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The new proclamation in the making, Ethiopia aims to privatize six sugar projects in first quarter of 2020

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Bileh Jelan/ Addis Standard

Addis Abeba November 29/2019 – Ethiopia’s State Minister of Finance, Eyob Tekalign (PhD), said Ethiopia was in the process of conducting evaluations including technical and social impact assessments and validation of factories covering all the thirteen sugar projects in Ethiopia with plans of privatizing six of them in the first quarter of the year 2020.

The Ministry has also prepared a draft Sugar Industry Administration Proclamation, which, among other things, establishes a Sugar Board of Ethiopia with tasks that include regulating the sugar industry and licensing and registering millers.

This was revealed at a day-long public consultation on the sugar industry was organized by the ministry on Nov 27 at Sheraton Addis. The event saw the presence of representatives of key government officials such as Eyob himself, Weyo Roba, CEO/Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, Beyene Gebremeskel, Director General/ Public Enterprises Agency and Dr. Brook Tayeb, Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Finance along with representatives of different stakeholders and local and foreign investors.

“As you know, the Ethiopian government is undertaking homegrown reforms where one of its agendas is to turn the focus on public enterprises,” Said Eyob and clarified that the purpose of the consultation was to inform, educate and consult the public about the reform process the sugar industry is undergoing. The sugar policy is “changing the way the telecoms policy changed,”he said.

The objectives “are to fulfill domestic demands, to generate exports and to create jobs,” he said, adding, “to attract investors and make the industry attractive so Ethiopia could reach its high potential, are important.”

Weyo Roba, the CEO of Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, complimented Dr. Eyob when he said, “our roadmap is to make our factories more efficient and reach our highest potential.”

In the introductory remarks given by Henok Assefa, Founder of Precise Consult International and Co-Founder of Angel Investors Network Ethiopia, said, “The sugar industry is a priority sector, and the government invested billions and billions of dollars in it.” Highlighting the goals of the consultation and explaining that an eco-system that sees participation from all stakeholders would “make the industry excel locally and compete globally.”

Dr. Eyob Tekalign in his opening remarks on the sugar industry privatization and government priorities made the point of explaining that the whole idea of homegrown reforms was to have better understanding and have better results. “The government is building on past successes while achieving and pushing for its own”, the state minister said. Speaking on the importance of homegrown reforms the state minister added, “Reforms should be family anchored and relatable to the Ethiopian socio-economic factors.” He added that through the reform process the government was aiming at seeing the sugar industry fulfill its potential, creating an inclusive environment for the private sector to take lead in the industry and having the country become the regional leader in sugar production.

A presentation by Dr. Tewodros Mekonnen on the sugar industry privatization, assessing policy and regulation highlighted that the industry is performing below potential, has an infant out grower schemes, is inefficient in logistics and distribution, is affected by low export competitiveness and high import demand and affected by the high excise tax that stands sat 33%. DR. Tewodros said “Estimates of sugar consumption in the country put it at 6-7 kg per capita, some estimates put it as high as 12 kg which is still below African standards,” he added, “Consumption will rise according to research in diet.” In his presentation he suggested separation of out growers development schemes from the sugar board, reasonable adjustment of the excise tax, adjustment to domestic and international trade policies and price stabilization could help push for positive results.

A presentation on sugar regulatory reform needs and key features of the draft sugar proclamation by Getahun Walegn followed. The presentation tried to answer questions raised about the need for a separate regulatory framework for the sugar industry. The product’s political sensitivity and importance to key industries such as food processing and pharmaceuticals, the peculiar characteristics of the industry, private sector interest, industry protection from global distortion and its role in jobs creation for rural communities were given as primary reasons. The presentation also discussed the Draft Sugar Proclamation that saw the establishment of both the Sugar Board and the Sugar Arbitration Tribunal and further discussed the technicalities of the Sugar Academy & Research institute.

Michael Hinge, a Senior Analyst at LMC International Ltd, gave a presentation on global, regional & domestic sugar markets and its implications on the Ethiopian industry. He discussed supply and demand in Ethiopia and put the official figure for sugar consumption at 5-6 kg per capita with 550-660 thousand tonnes produced annually from 8 functioning factories, which is below neighboring coastal countries where unofficial sugar inflow increases per capita consumption. He also put the unofficial inflow of sugar at 150-225 thousand tonnes in 2018/19 fiscal year and predicted that consumption will rise by 3-4% annually. On the supply and demand in export markets, Mr. Hinge noted “Ethiopia is located in a deficit region in Africa.”

A plenary Q&A session followed with Henok Assefa as moderator, Beyene Gebremeskel of the Public Enterprises Agency, DR. Brook Taye of the Ministry of Finance, Fasil Gebremeriam of the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, Dr. Tewodros Mekonnen, the Country Economist at IGC, Getahun Walelgn and Michael Hinge of LMC International Ltd as panelists. Answering a question regarding the potential of job creation Beyene Gebremeskel said, “The industry currently employs 30,000 people. When all factories commence operations, that could increase 10 folds and indirect jobs created may surpass into the millions.” Dr. Book Taye, discussing the issue of who will have monopoly over the industry said, “We want to make sure nobody has monopoly over the sugar industry and no-one has monopoly over how the sugar board is structured.” Underlining the nature of the newly established Sugar Board, Fasil Gebremeriam said, “The board is not a regulatory board, it is a consulting body representing different associations and professionals in order to manage private and public interests.”

Responding to Addis Standard on delays in PM Abiy Ahmed’s promise to have factories on the pipelines begin to operate within six shortly after he assumed his premiership, Weyo Roba of the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation said, “When PM Abiy Ahmed took office only six factories were operational. The delay was due to old contracts terminations, technical issues and the re-evaluation process for some of the projects.” He added, concluding, “A factory will go operational in 6 months, other factories are under construction and the Omo-Kuraz plant will start construction in a month’s time.”

In October this year, Bloomberg News reported that Ethiopia was “investigating possible misappropriation of funds meant for the expansion of 10 state-owned sugar factories that are part of the industry now slated for privatization.”

AS


Ethiopian Defense Minister Opposes Premier’s Party Merger Plan

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By  Samuel Gebre
Bloomberg
November 29, 2019,

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is facing opposition from one of his closest allies in his proposal to merge the ruling coalition into a new party.

Defense Minister Lemma Megersa said he disagrees with the rushed merger of political parties, according to an interview with the Voice of America. Lemma is the deputy chairman of Abiy’s Oromo Democratic Party.

Lemma said he also opposes Abiy’s new philosophy to unite the country, called “Medemer,” directly translated as “to add.”

Lemma’s comments come ahead of general elections expected in 2020, raising more challenges to the success of a new unity party. The merger has the support of all coalition members, even though it faced opposition from Tigray People’s Liberation Front, which was a former leading member.

The ruling coalition has been in power for 30 years in Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning prime minister has vowed the general election would be democratic.

Why are Egypt and Ethiopia fighting over Nile waters?

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Ramadan Al Sherbini
REUTERS

Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam is seen as it undergoes construction work on the river Nile in Guba Woreda, Benishangul Gumuz Region, Ethiopia September 26, 2019.Image Credit: REUTERS

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has triggered wide fears in Egypt, which relies heavily on the Nile to cover the water needs of its population of nearly 100 million people.

As many as 97 per cent of Egyptians live along the banks of the Nile where the country’s most fertile farmland is.

97%

of Egyptians live along the banks of the Nile

190828 river nile
A view of the Nile river in Egypt’s capital of Cairo.Image Credit: AFP

Ethiopia has repeatedly brushed off Egyptians’ worries and defended its construction of the $5 billion dam as being vital for its development and lifting its population of around 107 million out of poverty.

$5billion

cost of building dam

Ties between Egypt and Ethiopia seriously deteriorated in 2013 when Egypt’s then president Mohammad Mursi of the Muslim Brotherhood and allied politicians threatened to bomb Ethiopia over the dam.

In July 2013, the army, led at the time by incumbent President Abdul Fattah Al Sissi, deposed Mursi following enormous street protests against his one-year rule.

After he took office in mid-2014, Al Sissi sought to improve ties with Ethiopia and opted for negotiations to resolve the GERD dispute.

REG 191117 Renaissance2-1574009002415
Recent talks held in Washington, D.C., brought together officials from Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia to discuss the conflict.Image Credit: Reuters

Over the past four years, senior officials from Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan (also a Nile country) held a string of talks, which have failed to make a breakthrough.

Egyptians have repeatedly accused Ethiopia of playing for time until the dam is completed.

Last September, Al Sissi, addressing the UN General Assembly, warned that the long-running crisis threatens regional stability and called for international pressure on Ethiopia.

“For Egypt, the Nile water is a matter of life and an issue of existence,” Al Sissi said.

A drop in the Nile flow to Egypt will take a toll on its access to freshwater, farming output and power generation by the High Aswan Dam, according to experts.

With its mushrooming population, Egypt is seen heading towards absolute water scarcity, even without GEDR fallout.

In October, Egypt announced that talks over the Ethiopian dam had reached a dead end and called for international mediation.

The situation soon worsened after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmad said his country was ready to go to war if the need arises.

Later, Abiy, the winner of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, said his remarks were taken out of context and agreed at a Russia meeting with Al Sissi to resume negotiations to resolve the deadlock.

OPN Abiy Ahmed1-1570878074438
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.Image Credit: AFP

Early November, foreign ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan agreed at a US-hosted meeting to resolve the dispute by mid-January, a step that Cairo termed as positive.

The following is a look at the ups and downs in the course of the GEDR dispute.

About the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

In 2011, Ethiopia started building the GERD apparently taking advantage of the unrest in Egypt, which followed mass protests that forced long-time president Hosni Mubarak to step down.

REG 191117 Renaissance11-1574008996011
Construction work on the dam.Image Credit: Reuters

Ethiopia said the dam on the Blue Nile near the border with Sudan was necessary to meet electricity needs of its population and serve its development plans.

When completed, the dam will be Africa’s largest, generating around 6,000 megawatts of electricity, with potential for exports.

Nile_Dam
A map of the dam along the waters of the Nile.Image Credit: Gulf News

Ethiopia plans to begin next year operating the GERD, which is scheduled to work at full capacity by 2022.

The completion of the dam is envisaged to give Ethiopia control over the Blue Nile, which is the Nile’s largest tributary.

What are Egypt’s concerns?

Egypt argues that the dam compromises its historical rights over the Nile share.

Under a 1959 treaty, Egypt gets 55.5 billion cubic metres of the Nile waters each year.

55.5billion cubic metres

amount of Nile water Egypt is entitled to

According to a 1929 treaty, Egypt has the right to veto any project by the Nile upstream countries that would affect its share of waters.

Ethiopia and other Nile upstream countries have dismissed both accords as colonial-era legacy and urged the riparian countries to ratify a comprehensive framework agreement to replace the 1959 treaty that gives Egypt and Sudan the lion’s share of the Nile waters.

In 2010, six of the 11 Nile Basin countries signed a new pact amid Egyptian protests.

How did the dispute deteriorate under Mursi?

In June 2013, Mursi met with politicians to discuss how to respond to Ethiopia’s GEDR dam.

During the meeting, some participants proposed bombing Ethiopia while others called for inciting turmoil in the African country.

Neither Mursi nor his guests were aware that their discussion was broadcast live on Egyptian state television.

The threats infuriated Ethiopia and brought Mursi under derision at home. Even though, days later Mursi warned in a public address: “Should the Nile waters decrease by one drop, our blood would be the alternative.”

How did Al Sissi approach the dispute?

After taking office in June 2014, Al Sissi sought to mend ties with Ethiopia and favoured diplomacy in defusing tensions over the Ethiopia dam.

He has repeatedly acknowledged Ethiopia’s right to development, but without harming his country’s Nile share.

On March 23, 2015, Al Sissi, Sudan’s then president Omar Al Bashir and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn signed in Khartoum a framework pact, officially called the Declaration of Principles, on the GEDR crisis.

“The real value of our agreement is to reach a complete understanding so that technical studies [related to the dam] will be finalised,” Al Sissi said.

“We are seeking to achieve a concept of joint benefit and to avoid harm.” The Khartoum accord outlines rules for operating the disputed dam and stipulates seeking mediation if the three countries fail to resolve their row.

Two days later, Al Sissi addressed the Ethiopian parliament in Addis Ababa, calling for “opening a new page” in relations between the two countries.

In May 2018, officials from the three countries decided at marathon negotiations in Addis Ababa to set up a scientific study group on the controversial issues of filling and operating the dam.

1.2235074-2737274333
Abiy Ahmed with Al Sissi in CairoImage Credit: Reuters

In yet a fresh sign of warm ties, the following month, Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmad visited Egypt where he pledged that the dam will cause no harm to Egypt.

“What Ethiopia wants is to use its share of the Nile and make sure that Egyptians will get their quota. We will work to increase Egypt’s share of Nile waters,” Abiy said in Cairo.

Why did GERD talks hit a stalemate?

Senior officials from Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have met for a series of talks since 2015, but without making tangible success.

A key bone of contention is filling and operating the GERD dam, 70 per cent of which is reportedly completed.

Egypt has proposed a seven-year period for filling the dam’s reservoir to head off an envisaged drop in its Nile share.

Ethiopia has rejected the Egyptian suggestion, insisting instead on a three-year limit. A quick filling of the dam will mean slowing down downstream flow.

Following the collapse of a new round of talks in Sudan last October, Egypt and Ethiopia ramped up their rhetoric. “I emphasise that the Egyptian state with all its institutions are committed to preserving Egypt’s water rights in the Nile,” Al Sissi said.

That month, the Ethiopian prime minister said his country is prepared to fight over the dam if necessary. “Some say things about use of force [by Egypt]. It should be underlined that no force could stop Ethiopia from building a dam,” he told Ethiopian parliament.

“If there is a need to go to war, we could get millions readied. If some could fire a missile, others could use bombs.” In reaction, Egypt said it was shocked by Abiy’s remarks. “If these statements are authentic, they imply negative signals and unacceptable insinuations,” the Egyptian Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Can Egypt and Ethiopia really go to war?

Despite occasional hints at military action, neither Egypt nor Ethiopia seems willing to go to war.

Both countries, already weary of the unrest, are focusing on pursuing development to improve life quality for their own people.

War would deal a harsh blow to their development efforts and place a new burden on their limited financial resources.

Judging by their latest remarks, leaders in both countries are keen to reach a diplomatic settlement to the dam standoff, spurred by international pressure. Egypt and Ethiopia are key allies of the US, which has recently stepped in to help break the logjam between Cairo and Addis Ababa.

-Web package put together by Layelle Saad, Middle East Editor

Why We Should Be Concerned About the Politics of AU (African Union)?

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November 30, 2019
Tegenaw Goshu

“The African Union Organizes the 6th Annual Continental Forum of Election Management Bodies’?”

This is the title of a report I read on Satenaw website (English). The report reports that the Department of Political Affairs of the African Union “organizes the 6th Annual Continental Forum of Election Management Bodies November 28 and 29 in Nairobi, Kenya.”  It sounds great as far as the general perception of making elections as democratic and participatory as they should be is concerned. The report reminds us about the importance of the Forum by saying that it is “to advance democratic and participatory governance in Africa”.

I would like to argue that this continental body that was established  in 1963 (56 years ago) with the name OAU (Organization of African Unity)  has made a remarkable success story with regard to  its most important objective and role of dealing with the challenges of decolonization , enabling the newly independent countries  to be viable ,  providing those people who were struggling to become independent and those  who were languishing under a very inhuman political systems such as apartheid or the brutal rule of white supremacy  with necessary support.

The problem arises when we try to look into the very question of what happened after decolonization or political independence.  Did those politicians who claimed themselves as leaders of liberation keep the promise and hope they preached, or did they become brutal and cynical masters of their own people? Sadly enough, the truth was and is the later. Yes, they succeeded in getting the objectives I mentioned above (decolonization and political independence) accomplished. Unfortunately enough, they couldn’t make the continental body (OAU or the present AU) an instrument for the prevalence and development of democratic political culture which is said to be the second most important chapter of the political history of the continent.  They rather used it as a club to deal with their own agenda and interests of how to rule and how to reconcile their differences and conflicts of interest in order to avoid public resistance and uprising against their undemocratic and illegitimate political power. They used the body as the forum to stand together and condemn any resistance movement of the people which they believed to be a threat to their limitless and abusive political power.  This very ugly and cynical way of doing politics has continued in a more systematic and deceitful manner throughout the history of the continental body OAU and now AU.

I do believe that nobody with his or her rational/reasonable mind disagrees with the very horrifying reality on the ground on one hand, and “the success story” by those dishonest politicians and bread winner employees of the Union on the other hand are terribly falling apart. Needless to say, all aspects of people’s lives on the ground in almost all African countries are deeply and widely different from the highly flowery/rosy political rhetoric by those self-aggrandizing and stupidly hypocritical political leaders of Africa who have of course made the Union the very club of their own highly dramatized and orchestrated political game at the very expenses of the people.

To argue that the continental body (AU) and its varies departments like the so-called Forum of Election Management Bodies that have nothing to do with genuine and independent management of elections can deliver meaningful input is either a political stupidity or the very evil-driven mentality of “who cares as long as the Body and its Parts remain the sources of our delightful life styles by the very standard of the poverty-stricken and politically oppressed people of Africa”.

It is self-evidently clear that the change of its name (AU) which was declared to be the Union of the people rather than the very CLUB of brutally undemocratic or nominally and deceivingly democratic leaders has never been realized. It still serves as the same CULB with a systematically cosmetic elements of changes that can be done even by a typical body of dictatorship. Almost all leaders of member counties are still trying hard to maintain their political power by brutally suppressing or oppressing or deceiving their own innocent people in their own respective countries.

It was in 2002 (17 years ago) that the name OAU was changed to AU (African Union) and the difference was/is said to be a transformation from the Union of leaders (the club of leaders) to the Union of the people . Alas, what a hypocritical and disingenuous political game at the very expenses of terribly impoverished people of Africa!

What is painfully frustrating is when it comes to the question/issue of to what extent African leaders were and are real agents of democratic systems of governments and by doing so a real or meaningful agents of changes of peoples’ lives particularly since the change of the name AU (17 years ago).  Sadly enough, compared with what the people should deserve, African leaders have horribly failed.  Let me make myself clearer as follows:
a) The very perception or assumption of making the Union the Union of the people was and is totally bogus or fake and an insult to the innocent people of Africa because it has never been the case in practical terms.The very reality on the ground clearly shows that the Union has continued to be a very CONVIENIENT CLUB of the leaders (rulers) of each member country.

Though it is true that very few are relatively better than the very majority of them, the totality of the their policies and programs have failed because of the cynical, disingenuous, hypocritical and brutally misleading behavior of those leaders who have come to power by hook or crook and go away by giving in to the next political elites who continue doing the same if not the worst way of ruling. This is still the very painful vicious cycle of African politics.
b) Understandably enough, the very majority of the leaders (rulers) are not statesmen at all. They are not skilled, experienced, respected and above all willing to lead by the power of practical example that goes beyond a generations. They are elites of self-serving by any means including cynicism, hypocrisy, and hit-and -run type of political game. They have never been independent of those former colonial rulers and other powerful actors of world politics who have no any real sense of concern about the untold sufferings of the people as long those severely corrupt leaders are willing to advance their (foreign powers’) respective national interests. Leaders in our continent do play  a “friendly” relationship with those powers in order not only get their voracious self -interests satisfied but also to make them (their own self-interests) fatter and more “delightful” at the very expenses of the people who continued to be hit hard by all aspects of the horrifying situations.

  1. c) They (African leaders) are highly if not incredibly corrupt to the extent of exchanging the very interests of their own people (national interests) for their own wildly limitless self- interests and the interests of those around their palace politics. That is why although they claim themselves as a “true representatives” of the people of their respective countries and the people of the continent in general in the arena of international relations such as UN and its organs as well as programs, they have never been effective as they claim to be because they always watch not how to fight for the interests of  people to the end, but how to win the support and favor of the former colonial powers and other developed countries  of the western hemisphere. Not only this, but they also try hard to maintain their tyrannical political power and by doing so to get their monstrous self-interests satisfied by playing unwritten cold war style policy. They do dance between China and Russia on one hand, and the western powers on the other hand.

I really wonder how these African leaders who were not willing and able to build their own Headquarters got it built by China and accepted it back as a “great gift” can have a real sense of moral and political ground. It is very sad to see a vast continent endowed with great natural and human resources being unable to afford the financial resources to build its own Headquarters. This is why it is very difficult if not impossible to believe that the continent can play a significant role in balancing the power of world politics that can meaningfully favors the very interests of the people of Africa.

  1. d) I do really wonder what kind of advancement of democratic and participatory governance they are talking about. How many member countries are showing a real or meaningful progress let alone establishing a meaningful good governance that should be characterized by a truly democratic way doming politics? When, Where, and how they courageously and effectively help the people of Africa who have continued paying huge and bitter sacrifices in order to make their dreams for a democratic political system reality? Are they (African leaders) not doing the opposite (against people’s struggle for freedom and justice)?

What did they do when the innocent people of Ethiopia had to face intimidation, harassment, brutal interrogation, mental and physical torture and incredibly inhuman killings for the last quarter of a century for the simple reason they tried to exercise their basic democratic and human rights?  Didn’t they declare all the very undemocratic, brutally and systematically orchestrated elections of TPLF/EPRDF free, fair and democratic? It is these people who are now telling us about their Annual Form of making elections democratic, fair, and free in a much more historic fashion. What a terribly deceitful and disingenuous political discourse and behavior!

There is no doubt that these disingenuous politicians and bread winner employees of the Union will repeat the same disgraceful and terribly deceitful testimony about the upcoming election by the current government of ODP/EPRDF or may be the so-called unified Prosperity Party (the rebranded EPRDF) to be wonderfully democratic, free and fair. It is an open secret that this continental body and its various political arms were used to declare the very tragic elections for the last quarter of a century to the extent of admiring an extremely hypocritical and brutally dictatorial regime of the late Ato Meles Zenawi. Needless to say, they are in the process of repeating the same if not the worst wrong doing at this very critical moment in our country by giving their “blessing of historic victory” to the current ruling circle and government in the upcoming elections.

To this end, they have a good for nothing personals of the so-called the National Election Board of Ethiopia led by Ms. Birtukan Mideksa who terribly became the very good playing card (puppet) of the very cynical, hypocritical, disingenuous and conspiratorial political elites of the former TPLF/EPRDF and the current ODP/EPRDF or the rebranded Prosperity Party that is the very replica of EPRDF. It is painfully disturbing to see individuals like Ms. Birtukan Mediksa who got the admiration of the Ethiopian people and international recognition because of their political role in the struggle for the prevalence of genuine democracy in the country and the high price they paid being used as speaking tool for a very doomed to failure political game of EPRDF’s politicians.

It is in this very ugly political and socio-economic situation that the very interests of the people of the continent in general and the people of each country in particular are totally lost.

Look at the PHOTO UP at the top of the report very carefully and try to compare and contrast this very cheap way of doing politics on the much untold sufferings of the people that is self-evidently clear on the ground. This is how they play their brutally disingenuous if not tragic political game.

Do not get me wrong that what I am saying is nothing positive happened. No at all!  This is because there is and there will be positive things in any brutally dictatorial or tyrannical regimes leave alone in organization like the one we are talking about . What I am saying is that compared to where the people of Africa are now in every aspect of their lives, it is not far from the truth that the very idea of transforming this continental body from OAU to AU in order to make it the Union of the people was/is totally absurd if not terribly  hypocritical.

Whatever the case we may raise and argue, one very bitter truth will remain seriously challenging. As long as the people of Africa remain not fortunate enough to get timely and effective help from their educated and courageous children in order to make their dreams for democracy  reality in their respective counters,  this continental body (call it OAU or AU) will remain the very CONVEINEIT CLUB of disingenuous, disgraceful, disgusting, corrupt politicians and the beneficiaries .

This has a very significant implications to our own case which is going not only in a very wrong direction but also a very devastating destination. That is why I strongly believe and argue that we cannot remain indifferent to the very behavior and practice of leaders or politicians of this continental body (AU) if we have to bring about a democratic system in our country that could have a powerful cross boundary positive influence!

The people of Africa  cannot effectively and irreversibly bring about a truly democratic system in each member country unless they give due attention and do something about  the very critical question of how to make this continental body a body that should be responsible and answerable to the very will and interest of the people.  This is because it would be foolish enough for us to expect the emergence and development of the culture of democratic system and good governance in a political environment in which leaders present themselves as witnesses and defenders of each other’s undemocratic if not dictatorial behaviors and practices. Needless to say, the AU has been used and still is being used as the forum for advancing not the very just cause of the people (democracy and justice), but the very self-aggrandizing and voraciously power mongering leaders and disgustingly opportunist political elites and intellectuals.

Let me conclude with the following.  If we want to see not only a democratic country of Africa but also democratic countries of Africa and gradually a democratic Africa, we have to recognize the challenges we are facing with a strong sense of understanding and try hard to find out appropriate and effective strategies and plan of actions and to act up on those strategies and plan of actions with a real sense of common concern and concerted efforts.  The very proverb “If there is a will, there is a way” is so powerful if we are serious enough about the very essence of freedom, justice, rule of law, human rights, equal opportunity,  sustainable peace , compassion,  shared prosperity .

 

 

 

You Snooze, You Lose! Wake Up Slumbering Diaspora Ethiopian Giant!

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By Alemayehu G, Mariam

Author’s Note:  I have written this commentary as a wake-up call to diaspora Ethiopians, particularly those in the United States. Fundamental and structural changes are taking place in Ethiopia.  Ethnic apartheid is taking its last gasps of air. The masters of ethnic apartheid are living out their last days in the Ninth Circle of Hell. No doubt, they shall continue to toil in darkness to spread their gospel of hate and division.

Henry David Thoreau correctly observed, “Things do not change; we change.”  I am afraid most of  us in the Ethiopian diaspora, especially in the United States, are not changing with the change. We are watching the change in Ethiopia on the sidelines fretting, anxious, perplexed and paralyzed from taking action. Indeed, many of us are numbed to the change a few turned comatose. Some of us are sleepwalking through the change. The rest of us refuse to change our ethnic-colored eyeglass lenses which turn roses into corpse flowers.

The change that is taking place in Ethiopia will continue with or without us. We have a choice of being part of the change – a dynamic and synergistic element – or opt out and be left behind. I have often remarked using the old maxim, Ethiopians “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” We have a great opportunity to become part of the change and help our long-suffering people.

But we have a more compelling reason to be on the side of change: Enlightened self-interest as diaspora Ethiopians! If we miss this opportunity, if we don’t wake up and smell the coffee, we shall surely end up being roommates with the TPLF in the dust bin of history!

Diaspora Ethiopians gotta wake up and know what time it is in Ethiopia!

In July 2006, I gave a speech entitled, “AWAKENING GIANT: Can Ethiopians and Ethiopian Americans Living in America Make a Difference in their Homeland?”

I answered my own question in the affirmative.

I argued diaspora Ethiopians in America are like a sleeping giant, a powerful and irresistible political force that has not realized its potential to effect positive change in Ethiopia.

To wake up meant to purge and cleanse ourselves of the poison of ethnic hatred that has paralyzed, incapacitated and put us to sleep for so long.

Over the past nineteen months, the leaders who are spearheading the massive campaign to change hearts and minds in Ethiopia have been doing their level best to purge the toxin of ethnic hatred coursing in the Ethiopian body politic.

They are working day and night to turn the long night of TPLF oppression, hate and division into a new dawn of forgiveness, reconciliation and national unity.

Unfortunately, by and large, those of us in the Ethiopian diaspora seem to have turned catatonic or are sleepwalking right through the change.

Most of us today are sitting on our  duffs, twiddling our thumbs, scratching our heads and periodically sticking our index fingers into the air to feel which way the wind of change is blowing.

Far too many of us in the Ethiopian diaspora have become like the “foolish and senseless people, who have eyes but do not see, who have ears but do not hear.”

The fact of the matter is that there are mighty winds of change sweeping over Ethiopia today.

They are tornadic winds of freedom, democracy and rule of law clearing out the accumulated garbage of the ethnic politics accumulated over the past 27 years.

The answer to our long standing questions are blowing in the winds of change blowing over Ethiopia today.

Just like Bob Dylan’s sang it.

How many years must some people exist
Before they’re allowed to be free?
And how many times can a man turn his head
And pretend that he just doesn’t see – the answer
The answer, my friend, is blowin’ in the wind
The answer is blowin’ in the wind

The answer, my diaspora Ethiopian friends, is blowing the gusting winds of change in Ethiopia!

The time for change is not, not in years to come.

The time is right for change and wrong to turn our heads from the direction of change.

So, as diaspora Ethiopians, today we face the defining question of their lifetimes: Are we going to catch the wind of change and put it in a bottle to use in airbrushing a new bright future for Ethiopia or will we remain hopeless windbags complaining and gabbing the tired old identity politics until we are blown into the dustbin of history?

What time is it, diaspora Ethiopians?
It is time to catch the wind of change in a bottle and transform it into a tornado of freedom, democracy and rule of law in Ethiopia!

In our time…

For nearly a decade and half, diaspora Ethiopians in the United States have worked tirelessly to dismantle the ethnic apartheid system of the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front in Ethiopia.

We have marched the streets and walked the halls of Congress.

We have organized grassroots efforts to hold the TPLF accountable for its gross human rights violations.

We have taken to the houses of faith and civic associations to create allies in our struggle.

We have taken to the newspapers, radio and television stations across the land to spread our message and mobilize Americans to help us fight TPLF tyranny.

We have even petitioned U.S. presidents to intervene and moderate the oppression of the TPLF.

It is true many of us in the diaspora have engaged in street protests, legislative advocacy, social media activism, scholarship and analysis.

We have been somewhat successful in our efforts.

I am proud to say I have played my part in all of these efforts.

But of late, we seem to have lost our sense of vision and mission.

Most diaspora Ethiopian academics, professionals, activists and advocacy communities seem to have developed an over inflated sense of our own self-importance and role in bringing about change in Ethiopia.

Change came to Ethiopia despite the role played by diaspora Ethiopians.

Change came to Ethiopia because Ethiopia’s young people and their young leaders paid for it in their blood, sweat, tears and sacrifices.

The young people and their leaders brought about change by facing TPLF’s live fire every day and by going to jail in large numbers.

The young people brought about change by suffering torture and prison conditions once described as among the absolutely worst in the world.

The young activists and their leaders who guided the nonviolent resistance won the day by outthinking, outsmarting, outplaying, outfoxing and outmaneuvering the mighty TPLF with feet of clay.

They brought about change and ended the entrenched power of the TPLF without firing a single shot.

They are the wunderkinds of political change in all Africa.

The fact of the matter is that “We” diaspora Ethiopians are not the driving force which drove the TPLF ethnic apartheid regime out of power and into the trash heap of history.

But in a feat of incredible fantasy, many of us in the Ethiopian diaspora, particularly in the U.S., have convinced ourselves we are the OWNERS of the change in Ethiopia and we must control the process and pace of change.

Truth be told, we never had skin in the game. We played the change game by remote control online.

The irony of change in the Ethiopian diaspora

“Everyone thinks of changing the world, but no one thinks of changing himself.”

The irony of change in Ethiopia is that when change came to Ethiopia, diaspora Ethiopians refused to change.

If the change taking place in Ethiopia could be described in a single word, it would be “Peaceful”.

Peaceful change in its essence means those in power and the government do not engage in arbitrary killings, arbitrary arrests, arbitrary detention, arbitrary prosecutions and arbitrary denial of due process of law.

The TPLF committed gross human rights violations in the name of defending the rule of law.

Today, I hear diaspora Ethiopian activists, organizers, academics, professionals, clergymen, community and civic leaders urging the PM Abiy “to take action”.

When I ask them specifically what “action” the PM Abiy or the government should take, they become hopelessly vague. “The government has to do something about one individual or another. The government must stop the lawlessness. The government must do something!”

They are intellectually dishonest to admit what they are asking for is a return to the old days of arbitrary killings, arrests, detentions and so on in the name of law and order.

They want the government of PM Abiy to soak its hands in the blood of innocents in the name of law and order.

That is not change. That is called “insanity, or “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” 

Dr. Martin Luther King taught: “Hate begets hate; violence begets violence; toughness begets a greater toughness. We must meet the forces of hate with the power of love.”

PM Abiy said, “The day the Derg was defeated was when it killed 60 people arbitrarily and without due process of law.” The Derg started with 60 people and ended up killing over 500,000 between 1976-78.

In my view, the TPLF was decisively defeated when Meles Zenawi ordered his troops to massacre hundreds of innocent protesters after the 2005 election. At that moment, the TPLF crossed a point of no return on its way to the dust bin of history.

Real change means an Ethiopia where we “shall beat our swords into plowshares, and our  spears into pruninghooks.”

Real change means an Ethiopia where brother shall not lift sword against brother.

Change means an Ethiopia where the young people shall no longer learn the vice of war any more.

When change came to Ethiopia, I changed. Some said literally overnight.

I am proud to say I support the current change and its leaders fully and not because the change is perfect.

I support them because, to be brutally honest, what they have done is nothing short of miraculous.

To give the TPLF their walking papers without a single shot fired is MIRACULOUS!

I always keep an open mind. If someone, anyone, comes with a better idea for change than what we have today, I will jump to it.

The fact of the matter, which we all know but do not have the intellectual courage to admit, is that today we have one and only one choice. PM Abiy Ahmed and his leadership team.

I challenge anyone, anywhere to name anyone one-half Abiy Ahmed’s caliber to lead Ethiopia today.

Ethiopia has a gift in Abiy Ahmed, though for some that gift may be a gift of pearl before swine.

In June 2013, I prophesied:

Ethiopia’s Cheetahs will rise and shine and soar to new heights. They will lift up and carry Ethiopia on their wings… Ethiopia’s Cheetah Generation is the only generation that could rescue Ethiopia from the steel  claws of tyranny and dictatorship. It is the only generation that can deliver Ethiopia from the fangs of a benighted dictatorship and transform a decaying and decomposing garrison state built on a foundation of lies into one that is deeply rooted in the consent and sovereignty of the people.

That prophesy has come to pass.

That is why change was not very difficult for me.

I changed literally overnight from being the unrelenting critic of the TPLF regime to the unapologetic supporter of PM Abiy and his government.

I respect fully those who do not support PM Abiy and his administration. It is their democratic right.

To oppose something is easy, but to propose something better is exceedingly hard!

I support PM Abiy and the change he is leading because I share his vision of an Ethiopia at peace with itself and it neighbors. 

I had long told the TPLF that I will change from being their relentless critic to their number one supporter if they changed their evil ways.

No arbitrary killing. No arbitrary jailing. No arbitrary denial of due process. No, absolutely no, torture.

Over a decade ago, I thought there was the possibility of redemption for the TPLF.

But to no avail because evil is coded in the TPLF’s DNA.

Many of us in the Ethiopian diaspora suffer from metathesiophobia (morbid fear of change).

The supreme irony in diaspora Ethiopian politics is that many of those who worked to bring about change – from TPLF dictatorship to democracy, from TPLF ethnic division and ethnic apartheid to national unity – changed their minds when change came and became reactionaries against change.

Many of us in the Ethiopian diaspora became the caricature of the proverbial man who wanted to harvest crops without ploughing the ground but covets and seek to lavishly feast on the harvest produced by the sweat of his neighbor.

Diaspora Ethiopians, particularly those in the U.S., talk about change but most of us are clueless about the kind of change they want.

We want change but we do not want to do our fair share in the heavy lifting to bring it about.

We want change and believe we can bring it by criticizing and belittling those who are doing the heavy lifting implementing change.

We want to change Ethiopia but we do not want to change ourselves. We do not understand “those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything.”

We want change but we do not want to be the change we want to see.

We want to change but we are trapped in herd mentality and groupthink.

We want change but only on our terms: “Our way of change or the highway. Take our change or leave it.”

We want change but we have nothing to offer to bring about change. We have no coherent ideas, no blueprint and no plans to offer.

Diaspora Ethiopians, particularly those in the U.S., think we can bring about change in Ethiopia by complaining, moaning, groaning and preaching victimology.

We think we can bring about change in Ethiopia by posting and disseminating fake news, fake stories, lies and disinformation on Fakebook, YouBoob and Twit-ter.

We think we can bring about change in Ethiopia gathering in front of public building and frothing at the mouth shouting slogans.

We think we can bring about change in Ethiopia by collecting donations on GoFundMe to line our pockets.

We think we can bring about change in Ethiopia by wishing upon a star: “Twinkle, twinkle little star, how I wonder change could suddenly fall from the sky.”

We think we can bring change by trash-talking Ethiopia. “Ethiopia is a failed state. Ethiopia is a civil war waiting to happen.”

We think we can bring about change in Ethiopia by finger-pointing, bellyaching, teeth-gnashing and heart-aching.

We don’t seem to realize “change does not roll in on the wheels of inevitability, but comes through continuous struggle”.

Above all, we don’t seem to understand change is a labor of love and a trans-generational legacy– love of humanity, love of hum-unity (unity of humanity) love of dignity, love of liberty and and love of duty to do the common good and the generations to come.

To be not to be part of the march to freedom and democracy.

To be or not to be part of the march for freedom and democracy is the Shakespearean question Diaspora Ethiopians must face and answer as Ethiopia undergoes tectonic transformation.

The foundations of the ethnic apartheid state established by the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1991 are in tatters now. They are being dismantled piece by piece.

The TPLF spent hundreds of millions of birr to stop the changes in their tracks and if that is not possible plunge the country into civil war.

There is nothing the TPLF can do to stop the change and get back in the saddle of power to complete their vaunted 100-year rule.

Long ago, I prophesied the TPLF is destined for the dustbin of history if they continued in their evil ways and in the end will inherit the wind.

That prophesy has come to pass!

In May 2009, I wrote a commentary and detailed the “psychologic of the T-TPLF’s paranoia” of being pushed out of power and prophesied how the TPLF regime would end:

They [T-TPLF] have been riding the Ethiopian tiger for nearly two decades. But one day they know they have to dismount. When they do, they will be looking at the sparkling eyes, gleaming teeth and pointy nails of one big hungry tiger!”

In my March 2015 commentary, I told the TPLF they are looking at their end days.

I believe the T-TPLF leaders know with absolute certainty that they are sitting on a powder keg.  As I have written previously, the T-TPLF has built its castles in the sand. The only question is whether those castles will be swept up by a tidal wave of deep public discontent or blown away by the tornadic wind of the people’s fury. In either case, the T-TPLF will be vacuumed and deposited in the dust bin of history. I am afraid the volcano that has remained dormant for the last 25 years is “growling” and “grumbling” and the T-TPLF has come to the ultimate realization that it is sitting on the cryptodome of the volcano. The heat and pressure are increasing  inside the Ethiopian volcano as the T-TPLF  ramps up its oppression, repression, and brutality. I am afraid the T-TPLF is now looking straight into the eyes of the tiger. Behold the eye of the tiger!

By 2016, the TPLF came face to face with the hungry tiger. Actually, the TPLF Hippos came face to face with the angry Ethiopian Cheetahs.

The cryptodome of the Ethiopia youth volcano had blown over and a tidal wave of hot magma was oozing out to consume the TPLF.

The Cheetahs peacefully subdued the TPLF Hippos and let them go in peace.

But the TPLF Hippos thought the peaceful gesture was a sign of weakness and continued with their evil ways setting ethnic fires throughout the country.

The changes have been the equivalent of a volcanic earthquake with endless aftershocks.

The first full-fledged eruption took place in 2016 and shook the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front to the core.

Today, as Prosperity Party announced its official establishment, the TPLF is finally interred under the volcanic magma that began flowing in 2016.

Ethiopian diaspora never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity

I hate to say it. Really.

But as a man who prides himself for speaking truth to power, I can’t help it.

The truth is diaspora Ethiopians and the TPLF appear to be doomed to share the same destiny.

Both seem to be destined to never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

The TPLF shapeshifters today wallow in a twilight zone of delusion, illusion and fantasy.

They are confused, perplexed and simply stumped.

They don’t know if they are coming or going.

They change like the weather in Chicago.

One day the TPLF leaders say they are out of the game. They will establish a de facto state.

Another day, they say they are neither in nor out of the game because they have not read the party program and their statement that they are out of the game is “based principle”.

The following week they intimate they will secede and create their own country. They have discovered oil reserves and such. They can be self-sufficient.

Then they say, they might join but they need time to think about it.

The TPLF reminds me of Schrödinger’s cat. They are both dead and alive at the same time.

The fact of the matter is the Prosperity Train has left the station as the TPLF watched in total confusion and discombobulation. Choo, choo!!! (Or as the old song from my day of youth goes, “Elem ale baburoo, wetat yizo bemulu. “The train left the station filled with young people.”)

The old men of the TPLF are watching the Prosperity Party maglev train zipping away.

Here we are the grand old men and women of the Ethiopian diaspora in the good ole U.S. of A.!

We, diaspora Ethiopians, are also standing on the platform of the proverbial train station listening/singing that New Shining’s song:

Too many questions remain unsolved and I wonder why
God knows I’m in desperate need of some kind of clarity
But I just can’t make up my mind
But I just can’t make up my mind

The TPLF just can’t make up its mind.

Neither can the Ethiopian diaspora in America!

Truth be told, whether the TPLF makes up its mind is a matter of mind over matter for me.

I don’t mind because the TPLF does not matter to me, except when it comes to exposing their crimes against humanity, the cruelty of their politics of identity and the poison they used to pollute Ethiopian unity.

But…

Diaspora Ethiopians do matter to me and I mind the fact they can’t make up their mind

I am afraid diaspora Ethiopians are heading in the same dead-end direction of the TPLF.

The so-called diaspora intellectuals, activists, advocates and the rest can’t seem to make up their minds about the change taking place in Ethiopia.

Some of them belittle and contemptuously dismiss the change and heap insults and denigration on the change leaders.

The brainless tsetse flies of social media spread lies and damned lies about the change and leadership of the change on Ethiopia.

The silent majority of the Ethiopian diaspora is silent as the (brain) dead. They are sleepwalking through the change.

The silent click-bait majority is silently asleep dreaming nightmares from all the fake horror stories they gather on social media and online.

They too, like the TPLF, are standing on the station platform as the train is leaving the station.

Let’s own a piece of the change…

I have one and only one set of concerns about the role of diaspora Ethiopia in the ongoing change in Ethiopia.

I don’t want diaspora Ethiopians to be left at the train station or the dock looking at the ugly faces of the TPLF.

I want diaspora Ethiopians to be on the Change Train.

The TPLF had many opportunities to act in their enlightened self-interest but rejected it.

But it is the fate of the TPLF to never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

They kicked the opportunity to enjoy their stolen wealth in the spirit of national unity and peace.

The TPLF today is in the dust bin of history. Nobody gives a damn!

As diasporans, our motto must be “seize the day (carpe diem)”.

Above all, we as diaspora Ethiopians must act in our enlightened self-interest.

We must not follow in the footsteps of the TPLF and walk straight to the dust bin of history.

We MUST realize that the change will continue with or without us.

We have the choice of standing in front of the freight train called “Change” or get aboard and ride it.

There are some things in this world that simply cannot be stopped, no matter how hard we try or cry.

Such is the change in Ethiopia today.

We cannot stop the change. We cannot delay the change. We cannot wish it away.

We can either be part of the change or by not being part condemn ourselves to the dust bin of history just like the TPLF.

In the interest of the enlightened self-interest of diaspora Ethiopians: Why I am so concerned about a role in the change taking place in Ethiopia

As I see the pace and direction of change in Ethiopia, I see two options for diaspora Ethiopians.

We can continue our old and outmoded opposition politics and attain irrelevance in the dustbin of history.

Or we can pursue our enlightened self-interest unapologetically.

I am not apologetic in articulating the interests of diaspora Ethiopians in Ethiopia.

We must make sure our voices are heard and considered by whomever the powers that be in Ethiopia.

Of course, as diasporans we share a lot with our Ethiopian brothers and sisters.

But truth be told, as diasporans we have special concerns and needs.

I want to make sure we are given our rightful place in the coming order.

There are many things that most diaspora Ethiopians seek in the New Ethiopia.

For instance, the vast majority of diaspora Ethiopians who had been forced by the Derg and TPLF to give up their citizenship, want dual citizenship.

That is the one question I am asked most often when I travel to speak to diaspora groups in the U.S. and Canada.

But there are many issues of special interests for diaspora Ethiopians. This is what they tell me:

We want to go back to their motherland and no be seen as foreigners or be identified by the label “diasporan”.

We want our children to become citizens and take pride in their ancestral heritage.

We want to participate in the political process of our motherland. We want to vote, run for office, influence decisions and shape policy. We don’t want to be treated like ferenjis.”

We want to work in our motherland without needing a work permit or visa.

We want to be guaranteed residence and own property just like everybody else. We don’t want to be discriminated because we are diasporans.

We want to invest but do not want to be treated like other foreigners because of our other nationality.

Ethiopia is an emerging market transitioning from dictatorship to democracy. The middle class is expanding and standards of living are improving. We want to play a central role in the country’s development.

We want to launch Ethiopian diaspora-led businesses and enterprises to create jobs and  spur economic growth.

We want to promote development through diaspora entrepreneurship using technology and innovation.

When H.E. Prime Minster Dr. Abiy Ahmed visited the U.S. in July 2018, he challenged diaspora Ethiopians to tender their proposals for dual citizenship. To my knowledge, no individual or group has taken the challenge and present such a proposal.

But to have a voice and a role, we have to do our part and support the change.

We cannot get something for nothing.

Only beggars expect something for nothing.

PM Abiy once zinged us with a particularly sharp comment. “Diaspora Ethiopians ask me 10 question at once but are not willing to give a dollar (a day to the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund.”

The late uber boss of the TPLF once said, “Diasporans (Ethiopians) can start something but they never finish anything.”

Many of us in the Ethiopian diaspora have become the hollow men (and women) in T.S. Eliot’s eponymous poem:

We are the hollow men/ We are the stuffed men
Leaning together/Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
Our dried voices, when/ We whisper together
Are quiet and meaningless

Our dried voices crying out in America today are quiet and meaningless.

We blow a lot of smoke but there is little fire left in us.

If we don’t like the change that is taking place, let’s challenge the government with better ideas. Let us give them better alternatives.

Let’s accept PM Abiy’s challenge and win against his party in the marketplace of ideas.

There is an election coming up in May 2020.

It will be free and fair and under the eyes of international observers.

The government to be elected in that election will have a public mandate to transition the country to multiparty democracy and ensure equality and justice for all.

In my view, whatever government is elected, there will be no return to the ethnic apartheid party system in Ethiopia.

Divisive ethnic politics will play a much-diminished role.

Ethiopia will join the rest of civilized countries where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections.

Only agreements and disagreements on political programs, ideology and philosophy. No violence.

A word to the wise diaspora Ethiopians: When in America, live and learn from the Americans

I doubt many diaspora Ethiopians in the U.S. are familiar with the Alexis de Tocqueville’s seminal work, “Democracy in America” (1835).

In that book, de Tocqueville discussed Americans’ natural tendency to come together voluntarily in “enlightened self-interest” to advance their own individual self-interests by promoting the interests of their group. He wrote:

The Americans are fond of explaining almost all the actions of their lives by the principle of interest rightly understood; they show with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly prompts them to assist each other, and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state.

Enlightened self-interest is the hallmark of American political and social life.

As Ethiopian Americans, we should work in our enlightened self-interest and help in Ethiopia’s transition to democracy, progress and prosperity.

It is in our enlightened self-interest to see a free, democratic and just Ethiopia.

Let’s face facts.

The days of protesting in front of the U.S. State Department are over. Only the granite slabs will listen to us stone cold deaf.

We can walk the halls of Congress until our shoe soles run holes. But no one is listening over there.

I have a simple message my fellow diaspora Ethiopians, particularly in the U.S.: “Make up your mind and your heart to accept and become part of the change in Ethiopia and swing with it.

The alternative you do not want to even contemplate but it is sure to happen just like the sun will rise tomorrow:

Prepare to join the TPLF in the dustbin of history.

Wake and and smell the original Ethiopian coffee diaspora Ethiopians!

Let’s not repeat our history. Let’s miss this ONE opportunity to miss an opportunity!

 

 

Six causes of transitional trauma

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December 2, 2019
by Ahmed Mohammed

There is almost no prospect of a swift and painless democratic transition in Ethiopia

Authoritarian regimes in Ethiopia—Imperial, Derg, and EPRDF alike—irrespective of ideologies they pursued, imposed their wishes on Ethiopian societies. All were finally forced to surrender to waves of public anger.

It was in 1960s when the renowned Ethiopian writer, Hadis Alemayehu, in his famous book “Fiker eske Mekabir” referring to the then Imperial Regime, prophesied that ‘’people take decision in their own hands when their hope in God is eroded’’.

Despite positive steps at every regime change during the second half of 20th century, the underlying contradictions were not resolved. The new governments that took office pursued their own group’s parochial self-interest.

Both Derg and EPRDF had “democracy” in their regimes’ names, but never put democracy into practice. Now we have entered another transition. This is not only about elections. It is about the process and outcome over a longer span. There is, however, almost no prospect of a swift and painless democratic transition in Ethiopia.

There are five main reasons for this transitional trauma:

  1. EPRDF’s parlous state
  2. Prosperity Party paradox
  3. Politicised security forces
  4. Politicised civil service
  5. Weak opposition
  6. Weak democratic institutions

EPRDF’s parlous state

To reduce the pain, the government must be ready to hand over power. That means, the EPRDF coalition and partner parties must hold that commitment. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has reiterated that he will hand over power if his party is defeated at next election. The conundrum is whether his party colleagues are equally committed to leaving office.

Currently the dynamics in regional states vary and may quickly change as the situation is fluid. There has been no linearity in EPRDF; the leadership could not speak on behalf of the entire coalition. There is no more democratic centralism.

Additionally, the boundaries between the ruling and opposition parties are not thick in some regional states, such as Somali and Afar. Clan relations will continue to play central roles in Somali politics and require a balanced mix of clans in both ruling and opposition parties. ONLF and the current ruling party in Somali Region may likely maintain their strategic alliance despite inter- and intra-party skirmishes. In Tigray, TPLF has taken a defensive position, towards which their cadres are highly agitated, leaving little space for dissent. It appears TPLF is not yet ready to concede power.

For better or worse, the change-makers are in the Oromia and Amhara parties. Yet there is no strong reason to believe that Abiy’s ODP is committed to multi-partyism in Oromia. Several of its officials are part and parcel of the old EPRDF regime and perceived to have been plunderers that may fear being criminalised once relieved of power. ODP is playing cat-and-mouse with the Oromo Liberation Front and Oromo Federalist Congress, making the political situation unpredictable. There is squabbling among OLF factions, which most Oromos see as a symbol of resistance against central rule.

ADPs came through a path similar to ODPs and there is also no strong reason here to believe their commitment to multiparty democracy. It seems that ADP is engaged in competition and collaboration with NaMA at the same time, possibly aimed at retaining power by pushing out parties like Ezema from Amhara Region. Democratic space in the region is stifled, and the security situation is volatile after the chaos in June.

That incident stemmed partly from ADP-NaMA’s unholy marriage but seems to have saved ADP from bowing to NaMA and its violent youths. In general, Amhara political elites still take it for granted that Ethiopiawinet is synonymous with Amharization and seem not to have dropped the imperial ambition of Amhara cultural hegemony where assimilation was an official line of citizenship and other cultures and languages were denigrated.

ADP’s ambition for hegemony throughout EPRDF is littered with skirmishes and collaborations. ADP and ODP are putting immense pressures on each other: ADPs want ODPs to subdue OLF factions and Oromo activists like Jawar Mohammed, whereas ODPs want ADPs subdue NaMA and other amorphous rightist groups like Eskinder Nega’s Baladera Council.

Prosperity Party paradox

Recently, it was difficult to think of EPRDF as a genuine coalition. Paradoxically, Abiy’s preferred solution is to merge it into one national party. There are two critical issues with this. The first is incompatibility of the current coalition members, and the second is how to bring on-board fully the so-called partner parties from Somali, Afar, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and Harari.

Abiy has driven through the merger, but it is not clear how it will work in practice. Should EPRDF dissolve and get replaced by a leadership group directly elected by members, or should the coalition parties including the so called ‘partners’ be given quotas in the leadership depending on certain criteria, such as existing party membership and population size?

EPRDF and partners’ merger to form Prosperity Party (PP) means dissolving all the regional parties and replacing them with PP. Again, there are two serious questions—regional representation and party programme.

How many people would be represented from each region and on what basis at different levels of leadership-executive committee, central committee, etc. Should this be rules-based or simply hand-picked by the chairman or leadership?

Technically, if PP is a new party to replace EPRDF, it will be required to choose a new leadership group including its chairman. Abiy Ahmed cannot automatically assume the post as he was not elected by PP members. Furthermore, the so-called partner parties were not part of the EPRDF Council that elected him chairman of the front in March 2018.

On the other hand, can PP come up with an agreed party programme that reenergises the movement? TPLF has already rejected the merger in the absence of an agreed programme, and now key ODP senior figure Lemma Megersa has spoken out in opposition. But the conundrum goes beyond that. The elites lined up behind the regional parties have polarised views, putting pressure on every regional branch and leaving with them little room to manoeuvre.

Some of the major dividing issues are: the nature of federal structure, resolution of administrative-territorial disputes (Addis Abeba, Dire Dawa and Welkait, for example), critical issues in Ethiopian history, and the language question. PM Abiy’s Medemer has become a buzz word and seems to have been perceived as an instrument or lens to provide a way out of the conundrum. However, Medemer cannot replace a political programme.

It is only with a party manifesto that PP can go out and campaign for election. Can PP have different programmes for people living in different regions, particularly for the contentious issues mentioned above? Can they tell contradictory messages to people living in different parts of the federation? How cohesive will this national party be?

It appears that the merger can go ahead even if TPLF rejects the move, although some legal issues are outstanding. It appears the merger is not ultra-risky in the short term if PP is able to forge a programme acceptable to all its members. The serious risk which may possibly lead to explosion is incompatibility of Abiy’s attempt to appeal to pro-ethnic federalists and anti-ethnic federalists at the same time; a dilemma Lemma’s opposition has highlighted. The other danger may arise in relation with the election if EPP tries to close the space before the polls or tries rigging the election itself.

The PP bylaws and programme has been approved by the EPRDF executive and central committee and some party congresses. They have made it clear that all EPRDF coalition members and partner parties will be dissolved. Their language decision has already trigger anger on social media—it brought back Amharic at the centre in all the regional branches. If this intent is followed by regional governments, it would complete PM Abiy’s aspiration to inherit the imperial regimes’ legacy.

Politicized security forces

EPRDF security structures—military, intelligence, police, militia—were highly attached to the political leadership both in ideology and through individual network with officers. Uncertainties remain with regional security structures (police, special force and militia).

It is not clear how much force regional security structures have both in terms of personnel and armaments. The Somali Region Special Force under Abdi Iley, for example, was a serious threat not only to other regions, specifically Oromia and Afar, but also to the Federal Government.

The current security structure, mainly the regional special police, is the most dangerous threat to the orderly transition. All parties must take this as a serious concern before moving to general election. Abiy has said that the security apparatus is under reform. But it seems the regional special police is out of his reach. Divorcing it from party politics is a primary requirement for democratic transition.

Politicized civil service

The nature of Ethiopian civil service is another bottleneck for a democratic transition. Ethiopia has not seen in its history the Weberian type of civil service or the Douglas North type of institutions. Under the emperors, the bureaucracy was just an extension of monarchies. Under Derg and EPRDF, the civil service was enmeshed with the ruling parties.

There is no formal rule to do a favour for civil servants of party members. However, civil service is considered a warehouse of future political leaders and mechanisms were put in place to attract civil servants to party membership; including preferential treatment for further education, better job, promotion, guaranteed job, key civil service posts and moving to key political appointment posts. And therefore, members and non-members are treated differently, as members are considered loyal to the ruling party’s agenda.

The following is a simple and live example of appointments that evidently will be problematic unless addressed early on. Currently, the number of weredas in Ethiopia is estimated to be more than 1,200 (rural and urban). If we estimate the number of zones (zones are one level up from weredas) to be just 100, together with the weredas we have 1,300 tiers below regional level. If we assume minimum 10 politically appointed officials at each wereda/zone, we will have 13,000 political appointees below regional government tiers. What will happen to those people if the opposition wins partially or fully? Should the opposition parties retain them while knowing these people are members of EPRDF who were appointed without meritocratic qualification?

On the other hand, retaining those people in their posts will not be acceptable to the supporters of the incoming opposition parties. If we add the number of political appointees at regional and federal government levels, it is obvious how the numbers soar. Therefore, democratic transition is integrally linked to the livelihood and very survival of EPRDF members and families in the current Ethiopia. In preparation for 2010 election, wereda officials were forewarned that defeat of EPRDF in their wereda would cost them their jobs. PM Abiy recently has said that he is not concerned for his job if his party loses the upcoming election. It is not about the prime minister losing his job, it is far beyond that: it is thousands of party officials.

Weak opposition 

The so-called EPRDF’s dominant party system has proved a failure. Democratic elections require not only existence of opposition parties but also commitment to peaceful competition. Opposition parties are numerous but only a few of them meet the criteria of an ‘’opposition party’’. Some are creatures of old EPRDF while others are bread-winners without real political objectives.

Therefore, unlike what we hear in the media, the number of meaningful opposition parties is not more than eight. In my view, all real oppositions are regional parties as their bases are bound by ethno-nationalist identities, including Ezema, which has an Amhara flavour. This means there is a need for a coalition of likeminded regional parties to form country-level parties if Ethiopia is to move to a meaningful multiparty system.

Polarisation or extremism is another concern with oppositions. For example, what would happen if OLF, NaMA, TPLF, ONLF, SLM, Ezema win elections in Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Somali, Sidama and Addis Ababa respectively? What would the deal look like and how can they come to terms without resorting to violent conflicts?

Weak democratic institutions

It would be naïve to think the election board and judiciary were neutral in the previous elections under EPRDF. There is no strong evidence yet that the new board members and judicial officials who have been appointed to these institutions last year will prove to be neutral.

Two precursors underlie my concerns: firstly, key posts in these institutions seem to have been filled with like-minded anti-ethnic federalists who may likely want to seize the opportunity to act in their ideological interests if the power dynamics turns out to allow them; and secondly, the election board’s interventions outside of its mandate regarding the Sidama referendum. The board’s mandate was to administer the referendum. It was not, for example, to organise debate among non-Sidama elites in Addis Ababa nor enquire about the status of Hawassa post-election.

While lack of capacity and experience is another concern, if the decisions of the board or the judiciary are perceived to have gone against the expected standards in favour of certain groups, it is likely to trigger election-related violence. The neutrality and transparency of these institutions are crucial from the very beginning.

Destructive ambiguity 

So far Abiy has tried to please all domestic actors as well as the international community. This is impossible. Abiy’s stock is falling fast among Ethiopians because his flowery rhetoric is not able to cover up his irreconcilable positions. He glorifies our imperial past, but he tells us he believes in a multinational Ethiopia. His Medemer is not detailed enough to show how to reconcile the extremes.

He wants to lead a transformative transition to democracy but is wedded to an authoritarian state and the constitutional electoral schedule. There is a danger that increasingly only a narrow elite around Abiy remains committed to his aspirational ambiguous project, while those who project a clearer vision, such as Jawar Mohammed, increase their popularity. These political problems combined with the aforementioned structural fragilities make Ethiopia’s transition a perilous one. Further trauma is expected if the ruling elites fail to end the ambiguity.

Query or correction? Email us

Editors: William Davison and Jonah Wedekind

Troubled SAA could be saved by merging with Ethiopian Airlines

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The plan has been months in the making, but seems to have stalled mid-flight. Here’s how a potential SAA merger with Ethiopian Airlines would work.

It has been revealed that one of the plans to save the nosediving South African Airways (SAA) business is to merge it with the wildly-successful Ethiopian Airlines, in a bid to grow the West-African travel hub together.

SAA: Merger with Ethiopian Airlines “on the cards”

The proposals were made by former SAA CEO Vuyi Jarana. His report, titled “The Investment Case for South African Airways”, suggests that merging with another airline is the SA carrier’s best chance of survival.

Both the UAE-based Emirates and German operator Lufthansa have been identified as potential partners, but documents seen by the Sunday Times highlight the importance of “consolidating air traffic through Africa” – making Ethiopian Airlines their preferred choice.

“Given the thin margin nature of the airline business, under government control or under government rules, it is unlikely SAA will deliver better margin performance. Government should consider exiting the airline business,”

“The biggest opportunity is to grow the West Africa hub together where traffic throughout Africa is consolidated, before connecting to the US and Canada.”

Vuyi Jarana

Government could dump an SOE

It’s understood that this plan of action would see the government offload SAA from its beleaguered roster of state-owned entities, providing a massive relief for the government. More than R40 billion has been spent on bailouts for the business, yet nothing seems to be good enough for the flailing airline.

This wouldn’t just be a case of palming-off the airline and its workers, however. Ethiopian Airlines would actually sublet aircraft into the joint venture and provide pilots, while SAA provides cabin crew. Avoiding retrenchments was a big part of the airline’s strike last month, and this solution seems to be a viable one that protects jobs.

Whoever inherits the hot mess of SAA will have to deal with recently-increased wages – up 6% after industrial action. They will also have to find a way of overcoming the operational challenges that have made South African Airways one of the least trustworthy airlines in the country. As the national carrier, a reputational facelift is required.

Book Review: “Medemer”, A Book by Dr. Abiy Ahmed

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By Assefa A. Lemu

Exordium

The book titled “Medemer” and written by Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy was launched  on  October 19, 2019 at a Millennium Hall in Addis Ababa (Finfinne). At a launching ceremony, the Author and Prime Minster of Ethiopia Dr. Abiy Ahmed cut a cake baked by the Government owned Hotel and Tourism Training Institute under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The ceremony was also streamed live on the Government owned Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation’s TV channel. I hope the cost of the cake and other costs of the launching ceremony were not paid from public funds because Medemer condemns “tie wearing thieves in government offices” who use public resources for their personal benefits and take bribes.  I also hope that neither public resources were used for the publication and distributions of the book nor gifts were accepted under the cover of “sponsor” for these purposes because corruption is one of the redlines of Medemer.

The proceeds from the sale of the book is said be used for the expansion of education in rural Ethiopia and I hope there are many Authors, including myself, who are willing to donate their books for such social development purposes if they get similar support, coverage, and publicity because the aim of some of the Authors is to share ideas more than getting income from the sale of their books. According to Dr. Abiy, Medemer was written to save Ethiopia from vanishing. In fact, it is not surprising to hear politicians saying they did this and that for the benefit of the people.  The former Prime Minister of Ethiopia Hailemariam Dessalegn who failed to govern the country and forced to resign told us that he resigned for the benefit of Ethiopian peoples. President Evo Morales of Bolivia who was forced to resign also claimed that he resigned for the benefit of the Bolvian people.

On the launching ceremony, Dr. Abiy disclosed that he has four published books under the pen name of “DRAZ” and Medemer is his fifth published book and the first book published under his real name. Writing a book by politicians to win election or to stay in power is not a new thing. Last year, in 2018, one of Madagascar’s multi-millionaire and politician Andry Rajoelina wrote a book which has 271 pages and titled “Initiative pour l’Emergence de Madagascar” (Initiative for the Emergence of Madagascar (IEM)) in which he outlined his political and campaign programs. He used his money and IEM to win Madagascar’s 2018 Presidential election and became the President of Madagascar in January 2019. IEM was Rajoelina’s and his party’s (Tanora malaGasy Vonona (TGV) or Young Malagasies Determined) vision written with the help of international and national experts to seek a concrete solution for Madagascar’s development (https://www.dw.com/en/andry-rajoelina-plans-political-comeback-in-madagascar/a-44984197). Unlike IEM, Medemer is said to be a philosophy and written by one man for sale like any other books.

In his October 29, 2019 article written in Amharic and titled “ካለንበት ወዴት?”, Major Dawit Woldegiorgis listed some of African leaders who wrote a book and claimed that they are philosophers and teachers of political philosophy (https://www.ethiopanorama.com/?p=110443&lang=en). His list includes Muammar Gaddafi of Libya who wrote a book titled “Direct Democracy”, Yahya Jammeh of Gambia who wrote a book titled “Patriotic Reorientation and Construction”, and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) who wrote a book titled “Authenticite”. These African leaders “followed” Plato’s advice in which he said the best form of government is that which is ruled by “philosopher king”; thus the kings (the rulers) should become philosophers or that philosophers should become kings (rulers).

In his Medemer book launching speech (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WM72u1oI53Q) Prime Minister Dr. Abiy invited comments and critiques on the book. This makes him different from the rest of “African philosopher kings” and may be help to save Ethiopia from becoming another Libiya or another D. R. Congo. This review/comment is in response to Dr. Abiy’s invitation to offer comments and critiques. In addition, Dr. Abiy said that the contest for the next Ethiopian election will be based on the written and bounded ideas. Therefore, we need to carefully evaluate the ideas which are written and bounded and presented to us by our politicians so that we will be able to differentiate those who stand for our interest from those who try to cheat us.

In contract law, there is a principle which says, when a government enters into business contract, it loses its sovereignty status and becomes no different than a mere private corporation or individual. In other words, when the government enters into a contract to do business with a private firm or individual, it lays down its sovereignty and takes the character and status of a private citizen. In such a case, the sovereign government and non-sovereign firm or individual are treated equally. As a private citizen, I thank Dr. Abiy Ahmed for publishing a book under his name and inviting us to critique it because this shows his willingness to be treated as a private citizen in relation to his book called Medemer.  His descending to the level of a mere private citizen encourages us to provide our frank opinion on the book without fear of repercussion from his government.

The Medemer book was published in September 2019 and has 280 pages divided in four parts and sixteen chapters.  Even though the book was written in Amharic and Afan Oromo languages, the version which was officially launched at the presence of the Author is the Amharic version. Therefore, this review is based on the version which is considered by the Author as an “official” version.

Medemer is defined differently by different individuals and groups. Some say, Medemer means “unity”, “togetherness”, “reconciliation”, “synergy”, “synthesis”, “consolidation”,  “combination”, or “cooperation”, but others say it is “putting everyone in one melting pot to create homogeneous society out of heterogeneous society”, “unitary”, “elimination of identity and diversity by the means of aggregation”, “domination through combination or expansion”, “clustering”, “bundling”, “merging”, or “cannibalization”. The Author defined Medemer by referring to three Amharic dictionaries as “coming together”, “to be combined”, “to be accumulated”, “to stand together”. He also said Medemer is “an idea” (example on pages, II, IV, V, 35, 42, 44), “a framework” (example on page iv), “a philosophy” (example on pages III, 4, 49, 73), “an outlook” (example on page 4). However, since the Author repeatedly said Medemer is “a philosophy”, I would like to consider Medemer as a philosophy.

It should be noted that Medemer (addition) is not only about increase, but also about decrease. For example, +6 + (+4) = 6 + 4 = 10 and shows increase. However, +6 + (-4) = 6 – 4 = 2 and shows decrease. In other words, the addition of numbers with like signs leads to an increase and the addition of numbers with unlike signs leads to decrease. Therefore, when we do addition, we must know the natures (signs) of what we are adding together because our addition may result in negative, rather than positive.

In terms of form, except for not including the titles of the four parts of the book into the tables of contents and not correcting a word in line three, paragraph one, on page IV, the Medemer book looks well proof read. I will offer my review of its contents under each chapter so that the readers can go to the relevant chapter and evaluate the reasonableness of my comments. Since the book has four parts, not to bore the readers, I would like to make my review in four parts. Here is the review of Part One of Medemer.

Acknowledgement

In the acknowledgement section, Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed, herein after the Author, thanked his friends, coworkers, and comrades who accepted the idea of Medemer and helped him to develop it.

 

 

Preface (Pages I-V)

The Author opened the preface with a saying in Afan Oromo but written in Sabean/ Ge’ez / Amharic alphabet: “Bashasha, olmaafi galiin bilasha”.  He translated this Afan Oromo saying to Amharic and the Amharic meaning shows that what he wanted to say is “Bashasha, olmaafi galli bilasha” meaning “in Bashasha you can spend a day and return home without incurring cost”. “Galii” and “galli” have two different meanings. The first one means “income” or “revenue” and the second one means “going back home”. Therefore, the Afan Oromo saying written in Sabean alphabet about Bashasha doesn’t convey the message the Author wanted to convey. This is a simple example that shows why Sabean (Amharic) alphabet doesn’t suit for writing Afan Oromo. I hope Medemer philosophy understands this fact and will not ask Oromo to abandon Qube Afan Oromo to proof that they are “added”.

In this section, the Author told the reader that Medemer was with him since he started thinking about life and grew with him. I wish he also told us how Medemer and his aspiration to be the seventh king of Ethiopia grew side by side with him without contradicting each other. He said the two contributors to Medemer idea are Ethiopian values and the law of nature. I wish also he listed these Ethiopian values which are different from the values of non-Ethiopians and contributed to Medemer philosophy. He said, Medemer idea took the shape of philosophy after he made it part of leadership value and institutional building in the institutions he worked as an employee. He believes that Medemer offers key solutions for Ethiopia’s key problems. He argues that there is no problem that Medemer can’t solve.  Congratulations to Ethiopia! He says, in Ethiopian history, the successes achieved including the victory of Adwa were the results of Medemer. Based on this statement, one can say that Medemer is not a new idea, but existed even before the Author was born.

In addition to expressing Medemer as a concept which he said grew to be a philosophy, the Author presented it as a framework in which he compiled alternative solutions to overcome political, economic, and social problems and which can bring changes in leaps and bounds.  The Author explained that he developed the Medemer idea based on his previous research works and papers. He also tried to give authoritative power to the ideas in the Medemer book by saying “as a leader who has an interest to plan the current and future goals of the country, I present this Medemer idea as a key solution to the problems of the country….”(page V).

Introduction (Pages V-VIII)

In the introduction section, the Author argues that Ethiopia’s problems will be solved by being inward looking rather than looking for solutions either from the West or East. He says, we have to follow the principle of “domestic solution for domestic problem” rather than looking for solutions from outside. It is not clear how this inward looking principle solve all problems that Ethiopia faces and brings progress to Ethiopia in the globalized world. In his September 2019 interview with Sheger FM Radio journalist Meaza Birru, the Author said when he came to power in April 2018, Ethiopia was a country that was not able to pay the salaries of Ethiopian Government employees and debts but he solved these problems by securing millions of dollars from foreign assistances (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zyQIVgOZ10k).  The question is how come Medemer philosophy which has grown with him and hoped to offer domestic solution for all domestic problems didn’t solve the problem of incapability to pay salary for domestic Ethiopian Government employees?

PART I: THE BASIS FOR MEDEMER IDEA

Chapter one: Human-beings’ Increasing Needs and Capacity (Pages 1-12)

In this chapter, the Author discussed about human needs. He divided human needs in to two main categories 1) Direct Survival Needs (need to protect oneself from danger and to live) and 2) Indirect Survival Needs [a) needs to eat, drink, and shelter; b) needs to be valued and honored, respected and glorified; c) need to be free] and argued that these needs can be met only by coming together (Medemer), not by working individually. This statement reminds me the argument in favor of cooperatives and villagization as well as the justification for establishing different associations such as farmers association, women’s association, youth association, labor union, etc. under Socialist Ethiopia.  The Author argues that human needs are survival needs and not addressing these needs is considered as playing with human-beings’ survival needs. He says, human beings have the capacity to cooperate or to compete and to fulfill the survival need, understanding these capacities is a must.

Chapter Two: The Contradiction of Two Ideologies (Pages 13-34)

In this chapter, the Author discussed Liberalism and Socialism. He says Liberalism gives priority to the need to be free, but Socialism gives priority to the need to be equal. According to the evaluation of the Author, Liberalism/Capitalism and Socialism as well as Social Democracy which emerged as a middle point between Liberalism and Socialism and attempted to reconcile the principles of both ideologies, failed to address the need of the majority. He also tried to show how Socialism and Liberalism (Developmental State) failed to work in Ethiopia and how the effort to bring Social Democracy through Revolutionary Democracy failed in Ethiopia.

According to the Author, the instabilities that Ethiopia faced were the outcomes of the conflict between the knowledges acquired from abroad and the conditions in the country. He argues, Liberal Democracy is based on the European liberal culture and it doesn’t fit to Ethiopia who is not in a position even to feed itself (page 34). In the Author’s opinion, Ethiopia needs independent and Ethiopian philosophy, i.e. Medemer. I wish he showed us how Medemer which advocates for coming together can address the needs of the majority where Socialism which is based on the principle of “Workers of the world unite!” failed. He argues introducing Liberalism to a country with illiterate and hungry population is wrong. I wish he explained in this chapter how Medemer fits to a country with illiterate and hungry population so that most developing countries that have illiterate and hungry people can use it.

Chapter Three: The Verdict of Medemer (Pages 35-48)

In this chapter, the Author presented the definition of Medemer. He has a subtitle which says “Medemer Means” (page 36), but instead of providing the definition of Medemer under this subtitle, he explained the objective of Medemer. It seems that he intentionally wanted to leave his readers in the dark regarding the meaning of Medemer.

On page 40 of the book, the Author shared the meaning of the word Medemer obtained from three Amharic-Amharic Dictionaries. The common meaning of the three dictionaries for the word Medemer is “to bring together to make one”. On the same page, the Author said something is created by coming together of small things, from their accumulation and this is what is called Medemer. This is why pro-federal system groups are suspicious to the idea of Medemer. They are wary of what Prime Minister is doing and see Medemer as his plan to take the country back to the unitary system where power is accumulate at the center.

The Author says the main objective of Medemer is to build upon the political and economic gains, to correct mistakes done, and achieve the needs and benefits of the future generation. He says, in terms of political analysis Medemer is indigenous; in terms of finding solutions it was designed by taking domestic and foreign knowledges. Here, the ideologue admitted that Medemer is using knowledge obtained from outside Ethiopia, the act he said in the previous pages a mistake and criticized. He also said Medemer is a concept/theory which touches upon all private and social life including political, economic, and social sectors.  Here, Medemer looks like a religion which governs the holistic life of an individual and a society. The Author argues, unless we bring together our ideas, money, knowledge, etc and add one on the top of another, individualism will lead us to decay and extinct. If this statement is true, I wonder how the Western capitalist countries where the concept of individualism is prevalent managed to survive.

The Author explained the benefit of building upon the achievement of the past instead of destroying what were done in the past and focusing on the clearing the debris of the past. He also repeated the explanation about the benefit of building on the achievements of the past on page 57. If that is the case, why wasting that much time and energy to destroy what were done by EPRDF, especially revising the federal structure, selling public enterprises and ongoing projects.

On page 42, the Author says “Since Ethiopia lived in isolation for epochs by burring itself within mountains and closing its doors, she has been in solitary deficit”. This contradicts with the statement that he made on page 33 of the book where he said the instabilities that Ethiopia faced were the outcome of the conflict between the knowledges acquired from abroad and the conditions in the country.  Such conflicting statements are some of challenges a reader may face while reading the book and while trying to see consistent flow of ideas in the book.

The Author identified “common goal” and “taking initiative” as fundamentals of Medemer. He also divided Medemer’s process into three: being passerby (ignoring Medemers concepts, being an observer, and external), being a gust (showing interest for Medemer and learning its concepts), and being resident (understanding and following Medemer theory). It is like issuing Red, Yellow, and Green cards for someone based on his/her position towards and knowledge about Medemer. I have no idea what color of card the opponents of Medemer should be given.

The Author also identified “unity of the country”, “respect for citizens”, and “prosperity” as the values of Medemer. He said the fate of nations and nationalities of Ethiopia are only to live together, not to live alone. Unity of the country is the matter of survival, not a matter of choice. Here, the Author resembles Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam who sent thousands of Ethiopians to war to keep Eritrea within Ethiopia and to protect territorial integrity of Ethiopia by force. Until I read this statement, I never compared Lieutenant Colonel Abiy Ahmed with Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam. The Author also contradicts the principle of self-determination of nations and nationalities enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution. This clearly shows that the value of Medemer is contradictory to the values of Ethiopian constitution because Medemer says nations and nationalities have no other choice except living within Ethiopia in unity and accuses anyone who thinks different from this as a racist (page 47-48).

Chapter Four: The Problems of Addend  (Pages 49- 76)

The Author says Medemer is measurable philosophy and our closeness to Medemer can be expressed in Medemer meter. I wish I knew how many meters I am close to Medemer or how many meters I am away from it.

The Author says Medemer has two main problems of addend: Problems of idea and problems of practice. He categorized extreme ideas, dependency on time (fixing one’s idea in the past, or in the present, or in the future rather than linking them together), simplifying things rather than looking at them as a complex whole, disrespecting professions, being revolutionary, mockery, and opportunist as problems of idea. On the other hand, he categorized lack of conscience (insensibility or heartlessness) and sluggishness as a problems of practice and Medemer’s redlines and behaviors which Medemer despise.  He said Medemer will not tolerate corruption and laziness. This reminds me National Control Committee under Derg and Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission under EPRDF both of which were established to control corruption but failed to achieve their objectives.

In this Part I of the book, the Author advised Ethiopians to stop using words and terms which put someone in a certain category such as chauvinist, narrow nationalist, anti-peace, anti-development, anti-people, and reactionary, but as stated on page 46 of the book, he created another labeling words such as “passerby”, “guest”, and “resident” of Medemer.

Frankly speaking, even though the Author repeatedly used  the phrase “Medemer philosophy”  in the Part I of the book, I didn’t get how discussing ordinary topics like the needs of human being which everyone discusses at a family level, the need to come together which every Ethiopian discusses at Edir and Equb gatherings in their villages, liberalism and socialism which were discussed enough in Ethiopia for the last 45 years, discussing the benefit of accumulating wealth which is even known by “tie wearing thieves in the Government offices”, and telling how bad corruption and laziness are which are well known even among the Tuk-tuk (Bajaj) drivers considered  a philosophy and the only solution which can save Ethiopia and its people from vanishing. I hope, I will be able to get answer and clarification for this question from the rest parts of the book.

PART II: THE FRACTURE OF ETHIOPIAN POLITICS AND ITS MAINTENANCE OPTION

In his Medemer book launching speech of September 2019, His Excellency Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed said, “ If one party and Medemer are considered not useful, let the brave person put his whisky aside and come up with the alternative idea and write a book titled Multiplication” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHwNmvrN_3E). What Dr. Abiy didn’t realize is that rejecting the idea of Medemer doesn’t require writing a book under the title of one of the remaining three mathematical operations—Multiplication, Division, or Subtraction. Rejection can be expressed by action or inaction.

When I hear the above quoted statement of Dr. Abiy, two questions came to my mind: 1) what is the relationship between drinking whisky and writing a book? 2) Why he focused only on male and asked them to write “Multiplication” book? Anyways, until we write a recommended book under the title of “Multiplication”, we will continue reviewing Medemer (Addition).

 

Chapter Five: Oppression and the Survival of Ethiopian State (Pages 77-90)

At the opening of Chapter Five, the Author said, “ In one hundred and twenty years of modern history of our country,  we repeatedly noticed situations where the fall of one government has posed a danger of dissolution of the country” (page 77).  Here, the Author confirmed EPRDF’s discourse that says Ethiopia was established by Emperor Menelik II and has only 120 year of history as a state under one sovereign government and with the defined boundary. This is a big departure from fairytale of never changing 3,000 year of “history of Ethiopia”. The Author admitted the truth that Ethiopian State was founded by Menelik II who was Emperor of the Ethiopian Empire from1889 to his death in 1913. Therefore, counting the age of present day of Ethiopia starting from 1889 makes sense.

The Author also argues that the leaders of Ethiopia, especially the kings, were busy with addressing external and internal political issues and didn’t get time to design policies which could prosper and civilize the country. The kings spent their whole time and age on stabilizing the country. Even though he didn’t specify the name of these kings, one may assume the Author is referring to Emperors Menelik II and Hailesellasie because these were the two kings who ruled Ethiopia after it was formed as a state.

The Author says, the main reasons for the absence of the required development and civilization in Ethiopia is because of lack of legitimacy of Ethiopia as a state. He says those who governed Ethiopia spent great deal of their time in bringing legitimacy to Ethiopia as a state rather than meeting the need of the peoples. Since the peoples in Ethiopia didn’t give legitimacy to the government and the state of Ethiopia, Ethiopian kings and authorities spent their times averting internal and external dangers posed against the very existence of Ethiopia as a country.  Because of this, they didn’t get time to meet the needs of the peoples and failure to meet these needs created discontents which in turn led to revolts and overthrowing of these authorities/leaders.

According to the Author, oppression has been the main instrument to maintain the very existence of state and government in Ethiopia and Ethiopian elites contributed to these oppressions. He argues that most of Ethiopian elites want to directly implement what they read instead of analyzing and matching it with the reality in the country. He accuses the Ethiopian elites as lazy and careless.

The Author says oppression could be divided in to two: 1) Manmade oppression which comes from the evil thinking and intention of humans and implemented based on the wish and plan of the humans; 2)Structural oppression which comes from the structure of the system and targets certain individuals or groups. Manmade oppression comes from individuals and oppresses everyone, but structural oppression comes from the system and targets selected groups. He proposes that the solution for ending manmade oppression is to make power come from the ballot box rather than from the barrel of the gun and to end structural oppression, reform should be made.

Chapter Six: The Plan to Create Ethiopian Democracy (Pages 91-108)

In Ethiopia, there has been the problem of legitimacy of government power. In the past, Ethiopian Orthodox Church was the one who used to give legitimacy for the rulers/ authorities. The bases for getting legitimacy were linage and force. Derg changed such legitimacy which comes from church and linage.  However, Derg failed because it was not able to implement democracy which is the basis for the new legitimacy of power. EPRDF also failed because its assumption which says legitimacy will come from achieving economic development didn’t work and the demand for democracy increased.

Out of the three demands which challenged the Ethiopian feudal system, namely, equality, liberty, and fraternity, the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution which tried to address the question of land holding (economic question) and the 1991 Revolution which tried to address the questions of nations and nationalities focused only on “equality”. The demands for liberty and fraternity didn’t get the necessary attentions. Even though there are still demands for equality, the main reasons for the continuous instability in Ethiopia are absence of the values of liberty and fraternity. I agree with the assessment of the Author in this regard.

In this chapter, the Author discussed the concepts of direct and representative democracy as well as the concepts of majority vote and consensus. He also briefly touched upon the arguments which are promoted by the so called “civic nationalist group” which says “if individual rights are respected, group rights will be respected  automatically” and by the so called “social nationalist group” which says “if group rights are respected, individual rights will be respected automatically”  and criticized both for failing to give balanced attention for manmade and system-made oppressions. He said both civic nationalists and social nationalists are trying to treat one disease with the medicine made for another disease.

According to the Author, the solution for eradicating oppressions and achieving equality, liberty, and fraternity is implementing “Medemer Democracy” which balances civic nationalism and social nationalism as well as uses consensus democracy by loosening the tension among the elites of different ethnic groups. In his opinion, Medemer Democracy which he said is based on the Ethiopian values and cultures can solve Ethiopian problems. He said the end goal of Medemer Democracy is to build Ethiopia in which democracy will be based on developed civic culture and competition of ideas and where there will be no more contradiction between democracy and the very existence of the country.

The effort to change Revolutionary Democracy to Medemer Democracy and transforming Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to Ethiopian People Medemer Democratic Front (EPMDF)  formally known as Prosperity Party (PP) is underway.  You can read the political program of Prosperity Party which is based on Medemer Democracy here https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Exclusive-Prosperity-Party-Regulation.pdf. If the Author really believes that Ethiopia shouldn’t be a laboratory where different ideas will be tested, I wonder why he wanted to test Medemer Democracy on Ethiopia.

Chapter Seven: The Challenge to Affirm the Legitimacy of the State (Pages 109-125)

According to the Author, legitimacy of state means where the people or the elites consider that the state is their representative that can implement their needs. When there is legitimacy of the state, the citizens will accept that state is the only legitimate entity that can use physical force. He says, the legitimacy of state comes from the consensus of elites because the state that doesn’t have the acceptance of elites will not get acceptance from the people.  In addition, he says the political elites have different stories and interpretations about what happened during the formation of Ethiopia and because of that there will be instabilities and conflicts. Thus, the works which are underway to solve the chaos related to the formation of the state cannot bring lasting solution but may bring quick answers to the problems.

The Author argues that the reason why nationalism has become noticeable in Ethiopia is because of the existence of national oppression. When there is oppression based on identity, people rally around identity politics.

The Author reiterated the fact about the formation of Ethiopian state at the end of 19th century through expansion from north to south. This expansion is seen by some as colonialism, by some as national oppression, and by others as state building (page 115). Ethiopia’s state building has been followed assimilation policy and remains suspended or half done.  Because of that, it has been a point of debate among the elites of the country. Ethiopian state building partly gave birth to civic nationalism because it was half built and on the other hand created social nationalists because it was an aborted endeavor. This made Ethiopian politics to be pulled between civic nationalists and social nationalists. (If you are interested to know more about nationalism in Ethiopia read the article I posted on this subject and available here:  http://www.aigaforum.com/article2019/Nationalism-in-Ethiopia.htm)

The Author argues that the way Ethiopian state built and the identity politics associated with the way it was built created negative attitude against the legitimacy of the Ethiopian state. Because of that, the value of common identity has been eroded from time to time and there is no common stance even on the main national issues. The tension between civic nationalists and social nationalists reached at the point where it posed the danger of ripping  the country into pieces and leading the peoples in the country to another endless war.

According to the Author, to end oppression and build democratic Ethiopia as well as to make sure that the Ethiopian state has legitimacy, national reconciliation and consensus are necessary, and to make this practical, the existence of independent institutions are necessary.

Chapter Eight: The Formation of Free, Independent, and Capable Institutions (Pages 126-133)

The Author argues that even though Ethiopia was able to establish strong central government like countries in Europe and Asia, it couldn’t build a political system where supremacy of law and accountability are implemented.  Because of that, it has been suffering from lack of stability and backwardness. According to the Author, one of the reasons why the attempt to build Developmental State in Ethiopia  for the last 27 years was not successful is the limitation to build capable institutions which are the sources of strength for the developmental state. The institutions on which the state has based have problems of mixing the responsibilities of party and government, lack of capacity and independence, and not renewed with social and economic changes.

The Author identified two main problems of Ethiopian institutions: 1) weaknesses which came from patrimonialism/neo-patrimonialism and cronyism, and 2) conservativeness (lack of interest/willingness to change and modernize).  To form free, independent, and capable institutions in Ethiopia, the Author argues, changing the attitude about public service delivery, organization, procedures, and processes as well as reforming the civil service are necessary.

Chapter Nine: Changing the Political Leadership from Boss to Leader (Pages 134-143)

According to the Author, one of the reasons why Ethiopia didn’t  get out of poverty using her natural resources is the failure of leadership. According to Ethiopian traditional thinking, leaders mean a boss who has inviolable authority.  Unless the Author is referring to the Habesha culture which is hierarchal and based on Getoch (master) versus Gebar (serf) relationship, his generalization is not true. For example, under Oromo Gada system, leaders are not considered as bosses and the system doesn’t allow them to act like bosses.

The author explained the difference between a boss and a leader: boss is one who imposes his dreams on others by force and creates followers by force, but leader is one who creates supporters by convincing and positively influencing. He says to build developed democratic society, we need to get out of the boss mentality. According to the Author, lack of ability to create common dream, lack of excellence to control emotions, challenges to reconcile leadership skills, and group composition are the challenges of leadership in Ethiopia. He says ethnic representation is one of the problems of group composition which weakens merit-based leadership. He also says most Ethiopians are dumb citizens (fiz zegoch) who run after their personal interest rather than focusing on the interest of their country (page 142). His proposed solution for such kinds of problems is to have leaders who have visions, who can share these visions with their followers, and who can motivate/provoke their followers (yemineshitu). He argues, rather than eliminating the leadership capacity of the country, it would be better to build upon what the country has, to accumulate the dispersed ability of the citizens. I hope the readers understand that in this article I am reviewing what he wrote in the book under review not what he is doing as a head of Government of Ethiopia.

Chapter Ten: Building Political Culture, the Lasting and Reliable Solution (Pages 144-154)

According to the Author, institutional building by itself is a flesh without soul. The institutions will get soul only when the culture that can support them has been created. Human beings have the ability to twist nature let alone other things. Therefore, unless democratic culture is developed, there is nothing that can stop human beings from twisting the independent institutions and make them means of oppression. He argues that the reason why some countries who built independent institutions and more or less held free and fair elections face vicious circles of conflict is because of lack of developed political culture.

The Author argues that building democratic culture at country level is a complex task that requires higher level of struggle and long time. Democracy requires civic culture and civic culture is strongly linked to all rounded economic and social developments. He says people whose economic and social developments are at the low level, can’t get out of the competition of regional interests and they are strangers to the competition based on ideas. According to this conclusion, the competition between South and North Italy, the questions of Catalonia, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Quebec are because of their backwardness.

He says less developed peoples are busy with narrow agenda and focus on material things and not suitable for the democratic system based on the competition of ideas. According to the Author, civic culture is not being careless about politics and following up of international politics and decisions. In the civic culture, refusal, being stranger, and carelessness have no places. It requires following up of politics and participating in politics. Civic culture is a culture where the citizens get out of regional agenda and competition for ethnic interest and concerned with country wide political direction and decision.

It is interesting that under Medemer philosophy, discussing grass root problems is considered as backwardness and being concerned about international politics shows the degree of civilization. Internationalism which was condemned in part one of Medemer is appreciated in this part two of the book. Part three of the book may tell us even more interesting things.

PART III: THE FRACTURE OF ETHIOPIAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND ITS MAINTENANCE OPTION

Chapter Eleven: The Achievements of Ethiopian Economy and The Challenge of Quality of Development (Pages155-164)

In this chapter, the Author recognized the economic development and social change achieved in Ethiopia in the last twenty eight years. He says,  the gross domestic product which was $7.9 billion dollars in 1991 was increased to $84.4 billion dollars in 2018, which is more than ten-fold. The number of population living below poverty line which was 44.2 % in 2000 reduced to 23.5% in 2016. The per capita income which was $164 in 1993 increased to $883 dollars in 2018 and average life expectancy which was 47 years in 1980s increased to 65 years in 2017. He also says the education coverage has been increased.

According to the Author, the achievements in the economic and social sectors happened mainly as a result of public investment in social services and physical infrastructures. The conducive international political environment also created an opportunity for the economic and social development of Ethiopia. As a result, Ethiopia got huge amounts of foreign aid and loans. The finance collected by domestic banks also supported the development of Ethiopia. However, he says, the economic and social developments have problems of quality. He listed high cost of living, unemployment, mismatch of saving and interest for investment, mismanagement of public projects, weaknesses in export sector and shortage of foreign exchange, budget deficit; slowness in structural transformation, contrabands, and illegal trades as a symptoms of lack of quality of the development.

The Author identified two main symptoms of what he said the disease of Ethiopian economy: (1) lack of fair benefit from the development (large gaps in wealth and income among the citizens) and (2) macro-economic problems (budget deficit, debt burden, mismatch of saving and investment, problem of trade balance, and shortage of foreign exchange).

In economics, there is a theory of immiserizing growth proposed by Indian-born American economist Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati in 1958. The immiserizing growth theory refers to the situation where economic growth could result in a country being worse off than before the growth. According to this theory, the economic growth may bring about an increase in level of production in the growing economy and the wealth effect may even be positive but there can be a decline in the welfare of the nation and the lives of the majority may become worse off than before. In other words, the economic growth makes people more miserable. This may happen because various reasons including the deterioration in the terms of foreign trade.  Even though the Author didn’t refer to this theory, his argument show that the economic growth achieved in the last 28 years in Ethiopia was immiserizing growth where few got the benefit and the majority became more miserable. Validating or refuting this argument requires detail research.

Chapter Twelve: Causes of Fracture of the Economic System (Pages 165-196)

According to the Author, there are three causes of fracture of the Ethiopian economic system. These are:

  1. Inadequacy of Market– Inadequacy of market happens in the market led economy where goods and services do not follow the principles of supply and demand. The inadequacy of market in Ethiopia is related to weak private sector, lack of productivity, competitiveness, and profitability. To correct the inadequacy of market, the government needs to take policy and control measures. The author says government must not leave the economy to the market; rather the government must continue interfering in the market in selected and strategic areas.
  2. Inadequacy of Government– Inadequacy of government is related to the problems caused by a government either when it interferes in the market and makes mistakes or when it fails to discharge its responsibility because of negligence and imbalance of production and distribution of wealth happened. The monetary and fiscal policies that government uses may  positively or negatively affect the way market operates and the way wealth is distributed. The Author says the illegal relationship between business persons and high government officials, in other words, corruption and favoritism which he call theft, and government intervention in the market are the two main inadequacies of Government.
  3. Inadequacy of System– According to the Author, establishing a system is about establishing rules of the game. He says per Medemer’s understanding, lasting and healthy economic development will be achieved with the participation of government, private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and education institutions. It seems that the idea of private sector-led economic development which brought proven economic development in the Western world has not been appreciated by Medemer. Medemer wants the collaboration and coordination of what it calls the main actors of the economy: government, private sector, NGOs, and education institutions.

According to the Author, the fractures of Ethiopian economy will be treated by fully utilizing the capacities of the economic actors (education institutions, NGOs/civic organizations, government, and private sector) and by using the principle of Medemer. Out of these actors, the Author considers government as the main force of development (page 189).

Chapter Thirteen: Forces of Production As Potential of the Country (Pages 197-215)

According to the Author, forces of production- human resources, natural resources, financial and physical capital- are the potential of the country. However, unless there is accountable system which protects these inputs from embezzlement, their existence alone cannot increase productivity. That is why the lives of citizens of some of the countries which have rich natural resources like petroleum worsen rather than improving. He also says the existence of good management alone doesn’t lead to prosperity. The development of the potential of a country depends more on the forces of production rather than on the management efficiency. Especially, natural resources and labor have significant contributions for prosperity.

The Author regurgitates EPRDF’s approach to achieving development through Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI), which mainly focuses on harnessing the three available resources- land, water, and labor- and then transforming to industrial development.

He says, following the land policy which came as a result of “land to the tiller”, an increase in the number of population happened in 1960-1985 Ethiopian Calendar (page 198). The proclamation to provide for the public ownership of rural lands of Ethiopia was issued in Yekatit 1967 Ethiopian Calendar(on March 4, 1975). Therefore, the statement he made about the population growth either has factual error or typo. In addition, he didn’t explain how the public ownership of land resulted in population growth. He also says economic development is the prerequisite for peace and security of Ethiopia (page 203). This is just echoing EPRDF’s policy of Developmental State.

The Author says the youth and productive manpower could be used to bring social and economic development and considers the number and composition of population as sources of national potential. He discussed the challenges to meet the growing demands of youth and weaknesses in the utilization of natural resources. In short, the Author’s perspective of economic development is not different from that of EPRDF. For example he says 1) Ethiopia should follow youth focused economic development otherwise the jobless youth will be disappointed and disturb the peace and security of the country; 2) agriculture is the mainstay of the economy and need to be modernized and made market focused.

Chapter Fourteen: Structural Transformation of the Economy as a Springboard (Pages 216-238)

The Author says the structural transformation of an economy mainly happens between agricultural and industrial sectors as a result of the movement of labor from rural to urban. He argues, agriculture is dependent on natural resources like land and water and applying technology and labor will not make its productivity to go beyond its last threshold. In fact, every production has a threshold where an addition of a factor of production results in decrease in the marginal output of a production, if all other factors of production stay constant. This is called  the law of diminishing returns and he didn’t explain what makes agriculture different from other sectors in this regard.

He says, the transformation of agriculture to industry is inevitable and that is why agriculture is called “growing mortal”. He also says, if structural change is to be made in Ethiopian economy, it must be made first in agricultural sector. This is another regurgitation of EPRDF’s policy because EPRDF has been promoting this idea and to this end established the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA)  in December 2010 which also serves as the Secretariat of an Agricultural Transformation Council chaired by the Prime Minister.  It seems that Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed is trying to sell EPRDF’s ideas by rebranding and repackaging.

Other subjects discussed in this chapter are:

  1. The challenges of industrial development which are related to skill and productivity of manpower, distributions of factories, domestic market, foreign exchange, and competition in the foreign market;
  2. Technological development which is related to equipment and tools, human skill, system and process, decision making, communication flow and storage; and
  3. Building knowledge based economy.

Regarding industrialization, the Author recommends labor intensive and capital saving industries (page 221). He says, Ethiopia has large and inexpensive labor force but compared with other countries the skills and productivity of Ethiopian labor force is low.

According to the Author, 28 years ago the Ethiopian Government asked itself how to get the citizens out of famine and poverty, how to provide services that improve their lives. But today, the question posed by the citizens to the Ethiopian Government is to have a political economic system that can enable them to convert creativity and assiduity to prosperity. In his opinion, the backlogs of poverty could be cleared and prosperity will be achieved through Medemer philosophy. This implies the relationship between Medemer philosophy and Prosperity Party (PP).

PART IV: ‘MEDEMER’ AND  FOREIGN RELATION

This is the final part of “Medemer” book review which has been provided in four parts. Now a days, not only Medemer Philosophy, but also the sale of Medemer Book became the project of the Government of Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC), Ethiopian Embassies, and other Ethiopian Government institutions are busy implementing this project (https://youtu.be/gGDNdVZXGh0 ). As the saying goes, “the request of the king is tantamount to an order” and it seems that everyone is working hard to fulfill the order. If the proceeds from the sale of the book are collected with the official revenue collection receipt of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) to go to the treasury and to be used for the procurement of goods and services for public purposes, there is no problem of investing public funds in its sale. Otherwise, it is considered misuse of government institutions and the time of Government employees. The process is worrisome because, in a country where the Prime Minister takes public resources with pinches, the ministers will take with shovels and other government officials with buckets.

Chapter Fifteen: International Situations and Their Implication on Ethiopia (Pages241-249)

The Author argues that forces and structures of international relations are volatile; the situations are in big change and revolt. He listed terrorism, migration, increasing number of international actors, and climate change as main changes surfacing in international relations. He says, the two main international issues which have significant impact on Ethiopia are 1) the confrontation of superpowers and the increase of actors of international relations, and 2) increase in populism and acceptance of ethnic based parties.

  1. The Confrontation of Superpowers and the Increase of Actors of International Relations

The competition among the developed countries for political influence beyond their boundaries became one of the realities of international relation. America’s dominance which was seen after the end of Cold War is challenged by the emergence of other powers who are striving for geopolitical and economic influence. Transnational companies and non-governmental organizations (NGO) are also the actors in international relations. The Author says, the revival of Russia and the emergence of China are posing challenge to the United States and the fake news disseminated through Facebook, Twitter, and Google are posing challenge to other countries. He also says, the political situation around Persian Gulf and Middle East, the Iran-Saudi competition, the competition between Egypt and Turkey, the war in Yemen and the Nile issue have direct impact on peace and security in the Horn of Africa and around the Red Sea. American, French, Chinese, UAE, and Saudi Arabian military camps around the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and the competition of these countries to have friends in this region are also another challenges in international relations. Therefore, the Author says, these dynamic international and regional conditions should be given attention equal to building accountable, representative, and effective domestic political economic system.

  1. Increase in Populism and Nationalism

The Author argues that the financial crisis of 2008 and the stagnation of economic growth and social crises that followed it resulted in increased populism and nationalism. Political organizations that accuse the status quo for political and economic problems and who want to change the existing system emerged. Instead of ideology, principles, national and international relations, populism and nationalism became the governing ideas. He listed Sweden, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Mexico, USA, France, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe as countries where populists and conservatives won election. He says, the anti-immigrant and nationalist behavior of populists is posing challenge to the international trade and multilateral organizations.

He argues, the rise of nationalism and acceptance of ethnic based parties at international level have significant impact on Ethiopia. An increase in the numbers of political forces who rather than designing agenda which address the basic question of the people inflame grievances and hate immigrants is a challenge for the multicultural Ethiopia. However, the Author didn’t explain how an increase in populism and nationalism at international level create challenge to Ethiopia. In addition, it worth noting that Prime Minister Abiy himself is one of the populists who exploited the grievances of the people to mobilize support and take power ( http://aigaforum.com/article2019/Populism-in-Ethiopia.htm).

Chapter Sixteen: Medemer and Foreign Relation (Pages 250-267)

According to the Author, one of the sectors where Ethiopia built capacity without backlog is foreign relations and diplomacy. The good international works done by previous Ethiopian leaders can be huge capital for the foreign relations that the country is following. He identified three causes of war- greed, fear, and dignity- and said Ethiopia enters into war only for her dignity and used the battle of Adwa as an example that Ethiopia fought for defending its dignity. Ethiopia’s peace keeping role in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and Liberia and its role in mediation also increased her influence.

As the Author puts it, Medemer’s foreign relation depends on cooperation and competition. It will continue the basic principles of foreign policy of the country by correcting the weaknesses rather than starting brand new. He says our foreign relation should give priority to relations rather than for pursuing interest and problems could be solved primarily by renewing relations. Renewing relation requires one party to take the initiative otherwise they will be in “Hobbesian Trap” where fear leads to an increasing fear and then to conflict. He says Medemer does not agree with the idea of “there are no permanent friends, no permanent enemies” rather it believes in the idea of “there is no such thing as friend and enemy”. He also says Ethiopia’s foreign relation will give attention to relations with neighboring countries with the focus on economic integration, peace and security and will assure national dignity which includes the dignity of citizens and having strong defense force (army, marine, air force, and cyber).  He also discussed the importance of being influential at international level.

EXIT (Pages 268-270)

The Author says Ethiopia got golden opportunities to start new chapters, but failed to use them and those opportunities were wasted. Now, another golden opportunity is in front of us- are we again going to waste or are we going to add the country and generation together and transform the country to the higher level? This chance is not what we usually get and, may be, this will be the last. Therefore, we all must rise up and write glaring history on the record. The Author tried to create sense of urgency to rally people behind his ideas. He also tried to convince the readers that this is the last chance for the country to see change.

According to the Author, the idea of Medemer is the conscious way through which we realize our common goals by exhaustively utilizing one’s ability and reducing wastage. It is a conscious way because it enables to reconcile principles with realities rather than leaving the problems of life to ideology. He says, if we follow Medemer’s way, it will take us to prosperity and civilization. If we are added together, we will solve our problems and ascend to the higher level. The Author concluded that the very existence of the country and the security of the people will be realized only through Medemer. In short, the Author is saying “my way or the highway”.

Medemer can be said a political roadmap rather than philosophy. It is a plan to allure unwary supporters. Time will tell if Medemer brings prosperity or poverty to the country, if it lifts the country to the higher level or douse it in the swamp of despair, if it brings stability or restiveness, if it unites or widen the rift among the peoples in Ethiopia.

In the 280 pages Medemer book, we find only one quotation on page 180 and that quotation is not done correctly (it is indented, in quotation marks, and in bold font and has no page number of the book from which it was quoted. Not using references and quotations and presenting ideas in the general terms based on assumption are some of the weaknesses of the book. In addition, one can observe that the author categorizes intergovernmental or public international organizations as NGOs (page 244) and he used incorrect timeframes (page 198).

The Author provided the list of books (bibliography) at the end of the book, but these doesn’t help the reader which idea is taken from which book or which idea is supported by which author. This diminishes the quality of the book and the credibility of his arguments.

I listened to numbers of panelists who tried to stretch the contents of Medemer to cover everything and make it one size fits all.   Even, I heard that the idea of Medemer came from Oromo Gada system and will work for other Horn of Arica countries too; but this argument is not true. Therefore, the readers shouldn’t be surprised if they couldn’t find the ideas which panelists patched together regarding Medemer. The assignments of some of these panelists are to convince their audiences by hook or by crook.

===============================The End===========================

መደመር መፅሃፍ በገበያ ላይ- የመፅሃፉ ሽያጭ በገጠሪቱ ኢትዮጵያ ትምህርት ቤቶችን ለማስገንባት ይውላል

መደመር መጽሃፍ በገበያ ላይየመጽሃፉ ሽያጭ በገጠሪቱ ኢትዮጵያ ትምህርት ቤቶችን ለማስገንባት ይውላል

Posted by FBC (Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C.) on Tuesday, December 3, 2019


Why Ethiopia needs a strong incumbent political party in the transition to democracy

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By Girmachew Alemu, For Addis Standard

Between revolution and continuity

Addis Abeba, December 03/2019 – Ethiopia is going through a political transition to democracy that began under the incumbent Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four ethnic-based political groups that ruled the country since 1991.  Despite its authoritarian past, the EPRDF initially committed itself to transition to democracy that is open to all opposition political parties. After a few months into the transition, the ruling EPRDF fractured following serious political differences between leaders of the party who support democratic reforms and those who want to retain the status quo.

On November 22, 2019, the chairman of the EPRDF, Pm Abiy Ahmed, announced the decision to merge three of the four members of the EPRDF coalition to establish a new national incumbent successor political party named Prosperity Party.  Other hitherto independent regional parties are also expected to join the Prosperity Party (incumbent successor party). This commentary reflects on why the birth of the new incumbent successor party is a step forward in the transition to democracy and highlights three major issues (ethnicity, dealing with the past, and personal rule) that are crucial for the strength and stability of the new party.

Party and party system institutionalization

Ethiopia’s leaders pledged, among other reforms, free and fair multiparty elections in May 2020. Yet, the country is home to highly fragmented, volatile and weak political parties and party system marked by lack of party cohesion, high regional fragmentation, weak financial resources, and clientelism.[1]  Over the years, the ruling EPRDF engendered the weak institutionalization of opposition political parties through direct repression and indirect pressure such as inducing internal rivalry, and monopoly over state institutions including the media.

The weak party
institutionalization has in turn resulted in a weak party system institutionalization
which negatively affected the ability of opposition political parties to forge
strong alliances, connect and establish stable linkage with voters, shape and
mediate mass political negotiations, and
be strong contenders against the ruling party.[2] Also,
the EPRDF’s failure to go
through the transition to democracy in one piece and the political wrangling
between its leaders has exacerbated the volatility and fragmentation of the
party system and weakened the transition to democracy.

The formation of
the new Prosperity Party committed to transition to democracy is an opportunity
to reduce the volatility and fragmentation of the party system.  The crucial role of an incumbent successor
party such as the Prosperity Party in democratic transition may sound counterintuitive
especially because of its authoritarian past and continued dominance of the
political space. Yet, those are the qualities that make an incumbent successor
party instrumental in pushing for high party system institutionalization and
competitive electoral democracy.[3]

In the transition
to democracy, the incumbent successor party will apply its capacity, resources,
networks, and dominant status inherited from its authoritarian past to win democratic
elections. The process will have the incumbent shaping and controlling the rules
and institutions of democracy including party registration and competition,
electoral and democratic institutions with what Riedl calls the ‘unintended
consequences’ of pushing opposition political parties to have cohesion and
stronger alliance even when the rules and institutions are favorable to the
incumbent.[4]

Also, a strong
incumbent successor party in Ethiopia is highly likely to produce robust
short-term and long-term policies, programs and plans. Such clarity will help
opposition parties to forge a strong anti-incumbent cleavage and come up with
solid policy and program alternative for voters and their constituencies.  The absence of agitation of voters and
constituencies by opposition political parties for the May 2020 general elections
left with only six months shows, among other things, the confusion over the
incumbent strategy and the extreme volatility and fragmentation of the party
system.

Parties representing regional states of Somali, Afar, Harari, Benishagul Gumuz and Gambella have joined Prosperity Party, signaling the opening of the national political space to a large number of citizens who were effectively marginalized by the discriminatory political set up of the EPRDF that limited membership to ethnic groups represented in the coalition. Such move will enable the Prosperity Party to mobilize large number of voters and constituencies across the country. The broad base of the Party will contribute to the stability of the party system by bringing smaller regional parties to a common negotiation forum. Moreover, the policy will likely push opposition political parties to form strong alliances against the incumbent thereby reducing the fragmentation and volatility of the party system.

Ethnicity and Pluralism

EPRDF has recognized the ethnic and religious
diversity in the country. The accommodation of ethnic and religious pluralism
is a constructive policy that should be maintained by the Prosperity Party.
EPRDF has also directly and indirectly encouraged the formation of ethnic
political parties, a policy that should be rejected by the Prosperity Party for
many reasons.  To begin with, a party
system dominated by ethnic parties
like ours is not compatible with the idea of accommodation of pluralism
and democracy. Ethnic parties are rigid because they ‘derive their support from
an identifiable ethnic group and serve the interests of that group’.[5]  As such, ethnic parties exclude those who
cannot identify with the ethnic group they claim to represent.  In a multi-ethnic country like Ethiopia, the
proliferation of ethnic parties created ‘several one-party ethnic states’
generating an extremely fragmented and fragile party system.[6]  Also, ethnic parties offer little or no policy
choice for voters that belong to the ethnic groups they claim to represent. Studies show that in a party
system dominated by ethnic political parties, citizens ‘feel that they are
trapped in ethnic-party zones and that they lack the freedom to form and choose
parties other than the one or two parties who claim to represent their ethnic
groups.’[7]  In effect ethnic communities become hostage
to the whims of ethnic elites who obstruct political mobilization and alliances
on grounds that are common to all communities in the country.

Another strong
policy reason for the Prosperity Party to tone down ethnicity as a tool of mobilization
is its extreme politicization that went on for the last several years. It has
become common to hear ethnic political parties accusing each other of
‘anti-x-people’ policies and actions. Semantics aside, it is now clear that the
EPRDF led politicization of ethnicity has eventually created numerous highly
fragmented and volatile ethnic political parties that are bent on dragging communities
that lived peacefully for generations into violence.

Granted, ethnicity will continue to be a strong tool of political mobilization in Ethiopia as in most agrarian societies.  Nonetheless, the Prosperity Party has an opportunity to set a new tone on the basis of an ideology of tolerance and mobilize voters and constituencies across a set of diverse issues and interests including class, gender, economic, social, and ethnic cleavages. The strategy will enable the party to be a ‘bridging’ and negotiation forum for diverse set of voters and constituencies including the youth, civic groups and ethnic groups. [8] In the long run, the policy will induce opposition parties to come up with equally robust and meaningful policy alternatives rather than focus and capitalize on ethnic differences among communities.

Dealing with the legacy of the past

The EPRDF party
brand has collapsed. Paradoxically, the strength and weakness of the Prosperity
Party is closely linked with the legacy of the EPRDF.  The Prosperity Party draws strength from its
inheritance of, among others, the financial and human resources, mass networks,
and political, economic, and social achievements of the EPRDF.  Conversely, the Party carries what Loxton calls
‘authoritarian baggage’ from the past such as human rights violations, high-level
corruption, massive financial mismanagement and other undemocratic practices
and policy failures of the EPRDF.[9]  Loxton identifies four strategies of dealing
with ‘authoritarian baggage’ by new incumbent successor parties in the context
of transition to democracy: contrition, obfuscation, scapegoating, and
embracing the past.[10]

Contrition involves
a process of breaking with the past through acts such as the admission of wrong
policies and actions of the past, opening up the political space, and renaming
and restructuring the incumbent party. Obfuscation is denying the connection of
the successor party with the failures of the past while scapegoating is blaming
a few top leaders of the old authoritarian party for all failures and
violations. Embracing the past is a strategy that accepts and celebrates all
acts and policies of the authoritarian past.

The current government
has taken steps that are meant to open up the political space in the transition
to democracy. For instance, several political prisoners were released. Numerous
opposition political parties are allowed to operate in the country. In his June
2018 speech to the parliament, the current Prime Minster and chairman of the
EPRDF made a rare and historic admission of the massive human rights violations
that were carried out under the EPRDF. Also, the process of establishing the
Prosperity Party can be taken as part of a strategy of breaking with the past. Nonetheless,
these actions on their own do not forestall authoritarian regression. They are
rather first steps in a long and arduous road in the transition to democracy.

The Prosperity Party
should adopt a forward-looking strategy that openly rejects the excesses of the
past and, more importantly, guarantees non-repetition in the future. There are
many challenging issues that swing between inheritance and authoritarian
baggage for the Prosperity Party. For instance, while it is beneficial to
inherit the EPRDF mass base of members and cadres, it requires a lot of work to
orient and align them with democratic and rule based political processes and
behavior. Similarly, setting accountable party administration and building
processes such as transparency on party ownership of economic institutions, and
the state-party relation are challenges of the new Party.

Personal Rule

Personal rule is
an elitist governance system run by a strong man ruler and a handful powerful politicians.
Personal rule can stand on its own or can run through a network of institutions
including political parties loyal to the ruler.[11]  Personal rule weakens political parties by
making them subservient to the whims of a few politicians. Political parties
under personal rule are not only inefficient and corrupt but are also threats
to the party system and the consolidation of democracy. Personal rule is one of
the authoritarian legacies of the EPRDF that should be rejected by the
Prosperity Party.  The Prosperity Party can
curb personal rule by using mechanisms that limit the power of political
leaders internally and externally.

Internally, political
leaders should be committed to the objectives and programs of the Party.

In the words of
Bizzarro et al. ‘constraints on
leaders stem from the process of leadership selection, which in a strong party
favors individuals with a demonstrated commitment to the party, usually those
who have risen through the ranks.’[12]  Strong political parties select and socialize leaders
on a basis of a succession plan that takes into account, among other factors, capacity,
levels of responsibility, and generational time frames.  Also, the tenure of leaders in strong parties
is limited. Political parties with strong leadership framework are instrumental
in checking executive power even in the absence of constitutional limitations.[13]

Externally, the
power of political leaders is limited by the objectives and programs of other
competitive strong parties within the party system. At different junctions of
the transition to democracy, leaders of the Prosperity Party are expected to negotiate
with opposition political parties and their supporters to avoid polarization of
voters and the wider society. Such negotiations would ideally end up in
political compromise that should be observed by parties and their leaders. Moreover,
externally, party leaders are also constrained by the commitments and promises
they make to voters and their constituencies. Strong parties specify consequences
for party leaders who fail to meet the commitments made to voters and
constituencies.[14]


Editor’s Note: Girmachew Alemu is Associate Professor, School of Law, Addis Abeba University (AAU). He can be reached at ganeme@gmail.com

_______________________________________//__________________________________

Footnote:

[1] See Asnake
Kefale (2011), ‘The (un)making of opposition coalitions and the challenge of
democratization in Ethiopia, 1991–2011’, Journal
of Eastern African Studies
, 5:4, 681-701.

[2] See
Scott
Mainwaring, Fernando Bizzarro, and Ana Petrova, ‘Party
System Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse’ in
Scott Mainwaring (ed.),
Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse (2018, Cambridge University Press) on
party system institutionalization.

[3] See Rachel Beatty Riedl, Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party
Systems in Africa
, (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.1-5.

[4] Ibid, p.1.

[5] Pippa
Norris and Robert Mattes, ‘Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing
Party? The Structural and Attitudinal Basis of Partisan Identification in 12
African Nations’, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty
Research Working Papers Series, RWP03-009, February 2003, p.5.

[6] Robert A. Dowd, and Michael Driessen, ‘Ethnically
Dominated Party Systems and the Quality of Democracy: Evidence from Sub-Saharan
Africa’ Afrobarometer, Working Paper No. 92, 2008, p.15

[7] Ibid.

[8] Pippa
Norris and Robert Mattes, ‘Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing
Party? The Structural and Attitudinal Basis of Partisan Identification in 12
African Nations’, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty
Research Working Papers Series, RWP03-009, February 2003, p.5.

[9] James Loxton,
‘Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide: A Framework for Analysis’, Kellogg
Institute for International Studies, Working Paper # 411, June 2016, pp 16-17.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Jackson, Robert H. and Carl
G. Rosberg, ‘Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa’, 1984, 16(4) Comparative Politics, pp.423-424; Mehran
Kamrava, Politics and Society in the
Third World
 (Routledge, New York, 1993), p.18.

[12] Fernando Bizzarro et al, ‘Party Strength and Economic Growth’, World Politics, 1-46, 2018, p.6.

[13] Ibid, pp.6-7.

[14] See Gustavo A. Flores-Macías, ‘The Macroeconomic Consequences of PSI’,
in Scott Mainwaring (Ed.), Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization,
Decay, and Collapse
 (Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 408-425.

The post Opinion: Why Ethiopia needs a strong incumbent political party in the transition to democracy appeared first on Addis Standard.

Aung San Suu Kyi and Abiy Ahmed are Tested !!!!!

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Aung San Suu Kyi and Abiy Ahmed

By Tedla Asfaw

Ethiopians are calling for a protest rally at Oslo, Norway to hold accountable Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed led government for the last month ethnically and religiously motivated killing of 86 innocent lives instigated by Jawar Mohammed that is living in 150K Bir rented apt under government protection.
Some suggest it is unpatriotic to stage protest while Abiy Ahmed is coming to receive his Nobel Peace for 2019 because the price is for ” Ethiopia” historical First and even insulting the protesters as “Jealous”.
Nobel Peace winning is not shielding anyone from accountability. In fact, the bar for character and integrity will even be higher.
Former Nobel winner Aung San Suu Kyi is going to Hague, Netherland to defend her government at International Court Of Justice Dec.10, the same day Abiy Ahmed is to make a speech on his tainted Nobel some call it  “Bloody Nobel”.
Suu Kyi and Abiy Ahmed both are Nobel Peace winners, the former will be in court to defend her government charges against the genocide of the Rohingya Muslims and Abiy will face protesters calling for him and his regime accountability.
The supporters of Suu Kyi are rallying in defense of her while Abiy Ahmed supporters in the Diaspora are accusing those who organized the protest as unpatriotic. Both supporters lost the meaning of Nobel Peace !!!! Standing For Life Is Standing For Peace and Justice !!!!!

60 Minutes visits Lalibela, a holy site where 200,000 Ethiopian Orthodox Christians make pilgrimage

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60 Minutes visits Lalibela, a holy site where 200,000 Ethiopian Orthodox Christians make pilgrimage

ቤተክርስትያን ሲያቃጥሉ ክርስትናን ብቻ ሚያቃጥሉ ሚመስለው ካለ ቆም ብሎ ያስብ:: ለማቃጠል የሚያስቡት የኢትዮዽያን ታሪክ እና ቅርስም ጭምር ነው:: ጥላቻቸውክርስትና እና ቤተክርስትያን ላይ ብቻ አይደለም::

Posted by Shemsu Bireda on Tuesday, December 3, 2019

The Legacies of the Ethiopian Student Movement

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AN INTERVIEW WITH BAHRU ZEWDE

Fifty years ago, a student movement transformed Ethiopia with radical calls for self-determination and land reform. But while the movement helped bring down the monarchy, the Ethiopia they fought for has never come to pass.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) was part of the country’s student movement that began in the late 1960s and continued through the 1974 revolution.

INTERVIEW BYHannah Borenstein

In countries throughout the world, the 1960s, and 1968 in particular, were a time of political unrest. Ethiopia was no exception, with demonstrations and student rebellion taking aim at the dominant social order. However, as historian Bahru Zewde argues in his book The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement c. 1960–1974, it was really 1969, rather than 1968, that was the pivotal year in Ethiopia, eventually culminating in the East African country’s 1974 revolution.From the beginning of the decade, it was obvious that many in Ethiopia were displeased with the ruling monarchy and the feudal land structure it oversaw. In 1965, students flooded into the streets of Addis Ababa, the nation’s capital, chanting the slogan “Land to the Tiller.” Their target: the land system that impoverished the country’s large farming population.

Demonstrations expanded in subsequent years, and “the national question” was added to the mix of grievances. Living in a country with scores of languages, ethnicities, and traditions, many Ethiopians felt that the ruling class was dominated by a small, select group — the wealthy Amhara contingent. They drew on ideas of pluralism and self-determination to contest the monarchy, led by Emperor Haile Selassie.

Students were critical in raising these concerns. Many met and built solidarity in Marxist reading groups, where the works of Lenin, Mao, and later the New Left flourished. Then, on December 28, 1969, disaster struck — a radical student leader named Tilahun Gizaw was murdered by police for his organizing. Gizaw’s death was a transformative event, laying bare the repression the government was willing to unleash and helping breed a more radical class of activists that pushed Ethiopia toward revolution.

After Gizaw’s death, leftist organizations grew and morphed. In addition to the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the Derg — a committee comprised of low-ranking officers of the Ethiopian Army — gained support from MEISON and grew in influence. In 1974, it was the Derg who overthrew Haile Selassie and the monarchy amid mass protests. But those hoping for a pluralistic, democratic country were soon disappointed. While the Derg implemented radical land reform and abolished feudalism, they also anointed themselves rulers of a one-party, Marxist-Leninist state.

Opposition was violently suppressed. Between 1975 and 1977, the Derg administered a lethal campaign known as the “Red Terror” (Qey Shibir) that meted out brutal repression against dissident voices and groups. Casualty estimates vary widely — the low end is 30,000 deaths, the high end 750,000 — but one thing was unambiguous: the violent campaign radically changed the populace’s perceptions of the Derg, which had waved the banner of communism during the revolution.

Hannah Borenstein recently spoke with Bahru Zewde about his activism during the pivotal year of 1969, the politics (both good and bad) of the radical students, and the legacy the movements of the 1960s bequeathed to contemporary Ethiopia, a country wracked by ethnic conflict.


HB

I’m wondering if you can start by talking about where you were in 1969 — and the 1960s more generally — in Ethiopia. Can you talk about your general involvement and exposure to the movements that you write about in the book?

BZ

In 1969, I was in what is called Ethiopian University Service (EUS). It was a mandatory service that students had to do after completing their third year and before their fourth year. We were sent mostly to the provinces, mostly to teach, and I was assigned to teach at a high school in a town called Dembi Dollo in southwestern Ethiopia. So I was there in 1969 when the movement was at a high point, but it was widespread and had ripple effects where I was teaching, including confrontations between the students and the national militia.

I had come to the university in 1965, soon after the “Land to the Tiller” demonstration. During the actual demonstration, I was in high school, but after I joined university, there were more demonstrations every year. In my first year, we had a “Poverty Is Not a Crime” demonstration, and the following year we protested against a bill to limit demonstrations.

In the beginning, it was really only a small group of students who were active, but by the third year, the movement had grown. The high point for me was the end of 1969, because by then I had come back and I was in my senior year, and there were so many things happening concurrently that year.

After student leader Wallelign Mekonnen read his paper “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia,” the constant agitation and confrontation with the government continued to grow. I thought I really needed to write an article on this. I was majoring in history and minoring in political science, and I published in the political science association journal. So, when I started writing the book, I went back to that article.

HB

What made you go back to it?

BZ

For a long time, I’ve been interested in the histories of intellectuals in Ethiopia. My book Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia specifically focuses on earlier intellectuals in Ethiopia, so it was almost automatic that the next intellectual focus would be on this era. I committed myself in that earlier book to start this more recent history.

HB

What specific works or strands were students turning to at the time?

BZ

The Leninist and even Stalinist renditions were particularly salient at the time. The two most important questions raised by students were the question of land and the nationalities question. The land question in particular — addressed by Lenin and Mao — became an important part of the struggle. It was used to justify the struggle for equality, the end of oppression, and the end of exploitation of the peasant.

The question of nationalities addressed another serious problem. The solution for it was drawn from the writings of Lenin and Stalin, like Lenin’s The Right of Nations to Self-Determination and Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question. They were, in many ways, taken as a ready-made recipe for the national question. And in the end, it was rather misguided, because it was taken up as a dogma rather than an interpretive framework to be used within the Ethiopian context and the Ethiopian reality. A lot of the writing did not relate to either Ethiopian history or ethnography.

Some of the really advanced students read Capital. But in many ways, the New Left writing was more popular than the classical writing. The serious works of Marx and Engels were read by only a few.

Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and especially Frantz Fanon — these were figures that people turned to. And then there were the figures who were inspirational in other ways, like Malcolm X, who came to visit the students in Addis Ababa shortly before he was assassinated.

While of course the question of land was on everyone’s mind, systems of landholding were very different in northern versus southern Ethiopia at the time. In the north, the main system of land tenure was the rist system, which made land hereditary and inalienable. Although still exploited, peasants there were far better off than southern tenant farmers, who had to pay tribute to ownership gults that were acquired from the monarchy — while working for them at the same time.

HB

Were the students that were protesting from one area of the country? What were some of the conversations between them about the regionally specific conditions of landlordism?

BZ

The Land to the Tiller protest mainly addressed issues in southern Ethiopia. The southern part in particular had tenancy sometimes to the tune of around 50 percent. So that was the target of the protest — the South.

Some of the articles that appeared in Challenge — a student publication published by the Ethiopian Students Union in North America (ESUNA) — did have some elaborate discussion of land tenure, but not much as to how the Land to the Tiller idea was going to be implemented and how it was going to take place. I think the real debate on this question came after the 1974 revolution, when there was more freedom of expression and newspapers actually became a platform for the free circulation of ideas.

Many ideas were discussed then, and the Derg, the military group that assumed power in September 1974, opted for the complete nationalization of land. It ended up not really being land to the tiller – it really ended up becoming land to the state.

The fact that it abolished landlordism of course was welcomed. But at the same time, when you look at the slogan in a more nuanced manner, this was not the target. The target was that the peasants would be the owners of the land, not that they would be at the mercy of the government or its representatives, the peasant associations.

HB

The Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU) was also active at this time. Did it work in tandem with students? Or were there any frictions between groups?

BZ

They did not work together very much initially. But after the student movement eventually transformed into leftist parties, particularly the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), they made it a point to establish links with CETU. Some students went on to work with CETU and were even employed in the organization. So CETU eventually ended up adopting the slogans and ideas of the EPRP.

HB

In your book, you talk about 1969, and the death of student leader Tilahun Gizaw, as being particularly climactic. Can you elaborate about the reaction to his murder by police and how this ended up culminating in the 1974 revolution?

BZ

This was a turning point in many ways. It led to the emergence of high school student activism, which eventually took over in the 1970s. The assassination and the killing of students the following day proved that the government was willing to go to any length to suppress the student movement, and quite a number of activists began to see that the old method of confronting the government every year with ritual demonstrations wasn’t going to deliver results.

There was also an exodus of a large number of students to North America and Europe. In the process, they started to radicalize the external movement even more. This was what caused the split in ESUNA between the older, more orthodox Marxists and a new radical and militant group of students. Inside Ethiopia, clandestine study groups began to pop up. Some of these groups eventually merged to form the EPRP.

So Tilahun’s death and its connection to the revolution is not totally direct. People knew that the revolution would come, but not so soon. And there were a number of contributing factors. There was disenchantment by soldiers with the war in Eritrea and dissatisfaction with living conditions. There was also the oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent fuel hike, which sparked taxi strikes. And there was a teachers’ strike that was also important — protesting against a new reform that was perceived as designed to make the education system keep poor students at lower levels of education.

But still, the revolution came quite abruptly and caught the ruling class and everyone else by surprise.

HB

How do you see some of these legacies connected to the political situation in Ethiopia today?

BZ

I think the most enduring legacy of the student movement is the question of nationalities. After protracted debates, in 1971, the student movement almost completely rallied behind this principle of self-determination up to and including secession. And this was taken straight from the books of Stalin. Over time, this was adopted by all leftist parties.

However, subsequently EPRP and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON) began to distance themselves from this principle because it was perceived as opening the gate for narrow nationalism. The split actually started in North America when some members of ESUNA — the Eritrean members in particular — felt that it was not sufficiently accommodating the Eritrean question, so they opted to establish their own organization. Shortly after, ESUNA came out with a piece that basically negated their previous stance about the question of nationalities.

The one organization that stuck with this principle up until the very end was the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). It saw the national question as an effective tool for mobilizing the Tigrayan population behind it. When they finally seized state power as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991, they incorporated this question of nationalities into the 1991 charter and then the constitution of 1994. That is how we came to have an ethnic federal system.

It’s hard to say what we are going through now. The current prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, appeared to represent a counter-discourse to the question of nationalities. He seemed to aspire to relieve the country of this burden that has really shackled Ethiopia for so many years and has had disastrous consequences. While the ruling party in Ethiopia, EPRDF, has in theory recognized the equality of nationalities, in fact it was controlling everything from the center. So self-determination was not really exercised.

Now we are seeing everything sort of running amok. Everyone wants to be the master of their land. And ethnicity and nationality have become more important than the country. So hopefully we are going through the last motions of this exercise. Or worse may be yet to come.

HB

What is student activism like today?

BZ

Students are so fragmented along ethnic lines they cannot even mobilize for a common cause. The last serious student activism was in 2003, and it resulted in the flight of some of the activists. Nowadays, everyone is in their own ethnic shell. This is completely different from the situation in the 1960s. Right now, it’s difficult to have a pan-Ethiopian organization.

In terms of the decline of militancy as well, I think there were two major turning points. After the Red Terror, there was complete passivity. And then, on the eve of the 2005 elections, there was euphoria, and soon after a mass clampdown. This was a major setback.

The major problem right now is that there is so much fragmentation along ethnic lines. And this makes it exceedingly difficult to organize students for a common cause.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Bahru Zewde is an Ethiopian historian and the author of many books, including The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement c. 1960–1974 .

ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER

Hannah Borenstein is a PhD candidate in cultural anthropology at Duke University.

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Eskinde Nega At UN !! A Brief Time With A Humble Man !!!

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By Tedla Asfaw
It was a memorable night with a remarkable man. Eskinder Nega Tour in America brought Ethiopians in large numbers with great passion  last month.
Some came to see him from far sometimes very hard to meet him to thank him personally or take picture with him for being a symbol of peace, freedom  and justice for more than two decades.
However, this humble man was reluctant to come to UN yesterday Dec.3 to warn on the hanging  cloud of “genoicide” like that of Rwanda94 in Ethiopia.
There was no date set for his coming to New York City because of a very tight schedule. He needs to return home shortly where he expects a huge challenge for him and “The Addis Ababa Take Care Council” shortly “Balderas” he chairs.
As professor Getachew Haile one of the delegates to UN on last night organized brief dinner with Ethiopians before Eskinder returned to DC the same night told us he was  very quite and seems forced  providing  the documents to UN. As he said and truly believed he was not happy to expose our “dirt” what we call “Gebena,ገበና” to the world. Ethiopians are not known to the world on such characters.
It was a somber night in a cold Dec.3 in NYC and all who came to see Eskinder Nega by text message were lucky to talk to him and thank him personally.
Ms. Tsigereda Mulugeta who was one of the delegates and the organizers of the UN meeting will  follow the case and report accordingly.
The love and support Eskinder received  from fellow Ethiopians he met in America  and the large numbers of the Ethiopian Diaspora followers respect will energize him to Keep on fighting for justice and freedom in Ethiopia for which he gave his life !!!!!

Fears That Saudi-Exported Extremism Is Spreading Throughout Africa

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Ethiopia has been shaken by attacks on Christian churches, and some fear that Wahhabism may be to blame.

World/Fears That Saudi-Exported Extremism Is Spreading Throughout Africa
WORLD

Christians leave a church in Ethiopia. Credit: James Jeffrey

After remaining under the international media’s radar for more than a year, attacks against churches in one of the world’s oldest Christian civilizations have prompted Pope Francis to speak out.

“I am saddened by the violence of which Christians of the Tewahedo Orthodox Church of Ethiopia are victims,” the pope said in his November 3 Angelus address. He was speaking of those caught up in ethnic clashes that had broken out across Ethiopia at the end of October and left about 80 dead. “I express my closeness to this beloved church and her patriarch, dear brother Abune Mathias, and I ask you to pray for all the victims of violence in that land.”

The burnings of churches belonging to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC)—the largest of the Oriental Orthodox Churches, which reject the 451 A.D. Council of Chalcedon and believe that Christ has only one nature—have proven even more shocking in a country where about 98 percent of the population claim a religious affiliation.

Until recent years, Ethiopia had been both a Christian oasis in the volatile Horn of Africa and a bulwark against Islamic extremism. The country had come to represent a remarkable success story in religious tolerance compared to most of the world.

Celebrated for its 7th-century Christian king who provided sanctuary to persecuted Muslims, Ethiopia today is home to about 35 million Muslims (some argue the figure may be considerably higher). They live cheek-to-jowl with about 45 million Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, and members of other Christian denominations, in relative harmony. Intermarriage is common, and both sides recognize and celebrate each other’s religious holidays.

Christians have suffered before in Ethiopia, enduring a spate of attacks by Muslim mobs in 2011. But that violence flared and subsided within about a week. The most recent attacks—during unrest sparked by an altercation between political activist Jawar Mohammed and the Ethiopian government—continue a worrying trend that since July 2018 has seen more than 30 churches attacked, more than half of them burned to the ground, sometimes with priests still inside, according to the Amhara Professional Union, a U.S.-based diaspora organization that has attempted to track events.

In August 2018, an estimated 10 churches were burned in Ethiopia’s eastern Somali region, resulting in 29 deaths, including eight priests. This March and April, another two were attacked in the Somali region’s capital, Jijiga, resulting in 12 deaths. Then in July, five churches were attacked in the southern Sidama zone with further burnings and deaths.

The ongoing ethnic-based tumult in Ethiopia and the accompanying witch’s brew of identity politics, territorial claims, and historical grievances make it hard to parse the motivations behind the church attacks and gauge whether religion was the main driver. Some argue that religious buildings are being targeted to incite tension and instability to further political plots.

At the same time, the attacks are occurring amid concerns over increased Islamic extremism in the Horn of Africa, including in Ethiopia.

“Islamic extremism has been growing in Ethiopia and has been a concern for many analysts in the region,” says Tewodrose Tirfe, chairman of the Amhara Association of America, another U.S.-based diaspora group. “Money from the Gulf region has been pouring into the country, building mosques, [Islamic] schools, and introducing the Wahhabi form of Islam to Ethiopian Muslims since the early 2000s.”

Wahhabism is a strict, fundamentalist Islamic doctrine and religious movement, backed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Both countries have shown an increased interest in Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa region over the past few years.

While Tewodrose says he doesn’t believe Saudi Arabia or the UAE are directly involved in fomenting religious tensions in Ethiopia, he does note that, over the centuries, Ethiopians of all ethnic groups have long respected diverse religious institutions. Hence the burning of churches is a “foreign” idea that must have been “exported to the country.”

Fears are thus mounting that any hint of religious conflict could make an already highly volatile situation even worse.

“Ethiopia cannot afford a religious conflict at a time when its very survival is [already in] question,” says Tewodrose. He notes that historically the Amhara, the country’s second-largest ethnic group, have been closely identified with the EOTC, and that most of those targeted in the church burnings were Amhara. “This will inflame ethnic tensions already present in the country,” he warns. “If the church burnings continue and Christians retaliate, this will be a huge setback to the peace that has co-existed between the two faiths and can potentially result in a new conflict leading to millions more Ethiopians being displaced.”

During the first half of 2018, due to ethnic clashes, Ethiopia’s rate of 1.4 million new internally displaced people (IDP) actually exceeded Syria’s. By the end of that year, after further ethnic strife, the IDP population had mushroomed to nearly 2.4 million, and remains close to that figure today.

Ethiopia is one of the earliest cradles of Christianity. It was the second nation after Armenia to adopt Christianity as a state religion around the 4th century. As a result, the EOTC rules supreme both culturally and psychologically. The Ethiopian Orthodox faith is intrinsically interwoven with the idea of Ethiopian-ness, evolving over the centuries into “a religion that embraces culture, politics, flag, identity and nationalism, all put in one package,” as religious studies professor and author Tibebe Eshete puts it.

But the flurry of reforms in 2018 that drew so much praise for Ethiopia’s prime minister—and now Nobel Laureate—Abiy Ahmed have also had unintended consequences, to the point that even the idea of what it is to be Ethiopian could now be under threat.

Increasing numbers of ethnic parties have emerged in the political space that Abiy opened up, many with an openly bigoted message. These play on historic grievances between different ethnic groups and have reignited territorial border disputes.

The July burning of churches in Sidama occurred during ongoing unrest over a movement for the area to secede from the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) to become its own independent federal state.

The complexities and scale of what is happening across Ethiopia mean that it’s important to remember, says William Davison, International Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Ethiopia, that during broader incidents of unrest, Orthodox Christian churches were not the only properties targeted, and nor were Orthodox Christians the only groups that suffered.

The corresponding difficulties in discerning between whether church attacks were driven more by religious differences, ethnic differences, or an admixture of both, perhaps explain why the attacks haven’t garnered much mainstream media attention. Though that appears to be changing, as the pope’s comments indicate.

This is not the first time the pope has spoken out over Ethiopian Christians. Pope Francis met with Ethiopian Orthodox Patriarch Abune Mathias in February 2016 to express his condolences over the Ethiopian Christians executed by Islamic State militants in Libya in April 2015. Now, once again, the EOTC is in mourning.

“There is a feeling of siege among many followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church,” says Elias Gebreselassie, a journalist based in Addis Ababa. “The burning of churches could lead to wider distrust within society and could be a time bomb.”

James Jeffrey is a freelance journalist who splits his time between the U.S., the UK, and further afield, and writes for various international media. Follow him on Twitter @jrfjeffrey.

ውይይት ከሁለት የሃይማኖት አስተማሪዎች ጋር

ውይይት ከሁለት የሃይማኖት አስተማሪዎች ጋር 👉 ከኡስታዝ አቡበከር አሕመድና ከቀሲስ ደረጀ ስዩም ጋር ኢትዮጵያውያን እና ሃይማኖታዊነት ፣ ሃይማኖትና የማኅበራዊ ሚዲያ አጠቃቀም እና የሃይማኖት ተቋማት ወቅታዊ ቁመና ላይ የሚያተኩር ውይይት አካሂደናል። (ለዛሬ ኢትዮጵያውያን እና ሃይማኖታዊነት የተመለከተውን የመጀመሪያ ክፍል ይከታተሉ)

Posted by VOA Amharic on Wednesday, December 4, 2019

Who Should Be TIME’s Person of the Year for 2019?


Dark Ages Ethiopia: The Ravages of Personal-Tribal ‘Rule’ and Beyond

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By Tesfaye Demmellash

The apparent reshuffle of existing ethnic-partisan groups within the EPRDF “coalition” into a single united political entity recently announced by PM Abiy came on the heels of the latest eruption of unspeakably brutal killings by Oromo mobs of scores of innocent Ethiopian citizens and the burning of churches and destruction of homes and businesses.

But no sooner had we heard of the supposed party unification than we learned of ‘opposition’ to it by Lemma Megersa, a top leader within the moribund ruling coalition. Evidently, PM Abiy had not secured adequate support for the ‘change’ even within ODP, the Oromo faction in the EPRDF whose Chairman he is, before attempting to unify the front as a whole. Unless, of course, the surprising but not wholly unexpected episode of “dissent” from the proposed change was more staged than real, the dramaturgic work of the shifty Abiy-Lemma duo itself.

The political theater, if that it was, might, perhaps, have been aimed at creating the impression that our dear leader Abiy ran into opposition in the Oromo partisan-tribal complex as he tried to do a good thing, to advance political, and possibly national, “unity” beyond the mere additive sum of ethnic factions. Who knows for sure about the Abiy regime anymore?

In any case, by all indications, the seeming reorganization of EPRDF into a “new” party, named the Prosperity Party (PP), is predicated on existing ethnocentric ‘constitutional,’ ‘federal’ and ‘kilil’ structures. And the continuity of structural conditions of tribal rule aside, ethnocentrism is likely to have ongoing spectral presence in the new political outfit, if such an outfit has actually taken shape and come into being at all.

What party “unity” means under these circumstances is unclear. It is not worked out in thought. The much bandied about notion of medemer does not here help much. Replete with sweeping analogical assertions, the nebulous notion has, strictly speaking, neither theoretical serviceability nor practical utility in resolving chronic polarization in Ethiopian polity and society, particularly in its present acute form of crisis of national-regional governance.

The attempt, real or feigned, at reorganizing the EPRDF appears to have been hastily undertaken by the Abiy regime to create the appearance that it is doing something tangible in response to the latest atrocities or, perhaps, to draw attention away from them. It seems to have been intended more as a distraction than anything else.

Largely symbolic rather than substantive, the ‘change,’ may be characterized as a short-run tactical move undertaken by the regime to deflect from itself broad public criticism at its inability or unwillingness to maintain basic law and order in the country and to bring about systemic change. By now, this pattern of simulated, short-term, crisis-to-crisis responses by the Abiy regime should be quite evident to the Ethiopian people.

It has also become abundantly clear over the last year and a half that every big idea that has currency in the existing pattern of regime verbal gestures or symbolic acts, like “unity” and the concept of “change” itself, is of dubious quality. It has little systemic, conceptual or principled significance beyond prettifying and aiding and abetting brute, killer tribalism that is foreign to Ethiopian national values and solidarity.

That Abiy personally has an ideological core may be in doubt, but his attachment to ethnocentrism, specifically in connection with the political project of “Oromiya,” is not so suspect. He has a stake in this project in common with other Oromo ethnoationalist groups and individuals, including Lemma Megersa, with whom he might have limited strategic or tactical differences.

So, absent effective movement toward structural change, Ethiopian national life would remain stuck in an interregnum between the blight of one (falling) ethnic dictatorship and that of another (rising) tribal tyranny. I don’t know if the nation had been through darker times than these. There appears to be no end in sight to the decay of Ethiopian nationhood set in motion in the revolutionary era, going back to the fateful Student Movement. Left unchecked, the decay could bring about a crisis of such proportions that could destroy our national life as we know and value it.

True to past pattern, the latest deadly upsurge of attacks by Oromo mobs on defenseless individuals, families and Orthodox Christian priests, was followed by a response – repugnant legally and morally – on the part of state authorities at both the “federal” and “kilil” levels. The joint response of Abiy, the Prime Minister, and Lemma, the Minister of Defense, both nominally government leaders of Ethiopia, was particularly indelible and noteworthy: they chose to speak to their Oromo constituencies, largely made up of supporters of Jawar Mohammed, leader of the Qerro mobs that committed the atrocities, rather than address victims’ families or the Ethiopian people as a whole. That was telling about where the actual “national” concern of the two leading Oromo political figures lies.

More significantly, in their address to an Oromo audience, Abiy and Lemma were incredibly unabashed in defending Jawar Mohammed, the notorious agitator who incited the mass killing of innocent citizens and whose personal “activism” borders on terrorism. In a shocking move, Abiy and Lemma thereby added insult to injury, re-traumatizing the Ethiopian people, already reeling from the pain and suffering inflicted on the nation by marauding, murderous Qerro hordes that are at the beck and call of Jawar.

Displaying a wholly unapologetic attitude, the ethnocentric duo publicly declared its solidarity with and continued support for its notorious ethnonationalist fellow traveler. The genocidal mob violence was repugnant enough, but what was doubly reprehensible was the Abiy regime’s defense of the chief instigator of the violence. Whatever his differences with the Abiy led system of ethnocratic rule, Jawar, along with his Qerro mobs, seems to function as a serviceable adjunct of the system.   

A couple of things have now become clear, if they were not already before the latest outburst of mass killings by a brutal strain of Qerro youth of innocent individuals and families, wrongly characterized by PM Abiy and others as  “clashes” between two  opposing sides. Clear, that is, to all but the least trenchant or most self-deluding Ethiopians.

Namely, first, there is actually no Ethiopian state worthy of the name today, no central government with honest intention and concern to safeguard the security, wellbeing and civil rights of all Ethiopian citizens. Parts of the existing tribal regime have in fact been complicit in the commission of crimes against humanity by Jawar’s marauding Qerro. Second, Abiy Ahmed may profess Itiopiawinnet with rhetorical flourish but his behavior has been patently at odds with his dissembling discourse.

In the troubling personal rule of “Negus” Abiy today, Ethiopia thus operates largely without a reliable or workable rule of law; fair and equal administration of justice is virtually non-existent in the country. This is not just my opinion; rather, sad to say, it is objectively observable fact.

The historic Ethiopian nation itself, and the lives of citizens and communities in it, are in this sorry state in large part because, for the last thirty years or so, trans-ethnic patriotic groups and parties have been woefully incapable of achieving effective national agency or “core actor” status in Ethiopian affairs.

The sources of this puzzling and troubling incapacity, which continues to this day, are varied and complex. But at bottom, they have to do with the inertia or residual effects of the domination of Stalinist ethnocentrism in Ethiopian politics and national affairs in the post-revolutionary era. But a proximate, yet not so obvious, reason for the incapacity is the personal ‘leadership,’ or lack thereof, of PM Abiy Ahmed.

Abiy’s Janus-Faced Personal ‘Rule’

Abiy Ahmed no longer has the outsize personal appeal and popularity he enjoyed during the first several months of his tenure as leader of government in Ethiopia. Today, Ethiopians – citizens, patriots, spiritual leaders, intellectuals, activists, political figures, journalists, and others – have mixed views about the Nobelist Prime Minister.

To some of us, whose number is fast dwindling, Abiy’s now fading charismatic rule, still appears, recurrent crises and all, a welcome release from the perverse, colonial-like, divisive dictatorship of the Woyanes.  In a highly positive vein, the PM has been seen as a Moses-like figure that would save the Ethiopian people from national destruction. Abiy has shown himself as an innovative political thinker, a champion of peace and democracy. His latest act, or apparent act, of carving out in short order the PP out of the EPRDF seemingly attests to this perceived quality of his.

 

But to many others among the Ethiopian people, PM Abiy’s tenure in office has been nothing but a perilous and frightening breach with law and order, in effect threatening to plunge Ethiopia into disastrous civil war. While some of the nation’s mihuran still regard “negus” Abiy’s reign a fount of “light,” a source of enlightenment, to other Ethiopian intellectuals less enamored of his persona, the PM is a charlatan, a pretender to the throne, a prince of darkness.

Terrified of the possible breakup of the country on his watch and yearning personal and national security, a fast lessening number of Ethiopian citizens and patriots still cling to Abiy, some demonstrating belief in him that is suggestive of incorrigible self-delusion. They hold on even in the face of the PM’s persistent failure or unwillingness to maintain civil peace and to ensure fair and firm administration of justice in Ethiopia. They wouldn’t “let go” even though the PM engages in a pattern of conduct in which what he says is often summarily reversed by what he does and what he fails to do, or is simply untrue.

 

A particularly repugnant example of such conduct was the PM’s attempt to excuse the most recent atrocities committed by Jawar’s Qerro thugs by claiming that most of the people killed in the mob attacks were Oromos, a claim that is false or at least questionable. Displaying an amoral Machiavellian deftness, the PM played ethnic arithmetic with the deaths of over eighty Ethiopians, turning the victimizers into victims, the wrong doers into the wronged.

In so doing, Abiy also demonstrated the emptiness of the ideal of social and national togetherness (medemer) he preaches, specifically, his rhetoric that ‘we are Ethiopians when we live and when we die.’ His idealizing discourse is in stark contrast to the reduction by the Oromo partisan groups he leads of social relationships to that of “us” vs. “them.” In the hands of these groups, all political purposes and activities are largely divorced from any principle, meaning or concept other than that of assertion of narrow tribal self or nativist identity.

Understandably, many other Ethiopian citizens and patriots have lost faith in Abiy. They are disenchanted by the PM’s vacuous speeches and grossly offensive action or inaction, most recently by his failure to stand with, or show sympathy for, scores of victims and their families in the wake of the latest deadly attacks against innocent citizens in the Oromo region of Ethiopia.

Indeed, the Nobel Peace prize winning PM was conspicuous in his failure to condemn the atrocities and their warring perpetrators. Instead, he chose to do something that, on its face, hardly stands to reason in political, national or moral terms: He openly supported and fraternized with the extremist political boss of the depraved, terroristic, ethnic Oromo mobs, a man who is not even an Ethiopian citizen.

Still, while Abiy’s political stardom may have decidedly dimmed over time, the person of the self-anointed “Negus” still looms large in Ethiopian politics and government, even in the context of the recent purported reshuffling of the EPRDF.  Yet, in acknowledging this fact, we should be careful not to overvalue the role of Abiy, the individual, or to focus exclusively on his “personality.”

More specifically, it would be a mistake to continue to construe his rhetorical gestures towards “Ethiopia” simply and straightaway as a mark of his prioritization of Ethiopian integrity and unity over ethnocentrism. Such construal gets in the way of a good understanding of the essentially political role and function of Abiy’s personal rule. Namely, to maintain the existing ethnocentric system of domination even while attempting to revamp the crisis-ridden EPRDF as a ruling party.

 

Personal ‘leadership’ and Ethnocentric Domination

It is useful to look at Abiy’s personal reign as PM, contradictions and all, against the background of the (now formally defunct?) EPRDF system of rule, particularly in the context of the political crisis the EPRDF apparatus has been in over the last five years or so. Its founder, the TPLF, which exercised hegemony over it for longer than a quarter century, may have lost its dominant position. But essentially the political order the Woyanes created, with its twin pillars, the “constitution” and “ethnic federalism,” is still very much with us today.

It is to be admitted that the EPRDF underwent a forced loosening of its dictatorial grip soon after the Woyanes captured power with Western help, jettisoning its language of Marxism-Leninism in favor of the doctrine of “revolutionary democracy.” More recently, over the last five years or so, the party was compelled by social protests, particularly among Oromo and Amhara youths, to undertake internal change and reorganization, culminating in Abiy’s ascension to power in April 2018.

Nonetheless, the changes that took place should not be understood as a fundamental realignment of political forces in Ethiopia. They are better grasped as alterations in three basic senses: (1) they opened up space within the existing tribal political system, enabling PM Abiy to exercise power in a relatively freer, less rigidly structured, personal way and to carry out certain limited reforms on the margins of the system, reforms essential to its continuity; (2) the changes facilitated a reshuffling of the ethnic power hierarchy within the EPRDF, allowing the OPDO (ODP/OLF) to begin to take its “turn” at the top and, oddly, letting the TPLF ensconce itself in Tigrai as a petty tribal regime unto itself; and (3) they created conditions for extremist partisans of “Oromiya” to create and deploy at will the Qerro menga as a brutal instrument of intimidation, violence and terror.

It should be noted here that, often connected, populism and personalistic leadership, generally of the authoritarian type, can be used to fabricate undifferentiated “mass support” for a troubled political system seeking to reorient or “rebrand” itself out of crisis. This involved, in the case at hand, the EPRDF as a political party and PM Abiy as its emergent leader engaging in ritualistic “self-criticism,” (gimgema) producing narratives of ruling party problems and failures, in part echoing popular concerns and grievances and demands for change.

The purpose of such gimgema, though, particularly as articulated with apparent candor by PM Abiy, has not been to question the legitimacy of the existing system of ethnocratic domination with an eye toward transforming it. Instead, the goal has been to coopt or instrumentalize public discontent in the interest of shoring up and maintaining the decaying order by undertaking certain necessary reforms and by mollifying social demands for structural transformation.

PM Abiy has been actively involved in giving the EPRDF network of ethnocratic domination a new lease on life, tactically using his personal rule, his charisma, as a political tool of system maintenance rather than of fundamental change. He has been emphatic in his defense of the ‘constitution,’ portraying it as source of civil and political liberties and of the rights of “nations, nationalities and peoples” of Ethiopia. The party of “Oromiya” may have displaced the party of “Greater Tigrai,” but PM Abiy has had no intention of undoing the ethnocentric political structure he now presides over.

While popular protest and resistance against EPRDF domination helped end TPLF domination, it created an opportunity that can be, and was, utilized by the OPDO/ODP, led by Abiy, to assume the top position within the then existing EPRDF ethnic-power hierarchy. Not surprisingly, the PM insists on keeping in place the present political structure, specifically the twin pillars of the structure, the “constitution” and ethnic “federalism,” while conceding reforms on its edges.

In fighting for meaningful structural change against emergent Oromo ethnocracy and toward Ethiopian national renewal, then, it is useful to grasp the status and function of the personal leadership of Abiy Ahmed or that of any Oromo political boss who might succeed him. Such understanding involves looking at the leading figure on two distinct but interrelated levels: the systemic political self or actorness of the leader and his personal agency in the context of the ideology and practice of the ruling party.

The political self in Abiy’s rule is grounded in a definite structure of residual and emergent ideas or mindset of partisan identity politics. The personal in Abiy’s stewardship is the peculiar manner in which he individually exercises power (or fails to do so) while more or less operating within the existing order of ethnocentric  political ideology and practice. It consists of individual characteristics, among which one might mention his (now discounted) charisma, self-assertiveness, know-it-all attitude, shiftiness, and rhetorical ease and lure.

Regarding PM Abiy’s rhetorical facility and enticement in particular, one thing is especially worth mentioning, something that has had significant implications for the continuity of ethnocentric rule in Ethiopia after the apparent end of Woyane hegemony. And that is Abiy’s seductive evocation of “Ethiopia” through a recursive riff on our national story, in effect and perhaps also in intent, defanging historic Ethiopian nationalism. In his telling of agerawi tales actual Ethiopian nationality is reduced to a passive, toothless value consigned to a realm of pure symbolism and simulation. Drained of vitality and vigor, it has become little more than an adjunct of identity politics and state ethnicism, yielding to tribal reengineering without putting up much of a fight.

So Abiy’s relating of agerawi tales amounts to a rhetorical tactic of neutralizing Ethiopian nationalism as a base and force of resistance against tribal tyranny. Such pre-emptive counteraction through narrative overdose or saturation has had, then, its own paralyzing effect on Ethiopian patriotic agency, though the origins of the paralysis can be traced back to TPLF tribal divide-and-rule and beyond.

In this way, Abiy seems to have accomplished personally and openly what Woyane bosses, partisans, and cadres with all their insidious tribal scheming and treachery, could not do: valorizing the Ethiopian nation through rhetoric while in effect degrading it, putting the nation on the verge of disastrous civil war by periodically letting loose provocative, dark tribal forces of death, destruction and social dislocation against it. PM Abiy presides today over an Ethiopia in which long-lived sentiments of national resistance and affirmation have surrendered as pliantly to aggressive Oromo ethnic re-engineering as have the country’s territorial integrity and the autonomous governance of Addis Ababa, its capital city.

With his effusive speechifying on any and all subjects, talking at will about what he thinks he knows, Abiy is able to run political circles around our national values and democratic aspirations, denying us any conceivable means through which ethnocentrism in Ethiopian affairs might be effectively challenged in contemporary patriotic and progressive thought. Expressly following his own maxim set out in his writing, Irkab inna Menber, he “tells us what we want to hear,” and many of us still seem inclined to believe that the truth of Abiy’s personal rule is what we wish or imagine it to be.

The historic and contemporary national reality to which Abiy’s Ethiopianist rhetoric refers is plain and evident for all to see. But it should be clear by now that the rhetorical reference has a sub-text, a message hidden in plain sight, which requires a deciphering. Under present conditions of ethnocentric politics and misgovernment in the country, “Ethiopia” is coded in Abiy’s talk of unity and stability as an entity whose meaning, values, and cultural and institutional resources can be drawn off and placed in the service of the sketchy hegemonic political project that is “Oromiya.”

So we as a nation now find ourselves in suspended animation, as it were, barely alive and putting up only laid back, haphazard, often coopted “opposition,” while our very national being is under ongoing concerted assault from within. In effect, if not all by design, PM Abiy has lulled Ethiopian nationality into passivity by seductive, paralyzing rhetoric while Jawar’s Qerro mobs kill and maim with impunity Ethiopian nationals by sticks and stones.

In confronting demons, we should, as it is said, be careful not to demonize ourselves. However, we should also realize that a national tradition which has lost the will and courage to rise up and defend itself by all means necessary in the face of clear and present existential danger has neither the power nor the agency to save itself from destruction.

“What is the ‘Solution’”?

This question is routinely offered for consideration toward the end of nearly every episode of media chatter at home and in the diaspora concerning current, deeply troubled, Ethiopian affairs. It is often posed in interviews and discussions of varying quality involving the nation’s journalists, intellectuals, activists, political figures and other commentators.

And the answers are given often revolve around regime change, specifically on establishing some kind of “transition government” that would presumably pave the way for sorely needed structural shift. That is, a shift away from the present crisis-ridden, dysfunctional and predatory tribal state and toward a more orderly, stable, citizen-based, democratic political system.

Setting up a transitional government may be an essential short- or medium-term answer to Ethiopia’s current political crisis, a crucial intermediary step toward systemic/democratic change. But it is not a simple and ready cure for our national ills. It is itself a challenge for us to think up and enact effectively, given our decades-old habits of polarized, overly partisan, and formulaic political ‘thought’ and action. The abstract possibility of “transitional government” does not spontaneously translate into operative ideas and principles in the post-revolutionary Ethiopian context. We cannot assume that the notion has clear, readily understandable meaning or function.

The idea of “transition” also faces immediate, practical obstacles. The party of “Oromiya,” particularly the Abiy regime within and beyond that sprawling party, has shown disdain for it as has the party of Tigrai, which has become an isolated petty tribal fiefdom, a hermetic, garrison regime. On the other hand, the party of Ethiopia, consisting of trans-ethnic patriotic and pro-democracy citizens, activists, social movements, intellectuals and political groups, is sadly too disorganized and enfeebled to have significant say in the matter.

Fractionated, hollowed out from within, and coopted by the tribal powers that be, the party of Ethiopia lacks sustainable political agency and strategic nucleus. It is too weak to work effectively toward passage to a new, freer and more democratic political system in Ethiopia, too powerless to apply pressure on the Abiy regime or to enter into meaningful negotiation with it. This remains the case although better days may be in the offing with the impending transformation of the much harassed Balderas Council into a political party.

The entry of the Balderas movement into the political field in response to popular demand promises to be an opportune moment of change. For, after nearly three decades of crisis-ridden sectarian tyranny, uneven and corrupt development, and massive internal displacement of citizens, families and communities, Ethiopia today is ripe for passage from the politics of the ethnos to the politics of the demos. It is ready to transition from tribal dictatorship and personal rule to citizen-based representative democracy and to the rule of law.

The hearts and minds of the Ethiopian people have been prepared for transition to a new order by the moral, intellectual and political bankruptcy of territorially aggressive and expansionist tribalism, that of the TPLF variety and the iteration of the ODP/OLF/Jawar-Qerro network. The Ethiopian people expect and deserve a new form of politics that ends the present state of sectarian chaos and does away with impotent ‘opposition’ parties, meaningless ‘elections,’ feckless ‘parliaments,’ and perverse ‘law enforcement’ organs.

From a longer term vantage point, a major part of the answer to the query posed in the sub-title above lies in the response we give to a couple of more focused questions. Namely, first, how is Ethiopian nationality defined or what is the Ethiopian national self? And, second and relatedly, how should trans-ethnic patriotic and democratic movements in Ethiopia achieve effective national agency or reach the position of primary actor and doer in Ethiopian affairs?

These questions are predicated on the assumption that the ultimate “solution” to predatory tribal domination in Ethiopia is the rebuilding and reaffirmation of the Ethiopian nation. History has shown that Ethiopian nationalism can be a mighty force against external and internal enemies. Today, it can be a powerful current of resistance against divisive and destructive political ethnicism and a vital affirmation of the values and experience of national solidarity. In short, historical depth, cultural diversity, and patriotic resilience constitute the truth of Itiopiawinnet and this truth should inform the strategy which would resolve the existential crisis we are in today.

National Self and Political Agency

To Ethiopian patriotic and pro-democracy citizens, political parties, intellectuals and activists, it is unsurprising that selfhood may be attributed to the nation, that Ethiopia has “identity” or unique wholeness that is different from and greater than the mere sum of its ethnic or regional parts.

Historic and contemporary Ethiopia imparts a larger, shared national value to its diverse ethnic and cultural communities while in turn enriching its nationhood through their diversity. It is as such that the Ethiopian nation must be addressed by political parties and leaders seeking solve its problems.

So it is important to consider what constitutes the Ethiopian national “self.” It is important because evaluations of the political agency of patriotic and pro-democracy parties and groups are artless if they are unable to account for the contributions of Ethiopia’s nationhood, its animate national landscape, to the agentic vitality, capability and movement of the parties.

The Ethiopian national landscape is variegated and complex. It covers a wide range of forms and contents: the historical, the contemporary, the spiritual, the secular, the traditional, and the modern along with the revolutionary. It constitutes a fusion of multiple, interactive, dimensions that operates integrally without reducing itself to a simple unitary entity. This is the mystery of Ethiopia’s staying power, withstanding decades of “radical” assault, tribal predation, and particularly dark times as these.

For example, history prefigures deeply in Ethiopian nationality not merely as a record of past events but in the continuity of the past in the present, vitally informing, shaping and conditioning our national life here and now. The Ethiopian national terrain is also more than passive geography or territory; it is active in that it makes up a dynamic field of social forces and cultural powers, flows of historical and contemporary energy that could be tapped by patriotic forces today.

Modern, ideas-based politics has also figured, albeit with mixed results, in Ethiopian national identity, particularly since the revolutionary era. But it is worth stressing that Itiopiawinnet cannot be embraced or approached through political ideas, beliefs and aspirations alone. It does not make itself felt merely in articulations, or attempted articulations, of universal concepts (like “democracy”). It also makes itself felt in sense-forming lived experience and culture, in the immediacy and clarity of sentiments, images and symbols, in transgenerational collective memory. Instead of excluding or negating soundly formulated progressive thought Itiopiawinnet can, and should, incorporate it as its constitutive moment.

More immediately, addressing the Ethiopian nation integrally means listening well to its people as one national community, not a collection of disparate “peoples” and “nations.” It necessitates being actually attentive to their common as well as distinctive needs and concerns to the highest degree possible, allowing the people to express their felt interests and desires in a way and to an extent they have never been allowed before.

This means letting Ethiopia “speak,” revealing in her own voice the degradation of her national culture and spiritual and intellectual life, the unmet basic needs and recurrent social dislocation and misery of her people. This cannot be done through partisan-tribal politics as usual, in the language of the old and tired Stalinist dogma of ethnonationalism or in its residual terms and categories.

Matters of human and individual rights, social autonomy, and constitutional and federal government which hitherto have been handled in conceptually vacuous simulations, rhetorical gestures, and ritual practices must now be attended to in more thoughtful, principled and substantive manner. The Ethiopian people deserve nothing less than this from the nation’s intelligentsia. This means those of us who traffic in ideas must actually engage in ideation rather than limiting ourselves to employing universal concepts as platitudes, merely as tokens of rhetoric or habit of polemic. Instead of rushing to be enablers and apologists of the tyranny of the day, we would do better to make a good faith effort to exercise critical reason and live the life of the mind in a way attuned to the Ethiopian national condition.

With respect to political agency, what do patriotic forces and groups which make up the party of Ethiopia do? They work with the actual and potential powers of Ethiopian agerawi consciousness and culture, drawing out strategic and tactical possibilities of our national experience for movement and struggle under present conditions. In the interest of descriptive economy, the question may be better addressed here in terms of the following precis or summary notes:

  1. Effective, and possibly hegemonic, agerawi political actorness does not take shape “outside” the Ethiopian national-social space; not wholly pre-given, it is an inherently interactive, relational performance and achievement. Core actorness is formed by participation in, and management of, diverse Ethiopian national contexts and networks and through various means of collective action and interaction. It takes shape and develops as an outcome of exchanges of ideas, resources and support, as an effect of negotiations, alliances, and forms of collaborative organization and leadership.

The contexts of action and interaction include localities, communities, institutions, flows of goods and services, economic relations, and cultural practices – fields or media of engagement that afford patriotic forces a range of actual and possible choices – within which they build autonomous actional capacity, strategic agency and networked national power. So it is only from its own unique base and point of departure in the Ethiopian national experience that the party of Ethiopia can develop and effectively exercise its role and function as core or leading political-national actor.

  1. A “dialectic” obtains between Ethiopian national self, the historically real Ethiopia, on the one hand, and Ethiopia as felt, experienced, and consciously thought through political agency, on the other. The latter includes the experiences of citizens and distinct cultural communities of the country. But the former and the latter are better understood as having dynamic, mutually constitutive relations instead of being seen as forming a duality.

Our experience of Itiopiawinnet through (and outside or beyond) political agency is predicated on, and contains as its essential substantive moment, the actual, objective Ethiopian nation in its historic unity and integrity. So the experience is not merely subjective. But political activity and movement cannot simply be attached to an entirely pre-given Ethiopia whose national being is totally at hand, something formed once and for all. This is particularly the case in dark times like these when the “givenness” of the nation is in doubt, when the nation is facing existential crisis.

But, crisis or not, Ethiopia is historically given not only in actuality but also in potentia, as a nation which is yet to be developed and perfected, as an ongoing performance as well as an achievement. The country contains within itself the possibility of a broader and deeper realization of national self and value. But, even as actually existent nation, Ethiopia gains life and spirit within the active participation of its citizens and cultural communities in its affairs.

So patriotic and democratic forces in the country should take a correspondingly dynamic form of political agency that would allow them relative openness to the vitality and diversity of the Ethiopian national terrain. They need to develop a broader and deeper collective self that creates national and structural order beyond embodying partisan or tribal interests and projects. They should assume the form of an integral power that is capable of integrating others even as it opens itself up to them. And this means approaching the Ethiopian national landscape not as a passive social space devoid of self-organized activity and agency, but a vital terrain of movement and struggle marked by the intersection or contention of various socio-economic, cultural, institutional and political forces.

  1. There is, however, tension between spirited, substantive Ethiopian nationhood – our common, sensuous national culture and lived experience – on the one hand, and the grudging, rhetorically simulated, merely tactical and instrumental embrace of “Ethiopia” characteristic of avatars of ethnonationalism, particularly leaders of the ODP/OLF led by the likes of Lemma Megersa, Abiy Ahmed and Jawar Mohammed and, of course, Woyane bosses, partisans and ideologues.

In so instrumentalizing “Ethiopia” to the ends of identity politics, Oromo ethnocentric ‘elites’ led by PM Abiy have been exercising state power using overly calculated Ethiopian narratives whose influence stems more from the surface of rhetorical enticement – with which they initially seduced citizens – than from a deeply felt telling of the veritable story of our tans-ethnic national life.

Little surprise, then, that communicative emphasis on hypnotic verbal surface resulted in in a torrent of speeches that initially captured Ethiopian public imagination but failed to keep the Ethiopian people politically intrigued and supportive. Itiopiawinnet has been given pride of place in high minded discourse yet, paradoxically, Ethiopian national experience has remained, on Abiy’s watch, actually marginalized, degraded, and impoverished in the context of “federal” state ethnicism and alongside insular “kilil” regimes, complete with their own tribal territories, militias, captive constituencies, working languages, flags, and so on.

  1. Over the last nearly thirty years, an exceptionally perverse “progressivist” trend in Ethiopian politics and government promoted the conceit of “self-determining” ethnonationality, elevating first the TPLF and now the ODP/OLF to a position of predatory tribal state power essentially disconnected from, and hostile to, the historic Ethiopian national experience. Whatever its differences in political style or substance with TPLF tyranny, the sketchy Abiy regime is basically an emanation of that trend.

The initial step contemporary patriotic forces and groups need to take in undoing this condition and in rehabilitating Itiopiawinnet is somehow to let the nation itself define its problems and possibilities,  express anew its interests and concerns, its hopes and fears. This means empowering the Ethiopian people to speak in their own shared as well as diverse voices, not in residual Stalinist partisan language and reason, the terms, categories and arguments of ethnonationalism on Ethiopia. It means allowing or enabling the nation to regain its life and experience after being entangled and stunned in the web of TPLF “revolutionary democracy” and after undergoing a state of suspended animation through Abiy’s tactical appropriation of Ethiopian national storytelling and propagation of the indistinct yet alluring notion of “medemer.

  1. Finally, in developing itself, patriotic political agency should maintain firm commitment and ties to Ethiopian national unity and integrity not only as a matter of principle or intrinsic value but also as a strategic imperative. Why? For at least two related reasons.

First, because Ethiopian solidarity is necessary in order to carry out peaceful systemic transition in uncertain times of political change, turbulence and crisis such as these. The times require robust stabilization by shared national interests, goals and commitments.

Put differently, there can be no stable and lasting passage to a new, more democratic political system in Ethiopia unless there is a vital national whole that is preserved and secured as a source of stability even as change of political order takes place. National unity is essential as a counterpoint to the uncertainties of transition and change and as a way to mitigate the risks of civil strife in the country.

Second, maintaining Ethiopian national integrity and solidarity is also necessary as a condition of addressing broader structural issues and problems of development and underdevelopment the Ethiopian people commonly face regardless of their ethnic, cultural or regional differences.

Given underlying challenges of Ethiopian socio-economic underdevelopment, what matters fundamentally is not so much the actorness or “self-determination” of this or that ethnic community in the country as the creation of structural conditions of broader, more powerful social action across narrow tribal identities and limited reginal boundaries. What is developmentally of greater significance is transforming the economic, technological, institutional, cultural and political contexts of individual and social agency in Ethiopia. And Ethiopia’s integral continuity and development in the interest of all its citizens is both a basis and an effect of such transformation.

tesfayedemmellash@gmail.com

Nobel body: ‘Highly problematic’ that peace winner silent

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By JAN M. OLSEN and ELIAS MESERET

COPENHAGEN, Denmark (AP) — The director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute has called it “highly problematic” that the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize winner won’t attend any event next week where he could be asked questions publicly, while the spokeswoman for Ethiopia’s prime minister cited “pressing” domestic issues and the leader’s “humble disposition.”

FILE – In this Tuesday, Aug. 27, 2019 file photo, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed speaks during the Ethiopia-Korea Business Forum in Seoul, South Korea. The director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute says it is “highly problematic” that the 2019 winner of the Nobel Peace Prize won’t attend any event where he could publicly be asked questions. Olav Njoelstad on Wednesday, Dec. 4, 2019 said organizers “had wished that (Ethiopian Prime Minister) Abiy Ahmed would have agreed to meet the Norwegian and international press.” (AP Photo/Lee Jin-man, file)

Organizers “had wished that Abiy Ahmed would have agreed to meet the Norwegian and international press,” Olav Njoelstad said, telling Norwegian broadcaster NRK on Wednesday that most Peace Prize winners have no problem putting aside three or four days for traditional Nobel events.

“We have been very clear about this and have clarified that there are several reasons we find this highly problematic,” Njoelstad said. “I think it has to do in part with the challenges he faces at home, and his religious faith and personal humility.”

Abiy’s press secretary, Billene Seyoum, told The Associated Press that it is “quite challenging” for a head of state to dedicate many days to the extensive Nobel program, particularly since “domestic issues are pressing and warrant attention.” Abiy will attend essential events in consultation with the Nobel Institute “to honor and respect the Nobel tradition.”

At the same time, “the humble disposition of the prime minister, rooted in our cultural context, is not in alignment with the very public nature of the Nobel award,” Billene said. “The prime minister is humbled and grateful for the recognition.”

Skipping the media isn’t unprecedented. U.S. President Barack Obama also declined to speak to reporters when he won the Peace Prize in 2009.

Abiy has rarely given interviews since taking office last year. His spokeswoman called him “one of the most accessible Ethiopian prime ministers to date in public and media engagements.”

Abiy was awarded the Peace Prize for making peace with neighboring Eritrea after one of Africa’s longest-running conflicts and for introducing sweeping political reforms, but already troubles are growing at home.

Violent unrest, sometimes along ethnic lines, is expected to worsen ahead of Ethiopia’s election in May. Debate has broken out on social media about whether Abiy deserves the award.

When the Peace Prize was announced earlier this year, Nobel chairwoman Berit Reiss-Andersen said some people may consider it too early to give it to Abiy, but “it is now that Abiy Ahmed’s efforts need recognition and deserve encouragement.”

The prime minister is expected to give his acceptance speech Tuesday at Oslo City Hall before officials, including Norwegian royals, after receiving the 9-million kronor ($945,000) cash award, a gold medal and a diploma.

Abiy also is to meet with Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg and open a Nobel Prize exhibition during a private ceremony.

Meseret reported from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Cara Anna in Johannesburg contributed to this report.

This version corrects the reference to Ethiopian prime minister’s press secretary to spokeswoman.

ጠቅላይ ሚንስትር ዶ/ር አብይ አህመድ በኖርዌይ የኖቤል ሽልማታቸውን በሚቀበሉበት ወቅት ጋዜጠኞች ጥያቄዎች በሚጠየቁበት ፕሮግራም ላይ አይገኙም

 

Awol’s fear is misplaced!

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In an opinion piece published on December 6, 2019, on Aljazeera titled ‘Why Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party could be bad news for Ethiopia’ Awol Allo seems to fear the formation of the new party will bring the country ‘to the edge of an abyss’.

Going through the article, one hardly finds substantive reasoning for making such an alarming prediction solely based on the formation of a new political party,( curious why Awol labels it as Abiy’s party) by the ruling EPRDF party in Ethiopia.

By Awol’s own account the party being replaced i.e. the EPRDF ‘has always been a hodgepodge of ethnic groups that served the interests of its most dominant member, the TPLF, and ruled Ethiopia with an iron fist for nearly three decades’.

If indeed this was the case, Awol should be congratulating the new party, for breaking out of the shackle, bringing along marginalized ‘partner parties’ as full-fledged members and forming an inclusive party on the ashes of EPRDF, rather than making the dark prediction because of its formation.

Again, if in Awol’s view the new party is being mainly supported by a ‘diminishing block’ of Ethiopian nationalists with a very slim likelihood of winning a free and democratic election, why worry so much?

But as it becomes clear in the article, Awol’s fear lays somewhere else. Awol seems to believe that the only viable form of political mobilization and or organization ought to be based on ethnic identity, and is a bit upset because the new party is being supported by Ethiopian nationalists. Despite his claim that Ethiopian nationalists are a ‘diminishing block’, Awol fully knows that is not the case, and therein lies his fear.

I must acknowledge that there are some fringe elements with no serious political standing on the ground that might harbor, what Awol calls ‘fixation on a homogenizing conception of unity’, but to attempt to conflate these elements with Ethiopian nationalists is being dishonest. Political calculus can not be based by using fringe elements as core variables, but by considering all and especially main prevailing currents.

Awol might be too young to remember, but the prevailing form of political mobilization and organization in Ethiopia prior to, during and after the 1974 revolution was on a multinational basis until these forces were decimated by mistakes made, and but also, mainly by the diabolical actions taken by the Derg regime against them.

Granted, the atrocities of the Derg coupled with TPLF’s relentless campaign of destroying multinational organizations in the past 27 years ( as the late Meles used to say, ‘we will wait until they sprout and get on their feet and then cut them down!) make it seems, for uncritical observers, that the Ethiopian political field is only the playground of ethno nationalists. That I had not expected from a seasoned observer as Awol.

Ethiopian nationalism is a nationalism forged by millions who sacrificed for the preservation of the nation in the fight against foreign invaders, but also by hundreds of thousands who sacrificed their lives in the fight for equality, justice and the rule of law and it will prevail.

Abegaz Wondimu

The Final Push of Egypt to Secure Zero-Sum Water Share Agreement with a “Destabilized Ethiopia”!

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By Ermias Hailu/December 6, 2019

After Egypt’s failure to integrate Eritrea to its territories by the end of the second world war, due to Emperor Haile Selassie’s superior diplomatic skills, the then Egyptian Pan- Arab nationalistic President Nasser’s government turned to ethnic and religious subversion against Ethiopia. In 1955 Egypt began working for the instigation of an “Arab” revolution in the then autonomous Ethiopian province Eritrea, to that effect, hundreds of young Muslims from Eritrea were invited to Cairo to study and enjoy special benefits. Though, the Muslims from Eritrea were not native Arabic speakers they absorbed the spirit of Arab revolution and adopted a modern Arab identity. Furthermore, these Eritreans Muslims were trained how to set up a modern guerrilla ‘liberation front’ and established the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1959 with the support of Egypt and an Algerian Islamic movement. Thereafter, the ELF launched an open anti-Ethiopian revolt in Eritrea in 1961, claiming and propagating a fake Arab Eritrean identity “The Arabism of the Eritrean People”.

To promote Eritrea’s liberation from Ethiopia, Nasser also helped local Eritrean Christian Tigrayans who resisted reunification with Ethiopia. In 1955, the prominent leader of Christian Tigrayans in Eritrea, WaldeAb WeldeMariam, was invited to broadcast daily anti-Ethiopian propaganda on Radio Cairo and the Nasserist regime and subsequent Egyptian governments remained the main pillar of support for the Eritrean separatist movement.

The myth of Eritrea’s Arabism, adopted and advanced by Eritrean Muslims, was to survive until 1980’s and the war in Eritrea that was instigated by Egypt lasted 30 years and caused untold human and financial losses both to Ethiopia and Eritrea. As of today, Eritrea has been a de facto colony of Egypt and has been used as a proxy war front against Ethiopia and it has been also the command post of those Egypt funded Ethiopian political groups who opted to ally with Egypt or Eritrea to destabilize Ethiopia. In a new development both the Eritrean government and the Ethiopian political groups who resided in Eritrea have been making peace with Ethiopia but how they will free themselves from Egypt’s standing agenda of “destabilizing Ethiopia” is yet to be seen. I doubt if this new development was possible without the blessing of Egypt and it could be an indication of a new covert intrusive strategy of Egypt to control Ethiopia.

No less significant was the Nasserist influence on the Somali nationalists and starting in the mid-1950s Nasserist agents worked to enhance the anti-Ethiopian dimension of Somali nationalism branded it as “Greater Somalia”. The Somalis encouraged by the potential Egypt backing claimed about one-third of Ethiopia’s territory and fought two unsuccessful wars that subsequently resulted in the disintegration of Somalia. The disintegration of Somalia and the subsequent civil war which has caused the scatter of Somalis throughout the world and death of millions of Somalis by war and famine and wastage of decades of nation building opportunity was a by-product of the failed Egypt destabilization strategy of Ethiopia using Somalia as its proxy.

Similarly, after Egypt failed to stop the British from allowing Sudan to declare its independence from Egypt in 1956, it has been constantly interfering into the internal affairs of Sudan including the Sudanese army staged coup d’état in November 1958, overthrowing the civilian government of Abdullah Khalil which had uncompromised and hard negotiation position on the interest of Sudan on the Nile river, in which Egypt friendly Gen. Ibrahim Abboud led the new military Sudan government.

The 1959 Nile water share agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan which gave the lion share to Egypt (78% to Egypt and 22% to Sudan on the net annual flow after deducting 10 billion cubic meters for evaporation loss) was signed with the Egypt friendly Sudan President Gen.  Ibrahim Abboud. Considering, the flow measuring point is deep in Egypt at the Aswan High dam and the annual hypothetical evaporation loss of 10 billion cubic meters, the share for Sudan is substantially lower than 22%. However, If the water share allocation was done considering “population size and arable land area” as factors, Sudan’s share should have been not less than 40%.

It is my expectation and I am confident that the new PM of Ethiopia will not make same mistake as Gen. Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan!!!

Though Egypt opposed the split of South Sudan from Sudan during the pre-independence war period, currently it is the main sponsor of the undemocratic and corrupt  President Kiir government and is prolonging the suffering of the South Sudan people with the objective of getting a foothold near to Ethiopian border to sabotage Ethiopia and possibly to resurrect its aborted project of digging the Jonglei Canal in South Sudan.

Therefore, due to Egypt’s standing strategy of securing the lion share of the water from the Nile river( under the pretext of ensuring water security) at the expense of more than 300 million people around the Horn of Africa, it has been obsessed in sabotaging the peace and stability of Ethiopia and  Sudan for more than 50 years and as the result the whole of Horn/East of Africa has been unstable and remained as one of the poorest regions in the world and major source of migrants to Europe , USA and elsewhere. Since the mid of 20th century, the Horn Africa has witnessed the death of millions of people, aggravation of poverty and wastage of scarce billions of dollars for a war that could have been used for development due to the behind the curtain destabilizing activities of Egypt

However, the Zero-Sum game that has been played by Egypt to ensure its water security has become unsustainable, out of dated and irrelevant for the following reasons:

Creating jobs and feeding the rapidly growing population in the Horn of Africa and in the countries of the Nile Basin demands governments to generate power for industrialization and to transform traditional farming to mechanized irrigated farming to produce sufficient food to ensure food security which requires more consumption of water. The domestic consumption of water also increases in proportion to the population growth.

The Aswan High dam only stores one-year flow of the Nile water, whereas, global warming and other unpredictable climate changes could result in a drought that lasts to the biblical-proportion of up to seven years. In that case, the Aswan dam could dry with unimaginable consequences on Egypt’s 100 million & growing population and makes Egypt’s current water security strategy null and void.

The growing population of Egypt also requires more water than the storage capacity of the High Aswan dam. That necessitates the construction of additional reservoir dams either in Ethiopia and/or Sudan (building additional dam in Egypt looks not practical).

  • The Aswan high dam may be filled by silt within the next 300 to 500 years. How will Egypt manage such unavoidable fact with a huge population that is 95% dependent on the Nile water??? It is important to note that, dams built in Ethiopia prolong the service life of the Aswan dam by reducing the silt that goes from Ethiopia.

Considering the above points, it is obvious that Egyptian water security strategists, hydrology experts and the Egyptians government covertly want the construction of more dams (reservoirs) in Sudan and Ethiopia as far as their so-called historical share is not significantly affected. They also know that dams built in Ethiopia along the deep Abay River gorge could only be mainly used for hydroelectric power generation with lower evaporation loss and lower construction cost per volume.

Egyptians are also considering other sources of water such us linking the Congo River with the White Nile and digging the Jonglei Canal in South Sudan which are good ideas but difficult to implement. However, If Egypt succeeds to dig the Jonglei Canal or /and connect the White Nile with the Congo river, the construction of cascade of dams on the Abay river is mandatory to regulate its flow and avoid flooding of Khartoum, other Sudan territories and Egypt.

Therefore, Egypt’s strategy of sustaining its water security through sabotaging and destabilizing Ethiopia and Sudan is no more a relevant strategy as Egypt needs more water reservoirs to be built both in Sudan and Ethiopia for sustaining its water security and cater for its growing population. Hence, to sustain Egypt’s water security, storing water in the deep Abay gorge is the most attractive option as it could store more water at lower cost and less evaporation loss. However, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt should negotiate and agree on a win-win water share tripartite and bilateral agreements on how to equitably benefit from the Abay river.

Whatever plot that Egypt may try to sabotage and destabilize the main water supplier to the Nile “Ethiopia “and the main potential Nile water Consumer” Sudan” may not be effective now and in the future as Egypt is  economically weak and facing serious external and internal geopolitical  threats and the international community is also expected to put pressure on Egypt to abandon its bad habits of destabilizing the Horn of Africa and seek for a negotiated solution. In addition, the main neighbors of Ethiopia, including Eritrea and Somalia, that Egypt had been historically using as a proxy to destabilize Ethiopia are currently making peace with Ethiopia, most likely as they are fully aware of the consequences of being manipulated and used by Egypt to conspire against their strategic neighbor.

However, as a negotiating tactic, Egypt has been blackmailing the GERD and is launching a fierce diplomatic offensive to directly or indirectly pressurize Ethiopia, through the Middle East countries, USA, UN, The Arab League etc., with the objective of signing a water sharing agreement with Ethiopia that legitimizes Egypt’s claim of so-called historic rights.

The objective of this article is to forward some ideas for the Ethiopian government that could be used for the negotiation with Egypt as illustrated below:

The Negotiation with Egypt must consider the following points:

  • As discussed above, the Egyptians badly need the construction of dams in Ethiopia as far as there is an agreement that protects their interest (this is a driver for win-win negotiation).

 

  • Population growth
    • By the year 2050 and 2100 the population of Ethiopia will reach 190m and 240m respectively. Hence, any water share agreement should consider such future population growth
  • The economic value of the water flowing to Sudan and Egypt:

 

  • As of today, the annual flow of water from Ethiopia’s all rivers to South Sudan and to Sudan is estimated to be 73 billion Cubic meters. Assuming ocean water salination cost is USD 0.40 per Cubic meter (this is the current lowest cost according to new salination plants build by Israel) and assuming 25% of salination cost to be the price of each cubic meter of water flowing out of Ethiopia, the annual price of the total water out of Ethiopia is: USD 0.40/ cubic meters X 25% X 73 billion cubic meter = USD 7.3 billion per year

 

  • Similarly, the annual flow of the Abay (Blue Nile) river to Sudan is about 53 billion cubic meters. Based on the above assumptions the economic value of the Abay river to both Sudan and Egypt is: USD 0.40/ cubic meter X 25% X 53 billion cubic meter = USD 5.3 billion per year

 

  • Assuming Ethiopia is willing to share 50% of the annual flow free of charge to both Sudan and Egypt (based on the principles of equitable usage of water), Ethiopia could charge both Sudan and Egypt USD3.65 billion per year for all the water flows to the Nile. Considering Egypt share is 78%( as per Egypt and Sudan agreement), Ethiopia could demand Egypt to pay Ethiopia about USD 3 billion per year.

 

  • Egypt that generates annually about USD 6 billion from Suez Canal, USD 13 billion from tourism and USD 30 billion from its agricultural sector is capable and should be willing to compenetrate Ethiopia in order to sustain its water security in a win-win manner.

 

  • Egypt wants Ethiopia to curtail its population growth and continue with the existing unsustainable rain fed agriculture instead of irrigated agriculture (these conditions should not be accepted by Ethiopia). Considering the erratic nature of rainfall, mechanized irrigated agriculture is the only viable option for Ethiopia’s future food security. Hence, Ethiopia must secure its right to use the water from Abay river not only for Electric generation but for agricultural production.

 

  • Egypt is also trying to unreasonably prolong the filling of GERD so that Ethiopia could not timely benefit from the dam and that must be resisted by Ethiopia. Filling of the dam is purely technical and three measurable scenarios could be agreed based on the forecasted rain in the Ethiopian high lands.

 

  • Egypt is trying to hide the water share agreement in the “dam operation agreement”. It has been reported in the media that Egypt is proposing to Ethiopia to guarantee the GERD to release minimum 40 billion Cubic meter volume of water per year (volume to be measured at the Aswan dam in Egypt). This proposal is impractical, and Egypt is trying to deny the today and future Ethiopia’s generation their right to use the Abay river for agricultural production, which should not be accepted considering the future population growth of Ethiopia and as it contradicts water sharing international principles. I would like to emphasize this issue to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia so that he will not make any compromise on this issue and avoid the enslavement of Ethiopia’s future generation by Egypt.

 

  • It is recommended to benchmark Turkey water share agreements and experience with its neighbors on Tigris and the Euphrates rivers.

 

  • Any agreement with Sudan and Egypt:

 

  • Should have political, economic, social, technical and environmental dimensions and must be comprehensive enough to cover all aspects.

 

  • Should be conditional to both countries committing that they will not be directly or indirectly involved on any activity that destabilizes or harms the interests of Ethiopia such as security, economy and political interests.

 

  • Ethiopia should be economically compensated for the water flowing to both Egypt and Sudan.

 

  • Any agreed volume to be shared to Sudan and Egypt should be measured within the territory of Ethiopia.

 

  • Should have exit provisions that enables agreed parties to revoke the agreement at any time based on defined evets of defaults.

 

  • Should have specified time span and expiry date (it should not be more than 25 years). This allows all parties to renegotiate new agreement (from zero draft) every 25 years.

 

  • Egypt must abandon its claim of zero-sum historic rights

 

  • Ethiopia’s sovereignty over its rivers in its territory and its right to build cascade of dams over its rivers and to use the water for irrigated farming, without significant harm to Sudan and Egypt, should not be compromised.

 

  • Egypt and Sudan must enter to a binding agreement to buy electric power from Ethiopia at international market rates with forecasted escalation rates.

 

  • As beneficiaries from the water from the Ethiopian dams(reservoirs) both Sudan and Egypt must contribute up to 50% of the dam construction cost (assuming Ethiopia will give them 50% the water flows to Sudan free of charge).

 

  • Must be openly communicated to the people of Ethiopia and ratified by the parliament. The fact that the agreements/understandings signed between the Ethiopian and Eritrean government were not discussed and ratified by the parliament of Ethiopia gives me a concern on how the Ethiopian government is handling and is going to handle the agreement with Egypt and Sudan.

 

  • The Ethiopian government should resist any attempt by Egypt, USA or any party to pressurize Ethiopia to agree on one-sided water share agreement in a rushed manner sweetened with a one-time monetary incentive from World Bank and the USA treasury.

 

  • If Egypt is requesting for prolonged filling of the dam and one-sided water share agreement without exit clause and termination period, there is no any incentive for Ethiopia to rush for an agreement while it is facing Egypt induced internal instabilities and with weak negotiation position. Ultimately, Ethiopia may consider or will be forced to delay the negotiation process.

 

  • It is recommended to include the European Union, China and Russia to observe the negotiation process to avoid one sided pressure from USA which is the main strategic partner of Egypt in the Middle East. The World Bank has been also historically the supporter of Egypt and has denied Ethiopia any financing for all the dams Ethiopia built or building. There is a risk that Ethiopia could be sandwiched between the rock and the hard place and pressurized to give-in for Egypt for a couple of billion dollars grant from USA and World Bank.

 

  • Ethiopia must resist to reach an agreement on piece by piece basis. Any agreed issues must be conditional to reaching comprehensive final agreement as outlined above.

 

  • It is recommended that PM Abiy Ahmed meets President Trump and UN officials as soon possible to present Ethiopian case for win-win solutions. It looks Egypt is leading in its diplomatic offence and Ethiopia is critically lagging.

 

God Bless the People of Horn Africa and Egypt!

 

Ethiopian Orthodox Synod decides to open training institutions in all languages, shatter Oromo extremists

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Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo church passed a decision to open several training centers in many languages in the country.

The Church has faced a mountainous problem since the new prime minister come to power in April 2018. Since then several churches put on fire and followers being killed.

In the last week’s mob attack in Oromia region, at least 70 people have been killed and churches turned into ashes.

On the other hand, Oromo ethnic extremists wanted to split the church by creating a language division.

Supported by Jawar Mohammed and his station OMN, Oromo extremists campaigns against the church for several months saying Ethiopian Orthodox Church does not belong to the Oromo.

Today on Monday, November 4, 2019, the Synod agreed and decided to establish training institutions in many languages as possible in all regions.

The institutions help the Church to maintain its followers that have challenges of communicating in other languages.

Brana

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