on the Net 2016 – Silencing the Messenger, Communication Apps Under Pressure’ added that two out of every three internet users – 67% – live in countries where online activities are largely censored.

The research was carried out by Freedom House, ‘‘an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world.’‘ It looked at 65 countries across the world and how they related to the use of the internet.


Hybrid Wars: The Horn Of Africa, the Scramble for Somalia; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Color Revolutions?

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Part II

By Andrew Korybko
Global Research, December 03, 2016
Oriental Review 2 December 2016
the-grand-chess-board2The first part of the research on the Horn of Africa described the regional state-to-state political dynamics, and now it’s time to delve into each country more in depth in order to acquire a heightened sense of their strategic positions. This will enable the final section about the Hybrid War vulnerabilities in the region to be more understandable to the reader, since a few of the scenarios admittedly require some detailed background information in order to properly comprehend the manner in which the US intends to effectively apply them. 

Somalia

Overview:

This civil war-torn country appears to have passed the crest of its over two-decade-long crisis and is finally on the road to recovery, although it will likely be a prolonged and sinewy one that might take a few more decades to fully play out. At this stage, Mogadishu is struggling to assert its authority throughout the rest of the country, and herein lays the major hindrance to any effective reconstruction efforts. Somalia has been bloodily divided into a handful of warlord-ruled territories, neither of which really wants to cede their hard-fought sovereignty to the other, let alone to a central authority responsible for everyone. As a means of attempting to adapt to this reality, Somalia implemented a federal system in 2012, although it had transitional plans to do so ever since 2004.

Despite the US officially recognizing the Mogadishu authorities in 2013, it’s practically impossible to speak about a “national” government and likely will remain so for the indefinite future. The official military does not have the capacity nor the international support to simultaneously combat Al Shabaab terrorists (which have proved to be a very formidable and internationally destabilizing threat) and ‘federal warlords’, and the obviously pressing priority has thus fallen towards fighting the former. More than likely, Somalia will never return to the cohesive political unit that it once was prior to 1991, and this is a geopolitical reality that the federal government, its various warlord principalities, and the international community appear ready to accept and deal with. For as many challenges as it opens up, there are also a few opportunities for self-interested and ambitious actors to exploit.

somalia-01-jpg

Institutionalized Warlordism:

The major domestic factor that defines Somalia’s geopolitical future is its implementation of federalism, which in its particular context amounts to Institutionalized Warlordism throughout the country. There was no feasible way that the Mogadishu government was going to reassert control over the rest of the country ever again, and the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) proved how radical non-state actors could actually become stronger than their host governments. In many ways, the rise of the ICU preceded the rise of Daesh, and it’s certainly appropriate to look at the two as being strategically and even tactically linked to one another in the grand sense. Separate from the rise of the ICU has been the autonomous and self-proclaimed independent statelet of Somaliland and its autonomous but non-separatist counterpart of Puntland, both of which the capital has had the highest degree of difficulty exerting its authority over. Whereas Puntland is still loyal to the Somali state, Somaliland endeavors to become its own separate country, and it already de-facto behaves as such. The other regions of Galmudug, the South West State, and Jubaland are more under the influence of Mogadishu than the aforementioned two, but the federal capital still does not have full and total sovereignty over their entire territory and all of its activities.

It must be qualified at this point that the regions which were just described are formed from some of the 18 separate legally recognized provinces within the country, and that while Somalia isn’t formally divided into a handful of different federal regions, the on-the-ground reality holds that this is the case and will likely remain to be so. Therefore, when discussing what the author has termed to be Institutionalized Warlordism, it’s important to remember that the regional constructs being referred to are not formally recognized by the 2012 Constitution but instead reflect the trans-provincial realities of Identity Federalism’s implementation to Somalia’s clan- and warlord-based realities.

Here’s an approximate map of the de-facto regional breakdown:

af16

* Red: Somaliland
* Yellow: Puntland
* Red and Yellow Hashes: Disputed territory between Somaliand and Puntland, mostly controlled by the former at the moment
* Green: Galmudug
* Blank: Mogadishu and its surroundings
* Blue: South West State
* Purple: Jubaland

As can be gathered from the above, Somaliland and Puntland are critically important for controlling the Sea of Aden and the entranceway to the Bab-el-Mandeb that connects to the Red Sea. This explains why the UAE is purportedly building a naval facility in Somaliland, which is a lot more developed, stable, and independent than Puntland (which is where most of the notorious pirates from the last decade came from). The territorial dispute between these two statelets doesn’t seem poised to escalate into a large conflict, although if Puntland’s former president is successful in his bid for the national presidency, then he might obviously cut a deal with Mogadishu and  perhaps even the international community (as represented most directly by the African Union forces in Somalia, AMISOM) to gain their support in making a militant move to settle this dispute once and for all under the pretense of promoting national unity and tackling secessionism. This would probably devolve into another phase of the country’s civil war and pull it back from the relative internal political successes that it’s made over the past decade.

In the more immediate future, however, Somalialand is expected to remain fiercely independent and will not unnecessarily cede any of its de-facto sovereignty to Mogadishu unless it gained (or thought it could gain) a lot more benefit than it believably loses by agreeing to this. Establishing that Somaliland is for all intents and purposes a de-facto yet unrecognized independent state and will continue to be treated as such by various self-interested actors such as the UAE, it’s appropriate to also talk about the other spheres of foreign influence that are popping up throughout Somalia and how they relate to the larger international dynamics of the Horn of Africa region. Jubaland, the purple-shaded territory along the country’s southwestern border, is the slice of Somalia that the East African state of Kenya unilaterally treats as its own, occasionally sending military forces and conducting airstrikes there to battle Al Shabaab. The forthcoming section about East Africa and which relates to that country in particular will explain the fear that Kenya has of Somali Nationalism and Al Shabaab, but for now it’s enough to just know that Nairobi envisions Jubaland as being its exclusive sphere of influence and one day operating as a buffer state in insulating the country from the rest of Somalia’s destabilizing woes.

As for the others, it remains to be seen exactly under which foreign powers’ purvey they will fall, but it’s reasonable to assert that Ethiopia will always have an interest in their activities. Looking back at the 2006 anti-terrorist intervention against the ICU, Ethiopia entered the country through the regions that are now generally identified as Galmudug, Mogadishu, and the South West State, thus underlining just how important Addis Ababa views these territories as its most preferred access route for directly influencing Somalian domestic events. It’s anticipated that this geopolitical reality will remain constant, although it’s unclear to what extent Ethiopia will be able to influence these regions in the future and whether or not it will ever stage another anti-terrorist intervention there. The latter scenario is only relevant if Al Shabaab launches a Daesh-like cross-border invasion aimed at establishing a terrorist ‘caliphate’ or if it stages some similar sort of provocation within the broad Somali Region (previously known as Ogaden). Should this transpire, then Ethiopia might end up repeating its 2006 operation and subsequently also occupying parts of the country for the proceeding next couple of years. This, however, is dependent on the military’s sustainable capabilities, and a domestic crisis such as a (preplanned and timed) separatist struggle against Oromo nationalists might force it to hasten an early withdrawal and concentrate more on responding to its most immediate and purely domestic threats.

To summarize, the implementation of Identity Federalism within Somalia’s specific domestic context and under its socio-political conditions has in effect institutionalized the warlordism that has been prevalent in the country for decades, and while this creates obvious challenges for the Mogadishu federal authorities, it also brings with it certain ‘opportunities’ for foreign states in most definitively carving out their envisioned spheres of influence. This state of affairs is most ‘mutually’ visible in the de-facto independent statelet of Somaliland, but it can also occur in any of the others, especially if a forthcoming domestic political crisis leads to them similarly cutting their established ties with Mogadishu and employing their respective militias in bloodily carving out a more ‘sovereign’ fiefdom within their territories. Also, the spheres of influence that were referred to might not always be ‘mutually’ agreed upon by the envisioned host region and their foreign ‘partner’, since as in the case of Kenya over Jubaland and Ethipia over Galmudug, Mogadishu, and the South West State, unilateral foreign action might be imposed out of furtherance of each intervening state’s subjectively defined self-interests.

The Scramble For Somalia:

This domestic geopolitical reality directly coincides with the abovementioned details about Institutionalized Warlordism, but deserves to be mentioned as its own separate domestic vulnerability and strategic factor owing to its large-scale importance. The UAE and possibly its fellow GCC partners are militarily involving themselves in Somliland, Ethiopia has a history of intervention and prolonged militarily presence in Galmudug, Mogadishu, and the South West State, and Kenya occasionally involves itself in Jubaland, which altogether proves that foreign countries are scrambling to delineate their interests in a centrally weak and broadly autonomous Somalia. That’s not all, however, since Turkey, like it was mentioned in Part I, is interested in setting up a military base inside the country too, albeit focusing on the Mogadishu Region. This would make it the second non-African state to have an indefinite military presence in the country, although of course the US’ secret drone bases mustn’t be forgotten as well. On top of all of this, the African Union (AU) maintains military facilities within the country as well, and it’s through the framework of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that countries such as Burundi and Uganda have legally deployed their respective forces.

Scaling down the focus and moving from state to non-state actors, it’s worthwhile to once more bring up Eritrea’s UNSC-suspected role in supporting Al Shabaab terrorists and the link that this group has with Qatar. Addressing Asmara, it follows that it used (and perhaps still uses) this organization as part of its region-wide proxy war against Addis Ababa, while Doha sees in it a proxy army that could advance its respective ideological and geopolitical aims.

Again, there is no smoking gun that links either of these two countries to Al Shabaab without a sliver of reasonable doubt,  but the existing arguments and provided evidence are convincingly enough to presume that some sort of connection between them did and likely still exists to a certain extent. From here, the analysis can thus proceed to the incorporation of non-state actors as agents of certain states’ geopolitical faculty, which thereby returns the focus to the regional federalized statelets and the interaction that states have with them and their respective militias (whether friendly such as the UAE and Somaliland or hostile such as during Kenya’s incursions into Jubaland). In accordance with the tenets of Identity Federalism that the author has written about before and periodically cited throughout the book, it’s expected that foreign states will intensify their state-to-non-state diplomatic interactions within Identity Federalized countries such as Somalia, and given the examined country’s geopolitical significance to global politics, it’s assumed that this will accelerate in the near and medium terms and usher in a competitive Scramble for Somalia.

Renegades:

The last driving issue in determining Somalia’s domestic stability is the role of Al Shabaab, which the author describes as a renegade terrorist group that disturbingly poses a latent regional threat on par with Daesh. The term “renegade” is applied towards the organization because it contravenes all established international norms and practices and is used by its two suspected partners of Eritrea and Qatar to destabilize the region in an unconventional way. Al Shabaab, just like Daesh, could one day turn on its previous partners and completely “go rogue” in becoming an uncontrollable source of trouble for every affected actor, be they its victims or former patrons. The interfusion of “Greater Somalia” nationalism, anti-Ethiopian sentiment (which could broadly be manipulated under the inclusive banner of “anti-imperialism”), and Wahhabi jihadism makes the group’s message attractive to misguided youth and mono-issue individuals who prioritize any of these three platforms above the rest of their life’s ideals. If Al Shabaab effectively harnesses the groundswell of support that it could possibly cull by exploiting each of these three unifying ideologies individually and then gathering them under the collective umbrella of their organization, then the terrorist group might receive a boost of support among some key constituencies and quickly rise to the level of strength that its ICU predecessor once wielded.

The renegade terrorist group would certainly succeed in prompting one, if not several, military interventions if it succeeds in gaining more prominence and power. For starters, Ethiopia would almost certainly intervene to a limited or all-out extent in order to prevent its Somali Region (formerly called Ogaden) from falling victim to the ideological contagion being spread by Al Shabaab. Kenya, too, would be compelled to do something similar vis-à-vis Jubaland, both to protect its own interests and also out of the regional leadership competition that’s playing out between it and Ethiopia.

Nairobi would not want to strategically ‘cede’ any square inch of its envisioned sphere of influence in southwestern Somalia to Ethiopia, the latter of which might broaden any forthcoming intervention to include that area as well. The African Union would likely get involved too, although its inner political mechanisms might prevent it from taking as immediate and resolute of a decision as either Ethiopia or Kenya, therefore making it the third most likely participant to directly militarily intervene, or in the case that it’s still present in the country at the time of this scenario (which is all but assured), beef up its forces prior to a robust offensive campaign. It can also be assumed that the US would play a Lead From Behind role via selected air/drone strikes, special forces incursions, and a strategic advisory to one, some, or all of the intervening militaries.

Considering all of the destabilizing “free-for-all” scenario branches that could predictably develop in response to Al Shabaab’s rise in Somalia, it’s fair to say that this terrorist organization represents the ultimate renegade factor in the country and perhaps in all of the Horn of Africa and, by Kenyan extent, to parts of East Africa as well.

Djibouti

Overview:

Tiny Djibouti has grown into one of the most geostrategic and competitively sought-after states in the whole of Africa, and this is entirely the result of its position along the Bab-el-Mandeb and its Chinese-financed railroad connectivity to the expanding Ethiopian economy. Its port facilities allow a handful of its closest military partners to assert their share of influence in behaving as the maritime ‘gatekeepers’ to Europe alongside of course Egypt and its control over the two Suez Canals.

djibouti-01

The flurry of diplomatic-military attention that’s been given to Djibouti proves that there’s an active competition underway among various powers for equaling or at least approaching Egypt’s role as it regards the flow of European-Asian goods by way of the Red Sea. On a grand scale, this indicates that the world is cognizant of the dual maritime-mainland nature of China’s One Belt One Road policy, and that while the unipolar actors are frenziedly confronting it and attempting to block the mainland portions along the Russian frontier, they’re also simultaneously trying to do something similar in regards to the maritime one along the Bab-El-Mandab and Djibouti.

It’s not at all forecast that they plan on shutting down the waterway anytime soon, but it’s the potential latent capabilities that the US and its GCC allies are trying to attain (the latter of which were nakedly exposed in the War on Yemen) that signifies a strategic threat to the multipolar world on par with the one that’s posed to the Strait of Malacca and its related interregional connectivity function. For this reason, the concentration of focus on Djibouti is all the more important because this country has become host to so many varied military facilities by a handful of geographically diverse states, heightening the competition that’s been unleashed for advantageous access (and proactive safeguarding potential) to the Bab-el-Mandeb ever since the late-2000s “pirate” scare was used as the grounds for initiating the subsequent international naval scramble.

Too Many Cooks In The Kitchen:

As the saying goes, if there are “too many cooks in the kitchen”, it means that there are too many decision-makers in too small of a given space. This is the case when it comes to the multitude of military actors on the ground in Djibouti, which to review, includes the US, China, France, Japan, and soon Saudi Arabia. It can be understood that the unipolar forces will generally all align their intelligence operations against China, just as China will do against all of them in proactive response, but neither camp is expected to physically harm the other. Instead, Djibouti is turning into a spy haven and a forward operating base for drone, special forces, and other types of non-conventional involvement in the region’s affairs, to say nothing of the employment of conventional naval forces. With the small state being used as a springboard for the promotion of grand regional strategies, it could ironically be said that it is “to small to fail”, or in other words, it is too small of a strategic base for all of the involved powers that none of them can afford to shake its stability and risk undermining their respective self-interested deployment in the country.

Color Revolution Threats:

As is regretfully typical, however, it’s likely only a matter of time that a security dilemma will develop between the US and China, by which the Pentagon’s allies will bandwagon together in devising a plan to protect their military interests at the same time as they devise another one that’s aggressively aimed at undermining China’s. The US’ track record of destabilizations suggests that Djibouti is obviously not immune, despite the US and its allies’ military presences and related superficial interest in retaining general stability there. The driving motivation for the US to undermine the existing government of President Guelleh is to pressure him to either renege on his basing deal with China or replace him with a compliant stooge who will carry out the orders that he refused. Following the documented playbook of Color Revolution strategies, it can thus be expected that the US will soon start to stir up some Hybrid War threats against the government, and in this perspective the December 2015 anti-government riots can be seen as a warning to Guelleh of what might later come if he doesn’t abide by Washington’s wishes.

The blowback potential to this scheme is that Guelleh might end up ejecting their military bases instead of China’s if he is forced to fend off (with Chinese advisory or direct assistance) a serious enough Hybrid War threat to his government. Furthermore, even if the regime change operation succeeds in removing the President, his replacement might not be exactly who they expect it to be, or the selected individual might end up being preemptively swayed by China and thereby strategically neutralized in carrying out any damaging policies against its interests. The unpredictable circumstances that can thus (and as a rule, typically and in a chaotic fashion do) transpire through the unipolar commencement of Hybrid War might end up reversing the hoped-for strategic gains and ironically inflicting damage upon their creators. Djibouti is so important for unipolar strategy that the purposeful destabilization of the country isn’t a scenario that will be considered lightly by the pertinent decision makers who ultimately call the shots on whether or not to carry through with it, but conversely, because it’s also just as important (if not more) for China’s grand strategy, it’s possible that some of them might feel confident enough to initiate this dangerous gambit.

Afar And Somali Nationalism:

The Tripwire

In the advent of a breakdown in state authority, probably triggered by a Color Revolution and latent Hybrid War push by the unipolar Djiboutian-based intelligence units, it’s likely that the country might split into violently bickering identity groups along traditional ethnic-clan lines. Demographicallyspeaking, around 60% of the country is populated by the ethnic-Somali Issa clan, whereas roughly 35% is inhabited by the Afar, a transnational group of people whose territory spreads out across Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia (the latter of which has granted them a geographically broad federal state). It’s also important to note at this point that the former French colony in modern-day Djibouti was called the French Territory of the Afars and Issas in the 1967-1977 period immediately preceding independence, emphasizing the role that both people have played in the country for at least the past half century (if not obviously longer). Tensions between the two sides reached a violent climax in the 1991-1994 Djiboutian Civil War which saw Afar rebels fighting against the Somali-Issa government, but in the end the authorities and their numerically larger ethnic constituents prevailed and ethnic Somali/Issa clansman President Guelleh was elected in 1999.

It’s important to point out that the Afars mostly concentrated their civil war activity in the northern reaches of the country where they’re natively from, and that in today’s current schema, this would place the Ethiopia-Djibouti railroad outside of their area of forecasted operations should a second civil war ever (as unlikely as it may seem at the moment) break out in the future. Considering that the said railroad is the spine of Djibouti’s strategic significance to the African hinterland, it’s accordingly appropriate to consider how it could be geopolitically affected by reactionary (or even proactive) Somali nationalism within an identity-based Hybrid War scenario in Djibouti. As a result of historical-colonial circumstances and the 1977 independence of their own sovereign state, the Issa Somalis have cultivated a separate identity from their Somalian nation state and namesake compatriots, which themselves have been proven after the beginning of the 1991 civil war to be a lot more deeply divided than may have initially met the eye during the Cold War and Siad Barre’s decades-long 1969-1991 administration.

Identity Unity And Disunity

In many respects, Barre functioned as a socially stabilizing force in uniting or at least pacifying the disparate Somali clans just as Gaddafi did in relation to the Libyan tribes, and the forced removal of both leaders had devastating consequences for national unity. It’s uncertain whether Guelleh serves a similar personal function for Djibouti or not, but it’s predicted that domestic disturbances against him could be the trigger needed to once more divide the country along its Afar-Somali/Issa lines which of course have geographic north-south dimensions, respectively. If this somehow opens the presumably dormant Pandora’s Box of Somali Nationalism and revives the idea of “Greater Somalia”, then instead of Djibouti being the recipient of the now-fractured Somalian state’s irredentist ambitions, it could turn out that the tiny country or at least some of its more nationalist grassroots (possibly even unipolar intelligence-influenced) individuals actively push to initiate the expansion or ‘unification’ of Djibouti with Somaliland in order to maximize the proposed state’s geostrategic significance and fulfill their ethno-nationalist desires.

There’s nothing concrete to indicate that this is a topic of popular discussion in Djibouti or Somaliland, but the author takes his cue from the observed experience of “greater” nationalist projects all across the world and their activation amidst periods of domestic identity strife. Also, the presence of so many unipolar military forces in Djibouti might likely also hint that there’s a sizeable NGO (intelligence front) complementary presence as well which could be discretely working to promote this agenda. From the unipolar standpoint, an expanded Djibouti-Somaliland (if the latter agreed to it) would lengthen their strategic presence along the southern passages of the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, thus joining the Ethiopia-Djibouti railroad, the Port of Djibouti, and the Somaliland port of Berbera together under one de-facto geopolitical unit.

Scenario Branches

Nevertheless, this might incite a counter-reaction from the Afar, which could then agitate for their own independence, unification with the Afar Region of Ethiopia (and thenceforth the destruction of the Djibouti geopolitical unit), or possibly even some form of Identity Federalism within Djibouti in order to retain the extant borders of the unwinding state. If that potentiality turns out to be the case, then the Afar would acquire the sparsely populated and landmine-infested northern reaches of the Gulf of Tadjoura while the Somali-Issas would receive the southern and more populated reaches, with the capital and ethnically mixed city of Djibouti (and all of its military facilities) being a separate political unit in the shade of Old Cold War-style Berlin. In this construction, the Ethiopia-Djibouti railroad terminal would be in the separately administered capital zone while the rest of its path passes through the Somali-Issa region, but it’s a near certainty that the Afar would want to have some sort of profit-sharing agreement with the Somali-Issas in order to financially survive in their resource-lacking northern reaches (which also haven’t been rented out for military bases, at least not yet).

To wrap up the scenario forecasting that was just undertaken by the author, a Color Revolution and/or Hybrid War attempt by the unipolar forces to change the existing Djiboutian government and oust China’s military presence in the country could reopen the ethnic wounds between the Afar and Somali-Issa communities, possibly leading to either the dissolution of the Djiboutian state and its division into “Greater Afar” as a sub-state entity of Ethiopia (but which would for sure be opposed by Eritrea out of its fear of encirclement) and “Greater Somalia” or “Greater Somaliland” or the Identity Federalized internal partitioning between two or three separate entities. In all likelihood, regional and world powers would now allow Djibouti to simply dissolve and be divided between its two largest neighbors because of the effect this could have in upsetting the delicate balance between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and if this specific scenario was advanced, then it would probably lead to a continuation war between the two Horn of Africa rivals.

Al Shabaab Aggression:

The last strategic factor affecting Djibouti is the possibility of attack by Al Shabaab, which might exploit the Muslim Somalian identity of the most vulnerable segments of the pertinent 60% of the population in order to gain militant recruits for carrying out its indirectly anti-Ethiopian assault there. They were already responsible for a May 2014 suicide attack in the capital which prompted the UK Home Office to warn that the terrorists may be planning to target more Western soft targets inside the country.

This precedent proves that Djibouti is on Al Shabaab’s radar and it will probably remain there for as long as the organization is in existence. A Paris- or Mumbai-style all-out assault on the country’s capital city would immediately prompt a state of pandemonium, as each foreign military organization that’s based there scrambles to understand what is going on and devise the most advantageous and self-interested way that they can assist the nation’s security forces in responding to the crisis.

The resultant competition might be fierce and unfriendly, and uncoordinated anti-terrorist measures by the US and China, for example, could even lead to unintended incidence of ‘friendly fire’, further heightening tensions between the two global rivals. Al Shabaab, as always, is the ultimate agent of chaos in the Horn of Africa and it’s impossible to accurately predict within a given certainty just what it will do, the impact it will have, and the domestic, regional, and international responses that it would elicit.

Eritrea

Overview:

The third and last littoral state in the Horn of Africa region, Eritrea is peculiar by all international political standards. Like was discussed earlier in the research, it’s engaged in hostilities or been in heightened tensions with all of its neighbors, which has led to a siege-like mentality among its population that has been readily promoted by the government. For this reason and many others, Eritrea is commonly regarded as a “rogue state” by the international community, which also involves the UNSC. This security organ unanimously implemented sanctions against the country because of what was alleged to be Eritrea’s support of the Al Shabaab terrorist organization. While the sanctions were decried by some alternative media commentators, it’s indisputable that both Russia and China agreed to these measures out of what they felt were justifiable grounds for doing so at the time, and that the personalities criticizing Moscow for its behavior in this regard almost always purposely avoid doing the same thing to Beijing. So as not to sidetrack the research too much into becoming an analytical commentary on the subtle workings of tacit pro-imperial and anti-Russian “alternative” media voices, the author would like to conclusively summarize that the existence of UNSC sanctions as also agreed upon by the multipolar leading states of Russia and China have led to the “rogue state” stigma being applied to Eritrea.

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The Red Sea state is rich in mineral resources but poor in living standards, and this is both a result of economic-administrative mismanagement and the priority that the state gives to military affairs over civil ones (as seemingly justified due to the siege-like mentality that was earlier touched upon). Eritrea is estimated to spend around 20% of its GPD on military affairs, which obviously eats an enormous hole in the national budget in order to defend against what it views as multi-vectored threats from literally every geographic direction. Partially because of the poor economic conditions inside the country and the large amount of GDP that it’s dedicated to the armed services, the Eritrean government is understandably hurting for cash, which might explain one of the reasons why it turned to the wealthy GCC in collaborating with them in their War on Yemen. For as right or as wrong as commentators may have felt that Eritrea was for its post-independence rogue-like behavior, whether as an expression of destabilizing aggression or resistant multipolar pride, it’s fair to say that by recently cooperating with the GCC, Asmara has unequivocally sided with a pro-American unipolar coalition in order to receive money, fuel, and the possibility of sanctions relief, a halt in the West’s “Weapons of Mass Migration” plot that’s been hatched against it, and possibly Gulf and other investment after positioning itself as a favorable though unspoken partner in this globally infamous campaign.

Near-Permanent State Of War With Ethiopia:

The first primary defining characteristic of Eritrea’s strategic situation is that it has been on near-constant war footing with Ethiopia ever since independence, and that this has come to literally dominate every aspect pertaining to the country. To recall the opening portion of the Horn of Africa research, the Ethiopian-Eritrean Cold War has stretched all throughout the region and is especially a factor in Somalia, which explains Asmara’s suspected cooperation with Al Shabaab. The perceived threat that a continuation war could break out at any moment necessitates Eritrea’s sovereign right to spend so liberally on military affairs and institute a forced and indefinite draft policy for its citizens. This latter decision will be returned to very soon when describing the effect of the West’s “Weapons of Mass Migration” on Eritrea, but as pertaining to the former, the country’s military expenses are not solely used on conventional investments. Instead, a good amount of Asmara’s strategic attention is focused on utilizing asymmetrical elements in offsetting the stability of the Ethiopian government, and this particularly takes the form of hosting a handful of secessionist and anti-government organizations.

The Transnational Tigrayans:

Out of all of the Ethiopian-originated groups that Eritrea supports, perhaps the most strategically affiliated are the Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM) which even the UN has accusedAsmara of assisting. While all insurgent organizations are destabilizing to various extents, there exists a certain strategic symbiosis between the Eritrean government and the TPDM, largely stemming from the transnational state of ethnic Tigrayans between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the Red Sea state, Tigrayans are estimated by the CIA World Factbook to comprise a whopping 55% of the population, while in Ethiopia, where they have their own ethnic-based federal state, the same source lists them as being just 6.1% of the nation’s total, though it should be underscored that this means that there are almost two times as many Tigrayans by number inside of Ethiopia than in Eritrea. Also, the percentage figures don’t properly indicate the inverse importance that Tigrayans have played in recent Ethiopian history because the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was the main driver of the anti-Derg resistance organization at the end of the Ethiopian Civil War and is speculated to be the most important component of the present-day governing Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

Interestingly, the TPLF was allied with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), so essentially what’s happened is that the two civil war allies have broken apart and assumed leadership roles of each of the rival states, adding a further dose of complicating drama to the Ethiopian-Eritrean Cold War. What this means, however, is that the Tigray Region of Ethiopia is seen by Eritrea as an especially vulnerable region owing to the cross-border spread of this ethnic group, but correspondingly, the same could also be said about Eritrea’s Tigrayan-inhabited areas vis-à-vis Ethiopian grand strategy. To add to that, though, it’s thought that the Ethiopian Tigrayans are more loyal to Addis Ababa then they’d ever be to Asmara because they are perceived as gaining a disproportionate advantage from their positions within the ruling EPRDF and are consequently not predicted to turn their backs on the government which benefits so much. However, due to the perception among some critics that the Tigrayans occupy too influential of a position in the EPRDF and the rallying potential that this can have for gathering opposition-minded civilians into anti-government manifestations, it’s also not predicted that Ethiopia at this time and given its presumed internal political leadership’s arrangement would risk launching a war against Eritrea on the stated behalf of creating a sub-state “Greater Tigray” (although this might in fact be the unspoken tangential result of any forthcoming successful war).

No matter how the Tigrayan factor is or isn’t used by either side of the Ethiopian-Eritrean Cold War, it’s inescapable to ignore that it’s one of the most emotionally charged elements between them and will likely continue to occupy an important and symbolic role in their strategic rivalry with one another.

“Weapons of Mass Migration”:

Harvard researcher Kelly M. Greenhill’s groundbreaking 2010 research on “Weapons of Mass Migration” introduced the controversial concept that states were generating, provoking, and exploiting transnational human flows, and considering the documented lessons of what this theory looks like in practice, it can be confidently asserted that contemporary Western policy towards Eritrea applies various facets of this stratagem. There’s been a lot of negative coverage lately about the exodus of Eritrean “refugees” from their homeland and how this poorly reflects on the domestic conditions of their society, but while there are mixed reports about the accuracy of whether or not Eritrea is as bad of a “failing state” as it’s popularly described to be in the mainstream media, the large-scale human outflow from the country can objectively be attributed to two separate reasons.

The first one, to refer to what was touched upon previously, is the government’s policy of forced and indefinite military drafting of some of its citizens. It’s not the author’s place to comment on whether the “refugees” that “flee” from this policy are traitorous turncoats or future-focused opportunists, but it’s undeniable that the forced and indefinite draft is the reason why a substantial amount of people are leaving the country to never return. The other reason that needs to be mentioned alongside the same vein as the prior one is that European countries have a complementary and facilitative policy to this whereby they granted some sort of “protection status” to Eritreans between 91% and 93% of the timeon average. Undoubtedly, this almost guaranteed assurance that all Eritreans have of being given “refugee” or other “protection” status in the EU serves as a very powerful pull factor in magnetizing the high rates of out-migration from their country. Regardless of what the given push or pull factor may be, the UN refugee agency’s 2015 estimate that nearly 400,000 have left the country of slightly over 6 million people over the past 6 years speaks to the magnitude of impact that the West’s “Weapons of Mass Migration” policy has had on Eritrea.

The reason that the country is being targeted is because it has historically been reluctant to integrate into the Western-led international economic and political order, which to Eritrea’s credit, it has stoutly succeeded in doing up until the present day. Western countries and especially their most elite transnational corporations would like to access Eritrea’s wealthy mineral deposits with the preferential sort of conditions that they have elsewhere in the non-Western world, and Eritrea’s refusal to grant them this is what largely explains the West’s hostility to it and utilization of “Weapons of Mass Migration” in asymmetrically weakening its internal military, economic, social, and eventual political stability. Even so, as commendable of a brave and anti-systemic stand as Eritrea has made over the past two decades in that respect, this doesn’t excuse its UNSC-suspected support of the Al Shabaab terrorist group or its recent collaboration with the GCC’s War on Yemen. Instead, it can be argued that Eritrea’s sovereign choice to remain as far outside of the world system as feasibly possible put its government in the position where it had to eventually resort to such unscrupulous actions in order to sustainably survive. Looking forward, if the “Weapons of Mass Migration” that the West has used against Eritrea prove to be utterly devastating over the long run, then it’s possible that the country will either collapse entirely or bend progressively to the Western world’s whims, the latter of which might evidently have already begun as seen by Asmara’s willing participation in the War on Yemen.

Bad Friends, Bad Future:

Background Context

The final thing that will be discussed about Eritrea’s strategic position is its silent alliance with the GCC in their War on Yemen. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea released a report in October 2015 claiming that the latter “forged a new strategic military relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that involved allowing the Arab coalition to use Eritrean land, airspace and territorial waters in its anti-Houthi military campaign in Yemen” and that “Eritrean soldiers are embedded with the United Arab Emirates contingent of the forces fighting on Yemeni soil”. While Asmara has vehemently denied that it sent troops to Yemen, it has remained strangely silent on the allegations that it allowed the GCC to use its territory for striking its cross-sea neighbor. The author wrote two detailed analyses about this development for Katehon and The Saker, but the general idea in terms of how it relates to the present research is that Asmara has finally ‘come in from the cold’ and is now closely collaborating with one of the most aggressive unipolar military blocs in history, dramatically turning its back on whatever perceived pro-multipolar policies it had in the past and boldly charting a new geopolitical future for itself.

Changing The Game

That’s not all, though, since the new strategic relationship between Eritrea and the GCC which was forged by the blood that has been spilled in the War on Yemen is actually an ultra-destabilizing development for Ethiopia, which now has to contend with the very real and dangerous possibility that its foe has gained the military support of some of the Mideast’s most aggressive players. The aforementioned analyses describe this more thoroughly and should certainly be at least skimmed through by the reader if they’re genuinely interested in understanding what a potential game-changer this might become in relation to the strategic balance in the Horn of Africa, but the basic idea is that Asmara might seriously be cultivating its ties with the GCC in order to prepare for a forthcoming war of aggression against Ethiopia. It’s sensible to think in terms of this scenario owing to the siege mentality that Eritrea has been in over the past two decades and the utmost hate that its leadership has for Ethiopia, and even if it decides to launch its campaign simply due to the heated rivalry that it has with its opponent, this would have the most negative of repercussions for China’s Silk Road strategy in the region, especially if the GCC got involved in supporting Eritrea.

‘Plausible Deniability’

None of the parties acknowledge the UN’s report about their alleged military relationship, probably because of the sensitivity that’s involved due to the GCC’s much-needed strategic agriculturalrelations with Ethiopia, but that doesn’t take away from the very real military-strategic impact that they can have on the long-term stability of the region. If Eritrea decides on its own to go to war with Ethiopia or is pressed to do so by the US as a condition for the lessening of “Weapons of Mass Migration” pressure on the country, then if Asmara retains its nascent ties with its new GCC allies (and there’s no indication that it would willingly return to “rogue state” isolation and reject the monetary advances of its new ‘friends’), it will likely bring them into the fray as well. Qatar and possibly even Saudi Arabia by that time might have a very real interest in offsetting Ethiopia’s rise and tangentially obstructing China’s One Belt One Road geostrategic multipolar project in the Horn of Africa, which ultimately accords to the US’ grand strategy as well. As it stands, Ethiopia and Eritrea are relatively evenly matched, and this state of affairs has retained the cold and tense ‘peace’ between them since their latest large-scale conventional war in 1998-2000, but the insertion of GCC military-strategic capabilities into the equation on Eritrea’s side could dramatically upset the established balance and quickly turn the tables on Ethiopia.

The China Factor

In response to this unfolding potential threat, Addis Ababa may be compelled to enter into an arms race with Eritrea which would essentially amount to one against the GCC as a whole if they turn the former province into their personalized military outpost on Red Sea. In this case, Ethiopia would not be able to compete with the wealthy Gulf Kingdoms, but it could decisively shift the balance by intensifying its strategic relations with China and depending on any forthcoming security commitments that Beijing makes towards it. China wouldn’t be able to properly defend Ethiopia in the event of any GCC-related hostilities against it (even if they use Eritrea as their proxy), but its Djibouti-based force could present a tripwire deterrent towards the Gulf’s large-scale proxy escalation of conflict because none of its allied countries would have anything at all to gain by destroying their relations with China and targeting its military units which might by that point be sent to frontline advisory positions inside Ethiopia. An interesting twist to the security dilemma between Eritrea and Ethiopia can therefore be forecasted, in that the more that Asmara tries to bring in GCC support to bolster its capabilities (whether physical or strategic, potential or kinetic), the more that Addis Ababa can do the same with China, thus setting the stage for a possible prolonged GCC-China proxy confrontation in the Horn of Africa over influence along the Bab-el-Mandeb and its related continental interior.

Ethiopia

Overview:

The second most populous state in Africa is unquestionably one of its emerging leaders and a pole of attraction for Great Power competition and investment. Right now, China is Ethiopia’s unrivaled partner and is assisting its rise to regional leadership in all capacities. The Chinese-financed Ethiopian-Djibouti railroad and LAPSSET network to the Kenyan port of Lamu are instrumental in decisively surmounting the country’s landlocked geographic constraint and directly engaging with the outside world. Altogether, these two megaprojects will catapult Ethiopia’s standing from a regional force into a globally recognized power in its respective corner of the world, and their completion will create a magnet of incentives for foreign investors to compatibly boost its rapid development. Addis Ababa follows Beijing’s lead to such a tee that the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is closely modeled off of the centralized administrative-political structure of the Chinese Communist Party. With China assured of its predominant position as Ethiopia’s prized partner of choice, it can thus work on maximizing the win-win benefit that it hopes to acquire from this relationship and help develop the country into one of the most dynamic economic nodes along the One Belt One Road global network.

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Pairing nicely with Ethiopia’s envisioned economic leadership role in the coming future, the country has also demonstrated a proclivity in expressing diplomatic, resource, and military leadership as well. For example, Ethiopian diplomacy is very actively involved in bringing a settlement to the South Sudanese Civil War, and Addis Ababa’s plans in constructing Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, the Grand Renaissance Dam, will give it total control over most of the Nile’s headwaters and thereby enable it to exert strategic influence on Sudan and Egypt (much to their grumbling consternation and objections). Finally, Ethiopia’s 2006 anti-terrorist intervention in Somalia, while no doubt controversial and polarizing to some, showed that the country is willing to flex its military muscle when it feels it appropriate to do so. All of these leadership-evoking roles, whether assessed by various observers as being positive or negative in accordance with their personal viewpoints, objectively leave no doubt that Addis Ababa sees itself as one of Africa’s rising powers and a continental force to be reckoned with in the larger Horn of Africa-East Africa super region. In view of this, the factors affecting Ethiopia’s strategic stability can be seen as crucially important for all of its direct and immediately indirect neighbors.

In order to add some additional context to Ethiopia’s examined position, it’s highly recommended that the reader reference the author’s aforementioned Katehon and Saker works about the GCC’s anti-Yemen cooperation with Eritrea. The author expanded on some of Ethiopia’s strategic qualities within those articles and they could be useful in helping the reader acquire a more comprehensive assessment of the domestic situation there. Additionally, because the scenario of a renewed Ethiopian-Eritrean war was already discussed earlier, it won’t be reiterated in this section.

When Is A Federation Not A Federation?:

There’s no issue more important to Ethiopia’s domestic stability than the highly partisan one of its existing state of federalization. The so-called “opposition” (both unarmed and armed) state that the country’s form of government is insufficient in granting what they believe to be “equitable representation” to the country’s myriad ethno-regional groups. Even though Ethiopia is already internal delineated according to 10 identity-based regions and the separately administered capital city, they believe that this is nothing but a ‘farcical ploy’ in showcasing a pretense to ‘democracy’. What they’re actually advocating is the pressured transformation of Ethiopia’s centralized federation (a political oxymoron of sorts) into a loose and disjointed Identity Federation that would function as a collection of quasi-independent statelets and undermine all of the leadership advances that Ethiopia has undertaken in over the two past decades. To be sure, there’s definitely a monetary incentive that the envisioned ethno-regional fiefdoms’ leaders and aspiring elite have in seeing this occur, since they’d be able to more closely concentrate their respective entity’s natural resource and human capital profits into their own hands as opposed to having to share it under the present arrangement with the rest of the country in accordance to Addis Ababa’s centralized guidance.

This draws into question what the exact nature of Ethiopia’s present federalized arrangement actually is if it’s not autonomous enough to the pro-Western Identity Federalists’ liking. Interestingly, broad structural parallels can be made to the effectiveness of Ethiopia’s model of federalism and that of the US, since both are in essence federalized models that satisfy certain symbolic criteria for their respective constituencies but inarguably retain very powerful centralized cores that have the overriding and final say on the most important elements of coordinated domestic affairs. That is to say, Ethiopia and the US are “federations” in the technical textbook definition sense of the word, but they don’t function in the manner that many people have rightly or wrongfully come to stereotypically expect from such a system. This is the bone of the externally provoked domestic contention that occasionally flares up in Ethiopia, since the existing federal system itself efficiently works to its full potential but does not legislatively manage itself in the manner that some of its citizens have falsely been misled by the US and others into believing is the “proper” way that a federation should run.

Internal Anti-Systemic Threats:

The EPRDF’s centralized federal system that’s actively practiced in Ethiopia is under threat by two complementary Hybrid War forces that regularly conspire against it and which can by theoretical definition be divided into their constituent Color Revolution and Unconventional Warfare components, however, the country’s circumstances are such that there is more often than not a strategic-tactical blurring between these two parts. For example, the Ginbot 7 “opposition group” is regularly presentedto Western audiences in a favorable light but is in reality a self-described “armed” organization, or in other words, a domestic regime change terrorist network that is also suspected of having ties with Eritrea. What would otherwise be a purely Color Revolution vanguard group had it not self-described itself as “armed” and admitted to taking up weapons to violently overthrow the government is in reality a doubly dangerous organization, in that it functions as a ‘publicly presentable’ international face for the anti-government ‘protest’ movement but also simultaneously carries out very clear Unconventional Warfare goals. Being the closest that Ethiopia has ever come to having a leading Color Revolution organization yet not tactically ‘pure’ enough to fully be described as one owing to its stated terrorist agenda, it can be generalized that the regime change conspirators have conclusively decided that all anti-government groups must have some sort of Unconventional Warfare attributes in order to immediately transition into Hybrid War battle mode at a split second’s notice.

What makes Ginbot 7 unique though is that it is technically not tied to a given ethno-regional identity and claims to be broadly inclusive of all potential members that it can cull from the domestic Ethiopian pool. This stands in contrast to the more traditional Hybrid War organizations such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which are generally tied to a given demographic, the Oromos and Somalis respectively. Concerning the first ethnic group, the rioting protests that some of its members initiated at the end of the year and which the author analyzed at the time have been accused of being linked to the OLF and Eritrea, which if true would be a reverse tactical application in which a generally Unconventional Warfare group engages in Color Revolution techniques and not the other way around like with Ginbot 7. It’s worthy at this moment to mention that the Oromo are the largest ethno-regional plurality in Ethiopia and that some of its members aspire to use this demographic fact to attain internal hegemony over the rest of the country, so the related doctrines of Oromo separatism and Identity Federalism are appealing to a certain segment of this group for these very reasons. However, no single terrorist group is strong enough to defeat the EPRDF and the Ethiopian military on their own which is why some of them have united into a semi-organized front, such as last May when the Tigrayan People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM), Gambella People’s Liberation Movement (GPLM), Benishangul Peoples Liberation Movement (BPLM), Amhara Democratic Force Movement (ADFM), and Ginbot 7 came together under an unnamed umbrella.

Assessing the state of Ethiopia’s strategic stability, the authorities must properly confront Hybrid War terrorist groups that masquerade in front of the global cameras as “pro-democracy” and “pro-federalization” ethno-regional-based civilians, but which can quickly reveal their true colors as lethal Unconventional Warfare foes capable of inflicting inordinate damage to the state system. Although the US has publicly distanced itself last year from such terrorists as Ginbot 7, OLF, and ONLF by stating that it does not support the use of armed force (especially by these particular groups) to overthrow governments, its hypocritical actions in Syria and elsewhere prove that this was nothing more than a public relations gimmick and likely presages that Washington is in fact actively cooperating with these terrorists but has wanted to present a semblance of ‘plausible deniability’ in order to proactively cover its tracks. The Hybrid War threat posed by these organizations is a difficult one to respond to, but Ethiopia has no choice but to rise to the existential challenge and face this major problem, as it’s predicted that this danger will probably become even more acute in the coming years as China solidifies its One Belt One Road influence in the country and Ethiopia naturally becomes recognized as one of the continent’s up-and-coming regional leaders.

Foreign-Originating Unconventional Threats:

Ethiopia is obviously under threat from Eritrea’s myriad intrigues that are aimed at undermining its leadership, but having already covered that in the previous section, it’s necessary to speak more about the other dangers that it’s facing. There are generally only two others that are significant enough to talk about, one of which has already been explored pretty comprehensively thus far. Al Shabaab is obviously a major threat to Ethiopia’s stability, although Addis Ababa can be applauded for keeping the organization outside of the country and largely contained to Somalia. It can be assumed that there are some terrorist cells residing in the Somali Region (formerly called Ogaden) and possibly even some attempted attacks that have been thwarted at the last minute over the past couple of years, but by and large, there doesn’t seem to be a considerable Al Shabaab presence in the country in spite of the presumably porous borders that Ethiopia shares with Somalia. The Daesh effect in using social media and other information-communication technology tools to propagate the terrorists’ message is mostly inept in this part of the world because less people are plugged into these platforms than they are elsewhere across the globe, which thus mitigates the potential for this occurring but of course doesn’t preclude it from eventually becoming a sizeable threat sometime further down the line.

There’s no ‘rule’ saying that Al Shabaab has to concentrate on recruiting the Somali community in Ethiopia or targeting areas within its namesake region, although these will predictably remain its areas of focus. That said, it’s very possible that the terrorists could be planning and eventually end up carrying out a large-scale attack across Addis Ababa or other larger cities within the country, and it can’t be excluded that they could team up with some of the many ethno-regional Hybrid War groups throughout Ethiopia in maximizing their collective chaos potential. Depending on the severity of any possible Al Shabaab attack, Ethiopia might be pressured to once more stage an anti-terrorist intervention into Somalia, although this time it might be of a considerably lesser scale and for a much briefer period of time than what it did in 2006-2009. It would of course have to exercise caution so as to not get itself caught in a debilitating quagmire that could unbalance its security forces from dealing with pressing domestic threats such as those from Ginbot 7 and its terrorist allies, so this policy option would have to be utilized judiciously and only in the most extreme cases. Be that as it may, the nature of Al Shabaab’s threat is that it’s so entirely unpredictable and always recently results in a highly publicized incident (e.g. the Westgate shopping center and Garissa College attacks in Kenya)  that Ethiopia might have no choice but to launch some sort of symbolic attack in Somalia regardless, no matter if it’s purely superficial and not tactically helpful.

The other main foreign-originating unconventional threat is the potential for South Sudan’s violence to spill over the border and destabilize Gambella Region. The UN refugee agency reported that Ethiopia “became the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa” in August 2014 after more than 190,000 South Sudanese refugees cumulatively had streamed into the country, many of which entered into Gambella. This frontier territory is estimated to have only around 300,000 people, and yet the UN accounted for 271,344 South Sudanese refugees being located there on 1 April, 2016. It’s clear to see that the region has been overwhelmed by what might also be cynically functioning as “Weapons of Mass Migration” in attempting to trigger a centrifugal identity reaction in tearing apart Gambella and the neighboring diverse Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR). The SNNPR is a quilted patchwork of various tribes and ethnicities and is the area of Ethiopia which most closely bears a structurally identity diverse and potentially conflict-prone resemblance to South Sudan. The incipient danger is that the structural destabilization that the refugees might inflict in Gambella could spread into the SNNPR and be taken advantage of by Ginbot 7, its allies, and Al Shabaab in order to throw Ethiopia into the burner of full-scale and nationwide Hybrid War violence, putting the authorities on the defensive in all fronts and inevitably leading to one or another regime change group making relative gains on the ground in the immediate aftermath.

To be continued…

Andrew Korybko is the American political commentator currently working for the Sputnik agency. He is the author of the monograph “Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach To Regime Change” (2015). This text will be included into his forthcoming book on the theory of Hybrid Warfare.

2016 in Review Era of the Princess Emperror Tewodros II – SBS Amharic

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2016 in Review Era of the Princess Emperror Tewodros II – SBS Amharic
2016 in Review Era of the Princess Emperror Tewodros II – SBS Amharic

What Do WE Want and Do Now (that “WE” Have Met the Enemy?) (Part V) [Al Mariam]

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by Prof Alemayehu G. Mariam
enemy-met40Author’s Note: This is the fifth installment in a series I have called “What Do WE Want and Do NOW?”.  The serialized commentaries have three aims: 1) take stock of the impact of the recent uprisings in Ethiopia against the backdrop of the extreme repression (“state of emergency”) unleashed by the Thugtatorship of the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (T-TPLF); 2) challenge Ethiopians, particularly Ethiopian intellectuals, to think outside the box, indeed with no box at all, about going  forward, and 3) propose some ideas that maybe useful in charting a future course of action given current circumstances. “We” have met the enemy and he is us!

As I suspected, my commentary last week seems to have ruffled a few feathers. Did I air a bit of the dirty laundry in public?

Some suggested I appeared holier-than-thou in characterizing some of the “opposition”, especially in the Diaspora, as power-hungry and –thirsty. Others did not take well my exhortation to acquire “emotional intelligence”. Some said I should take personal responsibility and organize the Diaspora “opposition” into a unified political force instead of writing prescriptions about what needs and should be done.

I aim to address the foregoing points in this and future commentaries.

Part I, HERE; Part II, HERE; Part III, HERE; Part IV, HERE.

XIV. “WE” must speak of ourselves as “WE” are, nothing extenuate.

As my website prominently proclaims, I aim to speak truth to power. But that is not all. I aim to speak truth to the power-abuser, the power-hungry and –thirsty and even the powerless. I tell it as I see it. For a long time, I have held back and bitten my tongue in speaking about “US”, the “opposition”, for various reasons. I directed my energy and focus on that corrupt gang of criminal thugs known as the “Tigrean People’s Liberation Front” (T-TPLF) playing divide and rule “government” in Ethiopia. It was difficult to critique the “opposition” when there is no identifiable organized “opposition”. The late thugmaster Meles Zenawi used to threaten the amorphous “opposition” allegedly “plotting” and “hatching to incite protests and terror” that they would “pay a price.” By the thugmaster’s standards, anyone who does not like him or his T-TPLF are the disloyal and subversive opposition. He used to threaten “opposition leaders” that if they misbehave they will “vegetate in jail forever.” For Meles, his own shadow was also the opposition.

Barack Obama said he opposes any Ethiopian opposition “group” “that is promoting the violent overthrow of a government, including the government of Ethiopia, that has been democratically elected.” Obama must have been smoking something when he said that because the only “government” that used violence to seize power is the T-TPLF. Yesterday’s terrorists are today’s respectable governments. What Obama failed to understand was the fact that once a thug, always a thug. Obama himself said it when he was running for the presidency. “You know, you can put lipstick on a pig, but it’s still a pig. You can wrap an old fish in a piece of paper called ‘change.’ It’s still gonna stink after eight years.” Obama can put lipstick and nail polish on a cackle of hyenas, but at the end of the day, they are hyenas. After 25 years wrapping themselves in power, hyenas stink to high heaven.

“WE” have come to believe that a few individuals railing on social media, commenting in the blogosphere, convening conferences, and propagating information in cyberspace represent the “opposition”. I am afraid “WE” have confused the politics of dissent and dissidence with the politics of organized opposition. I find recent trends in the “hyper-ethnicization” of the “opposition” particularly disturbing; and in the long-term, I believe it will guarantee the perpetuation of thug rule in Ethiopia. “WE” in the “opposition” can do no greater favor to the T-TPLF than talking their mother tongue of ethnic division, hate and hegemony.

The fact of the matter is the there is no organized opposition inside or outside Ethiopia.  The T-TPLF has made it impossible for any organized opposition to emerge in the country. Meles used to intimidate the opposition: “We will crush them with our full force.” The T-TPLF have jailed, tortured, disappeared, exiled and killed “opposition” leaders and members. They have bought off, blackmailed and intimidated others to stay out of “opposition” politics. They have persecuted and prosecuted those suspected of supporting the “opposition”. Obviously, the decimation of existing domestic “opposition” groups and elements in the country and making sure that no new ones emerge is in the self-interest of the T-TPLF.

However, it is a complete mystery to me why the Ethiopian Diaspora “opposition” cannot unify around a common agenda and present a clear alternative to thug rule. Every day the T-TPLF massacres and jails wholesale innocent citizens, and the Diaspora “opposition” is quibbling about ethnicity and jockeying for the illusion of power. This situation is “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” to my mind.

Lately, I have observed that the Diaspora “opposition” is styling in earnest along ethnic lines. The “opposition” is all about ethnonationalism. Self-appointed and –anointed individuals and groups are spewing the toxic vocabulary of ethnic hate, division and chauvinism. Interestingly, it all seems to be a gabfest of parrots. I have no idea why the “opposition” wants to play the T-TPLF’s zero sum ethnic games. Only the T-TPLF could be the victor in the game of ethnic thrones whoever plays it. The tragedy is that some in the “opposition” are sleepwalking in the T-TPLF minefield of ethnic and identity politics. The outcome is predetermined. The T-TPLF guys are watching on the sidelines smiling ear to ear as their opposition commits the equivalent of hara-kiri before their eyes.

What “WE” have today in the Diaspora is an opposition unified against itself; an “opposition” resolute in its opposition against its own rational self-interest. “WE” have an “opposition” that seems to be unwilling, unable and unready to form a genuine inter-ethnic and inter-religious alliance willing to work together to defeat the gang of criminal thugs that are plundering the country and indiscriminately massacring citizens and lay a foundation for an egalitarian society based on the rule of law. This, in my view, is sheer madness.

I have often wondered why the Diaspora “opposition” will cut its nose to spite its face. The “opposition” talks the talks of being unified against the T-TPLF but it refuses to walk the talk. That is the crux of the problem.

As I indicated in my last commentary, “WE” do not ask the right questions as the “opposition”.  “WE” should be asking how “WE” can organize around the common problems and issues that impact negatively on all Ethiopians regardless of their ethnicity, religion, language, gender or region. “WE” should unite in the cause of the  tens of thousands of political prisoners who are languishing in T-TPLF jails. The T-TPLF torture chambers are in overdrive. The T-TPLF state of emergency is the official stamp certifying Ethiopia today is a totalitarian police state. “WE” must unite around the suffering of our people.

I must confess I do not know the priorities of the Diaspora “opposition”. Is it the removal of the T-TPLF and seize power? Is it the formation of new and improved ethnic homelands, the apartheid-style bantustans created by the T-TPLF and called “kilils”?  Is the endless debate and recrimination about staking out positions for a post-T-TPLF era? Does it make any sense to play right into the dirty hands of the T-TPLF obsessing about ethnic politics?

The whole raison d’etre (the one and only reason) of the T-TPLF is the ethnic and communal fragmentation of Ethiopia. Is that what the “opposition” wants, particularly those who vow to see the dissolution of Ethiopia if they don’t get what they want? If so, why pretend to be the opposition? Why not openly join the T-TPLF and hasten the process of disintegration? Why put up the drama? Why torment oneself in a process of psychological projection?

My personal view on ethnic politics is well-known. I believe the T-TPLF created its apartheid-style homelands (kilils) to disempower the vast majority of the people and empower themselves as the sole masters of the Ethiopian people. The T-TPLF leaders know ten separate fingers flexing alone are powerless and useless. But when ten fingers come together and make a double fist, they can deliver a knockout. The T-TPLF created a Bantustan (kilil) of 9 regions (fingers). The T-TPLF cut the 10th finger, the thumb, and gave it away in 1994. Now, the T-TPLF is facing opposition from 9 fingers flexing  separately. Is it possible to push even a wobbly T-TPLF to the ground with 9 fingers flexing separately with a thumb missing?

“WE” should face the facts as they are.  WE” are doing the T-TPLF’s dirty jobs as the “opposition” by promoting the politics of ethnic identity and communalism.  If only “WE” knew what the T-TPLF say about “US” in private. It’s like the old Ethiopian saying: “If you knew what they say about you, you would not go to market.” The fact of the matter is that the “opposition” is unwittingly allying itself with the T-TPLF and advancing its divisive ethnic agenda. The T-TPLF guys did not stay in power wielding absolute power for 25 years by being dumb. They stayed in power by skillfully playing one group against the other. Machiavelli would be proud of them.

What the “opposition” needs to clearly understand is the fact that the T-TPLF appears strong because the “opposition” is weak; they appear organized and monolithic because the “opposition” is fragmented and disoriented; they appear decisive and resolute because the “opposition” is unsure and shows very little self-confidence; they appear unified because the “opposition” is in disarray. In short, the “opposition” has met the enemy. The enemy is not the T-TPLF. The enemy is the “opposition”.

XV. Are “WE” really serious about working for political change, democracy, freedom or human rights in Ethiopia?

“WE” talk about democracy, freedom, human rights and the rest of it. “WE” gather and pontificate about the virtues of “unity” and “solidarity”.  What I have observed over the past decade is that there is a lot of talk and a lot less walk the talk in the “opposition”. At best, there is half-hearted action towards collective action on the major issues.

The question that has puzzled me for long is determining the basis for “opposition” unity and solidarity. Is it ideological? Policy-based? Driven by vision and mission? Is it based on ethnic singularity? Nationality? Humanity? Or is it about elite unity and solidarity?

This question, I believe, has a three part answer. First, those who present themselves as the “opposition” or part of the “opposition” have a duty to articulate their vision, plans and programs and share them with the public in an educational campaign, and further engage the public in the discussions and debates. What are the “opposition’s” programs for political, economic and social change? What issues are to be given priority?

Second, the “opposition” must produce a comprehensive and systematic critique of the T-TPLF’s policies and programs, or what are palmed off as such over the past 25 years. That is easier said than done as the secretive T-TPLF hides everything. In my limited survey of the T-TPLF record, I have documented that the T-TPLF political economy is a statistical sandcastle. I have completely debunked the T-TPLF’s claims of double-digit growth over the past decade. It is a complete fabrication. I have demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt that the T-TPLF cooks the economic statistics to make itself look good. On numerous occasions I have challenged the T-TPLF to disprove my claim that they manufacture statistics to inflate economic growth. I know for a fact that the bean counters are directed by T-TPLF bosses to prepare two sets of books; one containing the real data and the other for public consumption and public relations with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the so called Development Assistance Group (DAG). But it is all lies, damned lies and statislies.

How many in the “opposition” can honestly say they have taken time to study the T-TPLF’s economic programs, laws, regulations and administrative and bureaucratic practices? How can one propose changes without fully understanding the existing rotten system? When the T-TPLF guys marched out of the bush into the capital, they were clueless about governance or policy. Meles was so clueless he had to beg some guy from the U.S. embassy to get him introductory economic texts. Later he began putting on airs after he started hanging out with Jeff Sachs and Joe Stiglitz who showered him with praises as a smart cookie. They were just coddling his fragile ego. The point is “We” do not want a repeat of the Meles-type on the job training.

I urge the “opposition” to undertake a comprehensive assessment of T-TPLF policies, programs, laws, regulations, etc. I often ask myself how many in the “opposition” have taken the time to carefully study the T-TPLF’s so-called “Growth and Transformation Plan 2010-15” and 2005/10, which the T-TPLF touts as the best thing that happened to Ethiopia since the invention of injera and wot? Anyone who has carefully studied that compilation of slogans, catchphrases and buzzwords knows how that gang of ignorant thugs have laid waste to the country. But I would wager few in the “opposition” have taken the time to delve into that economic fairy tale.

On the question of human rights, nearly all of the work is done by international human rights organizations, not the “opposition”. I do not expect the “opposition” to take over the work of the dedicated human rights organizations. But I believe it is important for the “opposition” to undertake a modicum of human rights data collection and analysis even on an anecdotal basis. I am also distressed by the fact that very few in the “opposition” take the time to read, digest and disseminate the findings of the reports of the international human rights organizations for educational and advocacy purposes.  I also see few “opposition” groups organized specifically to promote and advocate human rights in Ethiopia. So that I am not misunderstood, I want to make it clear that I fully support and applaud all who engage in demonstrations and protests actions whenever gross human rights violations are committed by the T-TPLF. It is vitally important to express moral outrage and be heard. My concern is more with the need for a Diaspora-based human rights effort operated by the “opposition”. How could human rights be promoted in a post-T-TPLF period if the seeds are not planted and allowed to grow now?

The nitty gritty work of human rights data collection and analysis and coordination with the various international human rights organizations is a time intensive and exhausting task. It may even be dangerous for those collecting data inside the country. But working closely with the international human rights groups and providing them support to do more must be a top “opposition” priority.  Moreover, the “opposition” needs to make human rights education and advocacy a priority.

On the question of democracy and democratic governance, I do not see much headway either. I have tried to learn about the T-TPLF’s “revolutionary democracy”, but that has led me on a wild goose chase. The chief ideologue of “revolutionary democracy” did not leave much written work behind to study;  and none of the Meles-worshippers have taken it upon themselves to expound on his “revolutionary democracy”. Like many things the T-TPLF leaders do, “revolutionary democracy” is a shell game with very little substance. Because the T-TPLF leaders are so sure that no one in the “opposition” will systematically challenge them on ideology and policy, they continue to recycle their tired and meaningless catch phrases, buzzwords and mumbo jumbo as “policy”, “vision” and “mission”.

But what is the “opposition’s” alternative for democratic governance?  “Ethnic democracy”?

Over the years, I have seen a few drafts of “constitutions” circulating in cyberspace. They were good starting points, but they all seem to have died on the vine. I have even participated in conferences and meetings aspiring to explore constitutional and governance alternatives. So I wonder out loud: Why is it that the “opposition” has not drafted alternative versions of proposed constitutions and presented them for ongoing public debate? When thugmaster Meles assembled his “constitutional drafters”, he manipulated them to produce a document that served his divide and rule purposes. But Meles never had any intention of abiding by his own constitution. It was something he whipped out whenever he went panhandling for aid and loans. He would say, “Look I have a constitution that is better than the U.S.” Meles actually said his so-called anti-terrorism laws was the best in the world because he did a word-for-word cut-and pastejob from the world’s best anti-terrorism laws. That has always been Meles’ and the T-TPLF’s problem. They think all it takes is to copy someone’s ideas or steal business plans from unsuspecting license applicants and make it happen. I believe the “opposition” should engage in an ongoing constitutional discussions and work collaboratively to develop creative ideas to deal with age-old problems.

XVI. Why I write, teach and advocate instead of engaging in political organizing

As I have stated on numerous occasions, I came upon Ethiopian politics not by personal choice but by force of circumstances. After living in the United States for decades, I had little interest in politics in Ethiopia or in Diaspora Ethiopia. When the T-TPLF took power in 1991, I wrote a few articles (available on my website) which took a wait and see attitude. I was simply not interested and was quite busy with my own professional interests.

Everything changed for me in 2005 when the late Meles Zenawi personally ordered his goons to shoot and kill any protesters following the 2005 elections. I later learned from a singularly authoritative source that  Meles had ordered the shootings to demonstrate to the opposition and the country as a whole that he could be ruthless against those who challenge his power. He wanted to send a clear message: Oppose me and I will crush you. It was a calculated shock and awe strategy; and it did work for several years as few dared to protest or oppose him in public.

The Meles Massacres of 2005, following the May election that year, transformed me from a disinterested casual observer of Ethiopian politics to a relentless and indefatigable human rights advocate. What deeply bothered me about Meles and his gang was not the fact that they used power to enrich themselves. I expected that from crass bush thugs. What enraged me was how Meles could feel so arrogant and so unaccountable that he could order a massacre and go on with business as usual without being challenged. Of course, I read and heard of African dictators massacring their citizens to cling to power. Those stories always saddened me and caused me to despair over the fate of Africa. But I was never enraged as I was when I saw the bloody pictures of the victims of the Meles Massacres. I decided to convert my rage and outrage by becoming the voice of all the Meles Massacres and all other victims of T-TPLF massacres and crimes against humanity. That was and remains my mission today.

Over the years, I have been sked why I have not joined a political group or party or participated in organized political activities. My answer is always the same. I am a teacher, a lawyer and a human rights advocate. I have absolutely no interest in the politics of power nor do I have any ambition for power. If I were to pursue politics, I would probably make a very bad one. A guy who proclaims to speak truth to power cannot be in power. It would be odd to speak truth to oneself. Truth telling and politics, like oil and water, don’t mix. So I leave the practice of politics to those who are experts in the art. I believe I can do a much better job speaking truth to those in power, abuse power, out of power, wanna get into power and dream about power and the powerless, than to be in power myself. I like the humorous definition of politics, which is derived from “poly” meaning “many” and “ticks” as in blood sucking ticks.

Over the past 11 years, I have sought to teach and preach on the cause of freedom, democracy and human rights every week. That I will continue to do. There are many who are inspired by my writings. Many find them educational and instructive. I suspect there are many others who blindly disapprove of my writings and views. I doubt many of those actually understand what I am writing. But no matter. There are T-TPLF supporters who believe that I am so obsessed with hatred for the T-TPLF that I would hound them to the gates of hell if I could. People can take what they choose from my writings and comments and interpret them any way they want. I do not write for public accolade and approval or to invite censure and disapproval. I speak my mind and exercise my right to free expression to the maximum. I do not apologize to those who are offended by my writings. They have the option not to read my commentaries and avoid the heartburn of my weekly sermons. My philosophy is simple: The dogs will bark and the camel will walk. But I will apologize and make immediate correction and amends if it is demonstrated to me that a falsehood or factual inaccuracies are included in my writings. In all of the years of writing I have done, I have not met a single person who has been able to prove to me that my opinions have been based on lies, damned lies and statistical lies.

But I regard myself to be an advocate, inside the courtroom and outside in the court of public opinion.  I argue my points and use the evidence to cogently support my point of view and to persuade my readers to agree with me. I believe that to be my professional, ethical and advocacy obligation. I welcome criticism and debate. But those whose forensic skills is in ad hominem attacks, I say, “It’s water off a duck’s back. The dogs will bark and the camel will walk.”

Here I should like to note that my total contempt for the T-TPLF leaders should not be mistaken for hatred. I have no hatred for the T-TPLF leaders because I do not know any of them; nor do I care to know them. It is illogical to hate someone I have never met. I have tried to keep up with their publications to gain insights into their thinking and the kinds of persons they are. For the most part, I find them striving for academic, social  and political respectability. They aim to present themselves as enlightened and visionary leaders. Many of them have purchased degrees from online diploma mills and now demand that they be called “Dr.” and so on. It is a source of comic relief for me. I don’t really care about their pretend games. The fact of the matter is that I have no antipathy for them; but they have earned my absolute contempt as criminals against humanity, murderers, war criminals and jailers of dissidents, opposition leaders and journalists. My only wish is to see them before the bar of justice and teach them a lifetime lesson in the rule of law.

But I don’t wish to avoid accountability on my part. Why can’t I organize a formal or informal group for the advancement of human rights and the rule of law in Ethiopia? I don’t want to hide behind excuses, but I have tried so many times to put together informal groups and found no takers. Beginning in 2006, I have tried to organize  Ethiopian lawyers and set up a legal defense fund, without much success.  I have called for and volunteered to help in the establishment of an informal “think tank” on various occasions to no avail. I even offered the idea to established “opposition” groups who turned deaf ears to my plea. I have attempted a variety of collaborative efforts, but I have found no serious takers. It would take too long to list the reasons why my efforts have failed. Suffice it to say that making a long-term commitment and making the human rights struggle as part of one’s personal life may not be a choice for everyone. It may not make a lot of sense for many people to put out a lot of hard work on behalf of people who live far, far away and where the results are not immediately visible. Human rights advocacy is not as sexy as politics. But that is just the way it is.

That does not mean I have given up; quite to the contrary, I shall continue to challenge my fellow academics, lawyers, activists and others to start efforts where we could join forces to work on human rights issues and advocacy. I would hasten to add that to be successful in such an effort, participants must agree to check in their political ambitions at the door and roll up their sleeves, put their noses the grindstone, shoulder to the wheel and keep on plugging away….

To be continued….

“Ethiopia’s Crisis:- Things fall apart, Will the center hold?” A Rejoinder  [by Minga Negash]  

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Minga Negash
Minga Negash

In his November 24, 2016 article, Mr. Rene Lefort described the Ethiopian crisis and theorized that the problem is a center-periphery issue, underpinned by economic growth and exacerbated by the power vacuum left by the late dictator, Mr. Meles Zenawi.  Mr. Lefort’s narrative, however, is not the same as the one that was made at the two-days-long conference which was held in October in Washington DC, under the theme of Transition and Constitution Making in Post-Conflict Ethiopia. I also read Professor Messay Kebede’s critique and Mr. Lefort’s response. It is an interesting and timely discourse, with scholarly decorum. In this rejoinder I attempt to show that no single theory fully explains a social and economic phenomenon, and argue that the center-periphery thesis does not fill a void. As Amartya Sen succinctly documents, “the asymmetry of power between the ruler and the ruled which heighted culture, cannot be used to the explain failure of governance”. We need to find a better analytical framework.

On a text level, the author of the original article does not hide what he intended to say, for the article is readable despite its wordiness. The work appears to be a chronicle of his latest trip to Ethiopia rather than a documentation of a serious research, and hence unlike his other works, it contains ambiguities and assertions. In the response of December 5, 2016 Mr. Lefort slides and concludes that the continuity of the Ethiopian state is conditioned on EPRDF’s internal dynamics, as if the Ethiopian state is one of the post colony states of Africa, and founded on the fables of gedli historians. The piece and the response confuse between known problems of decentralization (organizational instabilities when sub entities have/do not have/ mass base) and ordinary factionalism or power blocks within organizations.  From a source perspective, the writer appears to have privileged access to the regime’s kingpins. The only other sample included in the report was one of the last dissenting legal voices in the country, Dr. Merera Gudina, a fearless advocate of dual identities, who is now finding himself in the jails of the dictatorship.

At a conceptual level, the article reignites the debate about the type of association (if any) between political institutions and economic growth. Is there causality or reverse causality between the two variables, and if growth exists, who are/were the actors (winners and losers)? These questions were subjects of careful works of academics and policy makers. The great classical and contemporary economists have immensely labored to produce a wealth of literature, in the context of both developing and developed nations. Qualitative arguments crucially depend on contextual orthodoxy (country’s uniqueness or exceptionalism), and hence attempting to examine Ethiopia’s crisis along the lines of orthodoxy is/will not be an exception.  However, in the evaluation of a text, empirical or otherwise, one is obliged to ask whether a text makes sense to either theory or practice or both; one has to examine whether the text hides anything. Theorization therefore suggests a “self-conscious development and specification of abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationship such as chains of cause and effect.” From Mr. Lefort’s description of the events in Ethiopia, one expects a major idea (s) to come out from an author of his stature, with the aim resolving the tensions. Indeed the major idea that is coming out of his piece is that the regime will and probably should continue, under a set of conditions (ifs and buts), regardless, and the threat to its rule is from within. The declaration of the state of emergency has as much to do with power dynamics (the PDOs’ elevation from a status of being TPLF’s satellites to junior partners) and factionalism within the ruling party as the attempt to quell the uprisings in various parts of the country.

In a paper entitled “Do Institutions Cause Growth”, Glaeser, La Porta and Lopez De-Silanes, using cross section of country data across a time period of forty years show that “human capital is the basic source of growth than political institutions; and poor countries get out of poverty by good policies often pursued by dictators and subsequently improve their institutions”. For them, institutions are sets of rules, attitudes, ethical standards, procedures and norms that are designed to constrain those in authority, and underscore that growth in poor countries may be feasible without immediate improvement in institutions.

The Economist of May 7 2016 compared the degree of crony capitalism in developed and developing economies, and the latter group of countries accounted for 43% of global GDP but for 65% of global crony wealth. During the last two decades capital moved from one country to another without restriction, financial liberalization allowed crony capital to consolidate itself, capture the state, speculate and evade taxes, and allied with dictatorial regimes, minorities and families to serve as intermediary for  foreign capital; owned crony industries through shoddy deals (large farms, banking, mining, telecommunications, and real estate) and pushed up prices, particularly property prices in these countries. Crony capitalism in many countries thus has led many nations to be vulnerable to discontents, surprising election results, political instability and government unaccountability. Cross country studies such as the above however had econometric problems where a number of social and political variables are difficult to recognize and measure, and hence more recent studies have attempted to examine “within country” factors, such as geography, culture and other social variables, which accentuate/attenuate cronyism.

Enter Ethiopia’s growth and institutions. The African Development Bank and the World Bank have been producing rosy pictures for the Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) region. Credit rating agencies painted a similar picture for channeling debt capital to the region. The deficit model of higher education development justified massification without proper professors. There were several narratives of economic miracles. Flat ties and black sheds became fashion. Even President Obama incensed many Ethiopians when he talked about a democratically elected government in Ethiopia. The small economies of SSA appeared to have been put on a steroid, and Ethiopia appeared in the Keynesian beauty contest, to show high rise and shiny buildings and engineering design simulations on televisions. Increase aid, remittance and debt finance, crisis in the greater Horn of Africa, and China’s rush for the control of resources and markets, have all begun to unravel themselves, questioning the legitimacy of relationship based (crony) capitalism as the gains (if any) did not trickle down to the population.

In his response to Professor Messay critique Mr. Lefort argued that growth has increased inequality but at the same time makes strange conclusion that poverty has also been reduced. If poverty has indeed been reduced, it is not clear how much of the alleged reduction was financed by the generic growth of the economy and not by external aid, and why the country is facing so much food shortage and outmigration. A number of economists, including Professor Seid Hassan, Professor Alemayehu Geda and Professor William Easterly, and Oxford University’s Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI)-http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Ethiopia.pdf and the mass outmigration of Ethiopians provide evidence that is contrary to Mr. Lefort’s “eye witness” account of prosperity or the regime’s largely politically loaded and exaggerated growth statistics. The growth espoused by dictatorial regimes throughout SSA, if it exists, quickly lost steam as citizens continued to suffer from conflict, the brutality of the state, debt burden, forced outmigration and internal displacement, and the dynamics of heighted economic, social and political discontents, exacerbating ethnic, faith and other differences. Ethiopia’s growth story, if it exists, is not very different from the rest of SSA.  Hence, for TPLF/EPRDF the odds have assembled again, challenging the growth hymn, to a level of a storm. The central question is whether or not it will wither the current storm via its instrument of a “command post”.

Moving to the institutions, many argue that EPRDF’s own mission and structure is a problem. Furthermore, there are more than 58 locally registered political parties and another 20 or so exiled and armed groups, all contending for power. At least half of the 80 or so parties have regional perspective. TPLF thrived on this. Fractured as they are, neither the structures of the political institutions nor the TPLF authored constitution has been able to manage and regulate political behavior and the relationship based capitalism, or the master servant relationship within the ruling party. There is little difference between the central committee of the party and the national parliament, and spouses and family members sat as members of a polite bureau. The key stakeholders do not want to change this structure as they are the benefactors of the system. Hence the rhetoric of controlling rent seeking behavior and the promise of reform cannot be taken seriously.  The regime’s structure and the political ethos it advanced produced untouchables, normalized cronyism, legitimized minority rule, overemphasized diversity rather than commonality, weakened the institutions of the state, forcing everyone to behave opportunistically and “think in a box”. When cronyism is added to regionalism or other forms of closed social associations, the contest for the control of the soul of Ethiopia’s institutions gets high as the cost of inaction proved fatal for the disfavored and unorganized groups.

Understanding the discontent, fracture and armed insurrections in various parts of the country thus requires a new perspective for assessing the internal and external dimension of the conflict. Constraining the behavior of those who control the levers of real political and economic power is one important issue.  Another important and practical question is the space and time for conflict management, resolution, justice and reconciliation. Until the conflict is resolved the capturers of the institutions of the state shall continue to attempt to the control, masses continue to protest, armed groups get legitimacy and popularity, foreigners get a chance to advance their own interest, and peripheries opt to ignore or undermine or exit from the so called “union of ethnic groups” construct of Ethiopia. They delegitimize the state simply because that is the bargaining instrument they have, and at present aggrieved parties do not have the institutional mechanism to resolve conflict from within. Regionalism as an instrument of bargain and de-legitimization of the state are likely to continue for a while but many have already realized that fads and fables do not persist.  Had Mr. Lefort’s energy been spent on this direction, it would have been a worthwhile investment.

With the TPLF/EPRDF determined as it is to assert its authority,  and continues its head-on collision with the new intelligentsia, under the mantra of growth, law and order or now ironically on “Ethiopian-ism”, it is only talking to itself and the demand for improved institutions will almost certainly continue as growth (if it exists) demands better political institutions. Furthermore, TPLF/EPRDF must know that the growth, if it exists could also have come in spite of it. In short whichever way one understands the causes and consequences of the conflict change appears unavoidable. Predicting future events is hazardous but probability theory also does not support Mr. Lefort’s many ifs and buts to happen concurrently to make the TPLF/EPRDF an agent of change. More importantly, change does not come out of the fiats of autocrats and benefactors of cronyism. What saved the TPLF/EPRDF from the storm is neither its political institutions, nor its popularity in Tigrai nor its “centrist elite”, it is rather the mono ethnic top brass of the defense and security organ which is a benefactor of the cronyism. Mr. Lefort is correct in questioning how long the situation persists, and that shall remain a puzzle. However, as the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyweered once argued, fundamental change is not possible without a “system break up”. No doubt examining how the cronyism gets replaced by better political institutions requires discourse; and there are several avenues for this. It is however incorrect to conclude that a breakup of an organization that is built on conflict and cronyism leads to the breakup of nations.

 

ESAT RADIO Dec 5 Mon 2016

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