Thousands of Ethiopians have been attracted to Saudi Arabia by the job opportunities

ADDIS ABABA, Jan. 9 (Xinhua) — Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Tuesday agreed to expedite the signing of overseas labor agreement.

The two countries announce the commitment as part of the visit of Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Workneh Gebeyehu, to the Middle East country.

“Gebeyehu and Nasser Bin Thani Al Hamel, UAE’s Minister of Human Resources, have underscored the need to fast-track the signing of labor agreement that was being discussed for over two years,” said a statement issued by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

Gebeyehu stressed that the signing of the overseas labor agreement “will create a viable legal framework for protection and safety of workers.”

UAE is one of the major Middle Eastern destinations of Ethiopian migrants in search for job.

The announcement came amid the Ethiopian government’s attempt to repatriate its undocumented citizens from Saudi Arabia as the latter ordered undocumented foreigners to leave its territory or face fine and imprisonment.

The Ethiopian government has repatriated some 14,130 Ethiopians from the kingdom, since the extended amnesty period ended on November 15.

However, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians are still believed to live in the kingdom without legal document and still hesitant to return home.

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Financial Times

Ethiopia is the China of Africa. Like China, it traces its history back thousands of years and considers itself a regional giant. Like China 30 years ago, it has a serious development plan based on raising health and educational standards, improving farm yields and industrialisation with the help of foreign capital.

Unfortunately, also like China, it has an authoritarian government that represses its people to stay in power. There is a crucial contrast with China, however. Ethiopia will not be able to carry off the trick of economic expansion and political repression indefinitely. For the 26 years since it ousted the Marxist regime of Haile Mariam Mengistu, the ruling coalition has tried just that.

Yet, if anything, it has been less prepared than the Chinese Communist party to give space to the private sector. It has maintained a firm grip over strategic sectors and planned its march towards putative prosperity with military ruthlessness.

That has stifled entrepreneurialism and jeopardised a strong economic record that has seen growth — at least according to official numbers — average about 8 per cent since 2000. It is the political risks that form the gravest threat to the present system.

Though it insists otherwise, the coalition is dominated by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which is seen to favour ethnic Tigrayans who make up only 6 per cent of the population. The cabal in charge seems genuinely to believe that only it can frog-march Ethiopia to middle-income status. Its plans have run into opposition from the Oromo and Amhara, ethnic groups that together make up 60 per cent of the population.

The Oromo, the biggest, have long felt discriminated against, a sentiment that exploded two years ago after government plans to extend Addis Ababa, the capital, into their land. Unusually, the Oromo have formed a united front with the Amhara, who have long felt themselves the rightful rulers of Ethiopia. That is the background to the turmoil that erupted in 2016 with the killing of at least 55 people at a religious festival. Several thousand may have been killed since, and many thousands more are still imprisoned. The ruling coalition’s attempt to quell dissent forcibly — tempered by holding off on Addis expansion plans — has failed.

Now, there is a hint that the government is rethinking. Last August, it ended a 10-month state of emergency. Last week, Hailemariam Desalegn, the prime minister, said the government would release political prisoners and close a notorious prison as the first steps to “national reconciliation”. It is too early to celebrate a change of heart. No prisoners have yet been released — and some are likely to remain in jail even if the government meets its promise. Though welcome, even a full-scale amnesty would be just a start. More fundamentally, the government must do more to deepen democracy and demonstrate that it rules for all Ethiopians and not just an undeclared minority.

That will require changes within the mechanics of government as well as a reprioritising of development goals such that all the country is seen to benefit. Enforced land seizures must stop. The press should be freed so that Ethiopians can have an informed debate about their priorities. The people who run Ethiopia have no monopoly on wisdom. Of the almost 50 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, few matter more than Ethiopia. A successful development agenda there could help ignite a continent badly in need of role models. Sadly, for all its economic and social achievements, authoritarian Ethiopia is still far from that.

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BBN Breaking News January 10, 2018

BBN Breaking – Addis Ababa youth activists distribute flyers and pamphlets

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Addis Standard

Tsegaye R Ararssa,
Introduction

Tsegaye R Ararssa,

Addis Abeba, Janurary 10/2018 – One of the most emphatic achievements of the #OromoProtests is Lemma Megerssa himself. The Lemma Megerssa moment is produced by the resurgent Oromo resistance that was rekindled in 2014 and persisted to date.  Having produced the Lemma Megerssa moment as its overall effect, the Oromo protest has since evolved into a full blown revolution that is increasingly forcing a fundamental change upon the TPLF-EPRDF system of rule. For the first time in its history, the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been rendered so incoherent that it is almost dismembered as a coalition of ethno-national fronts of the four major highland regions of the Federation, namely the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) of Oromia, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) of Amhara, Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM) of Southern Nations Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNPRS), and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of Tigray.

As a consequence of the Oromo Revolution, the TPLF, the hitherto dominant core of the ruling EPRDF, has been so fractured that it had to sit for an extra-ordinarily long meeting of over thirty-five days in October-November 2017, just so it can divine some coherence in a party that was completely in disarray. Earlier, the three other parties have been sitting for similar, if shorter, meetings at the end of which they all vowed that they have achieved what they insisted was a “deep reform.” In late December, the 36-member Executive Committee of EPRDF sat for a similarly long meeting of about seventeen days at the end of which they came out clearly divided (in spite of the fact that the written press releaseissued before the leaders gave a presser claimed to have achieved a unity of ideas and a consensus of a sort). What they were saying implicitly (also noted in the veiled comments of the TPLF chief, Debre-Tsion Gebremichael) was that they have averted a shootout among the leaders.

The combined effect of this complex and intricate dynamics is the emergence of a faction of the OPDO (now known as ‘Team Lemma,’ tellingly named after the OPDO Leader and the Oromia President, Lemma Megerssa) offering an alternative future for EPRDF and for Ethiopia. This was preceded by a heartening gesture of alliance between OPDO and ANDM, an event that unsettled the TPLF and signaled the increasing isolation of TPLF within the coalition. Lemma’s statement that although they “didn’t enter the Executive Committee’s meeting hall with a sense of competition among ourselves, there is a clear winner at the end,” already indicates that his team – or in his words, the country – has come out most favored. No doubt, following the long presser given by the four representatives of the parties (i.e., Lemma Megerssa, Demeke Mekonnen, Hailemariam Desalegn, and Debretsion Gebremicheal), Lemma has, as an individual, come out the most popular leader in the eyes of the Ethiopian public. This in turn has created what can be called the ‘Lemma moment’ in Ethiopia. The Lemma moment, as generative as it is in many respects, seems to be having its own irresolution and ambivalence. This piece reflects on the dilemma of this extra-ordinary moment highlighting the tension between ‘the logic of resistance’ that gave popular legitimacy to his efforts and the challenge of ‘occupying’ the seat of leadership that demands not just protesting but also governing.

Playing Politics into the Center: the Logic of Resistance

‘Team Lemma’ and the moment of political hope it created is the product of the Oromo Revolution. The team is a group that came to realign OPDO with the resistance movement of the Oromo youth, known in Afaan Oromoo as Qeerro, to whose pressure the old OPDO establishment buckled. As soon as the team took over the helm of power in the OPDO and in Oromia, it sought to vie for the minds and hearts of the Oromo youth by promising a massive employment scheme through what they awkwardly called ‘economic revolution’.

The team picked up some of the demands of the youth and amplified them as part of their desire to implement ‘deep reform’ within their party (OPDO), their region (Oromia), their front (EPRDF), and the wider country (Ethiopia). In so doing, the team started to sound like the voice of protest in government. It used the language of freedom from oppression, (human) rights, and people’s suffering. More often than not, the team followed tack of the protesters’ motto in insisting, among others, on the adherence to the rules of the constitution, observance of the rule of law, respect for the federalist principles of self-rule and shared rule, a better enforcement of constitutional human rights clauses, a more equitable distribution of wealth, a more democratic share of powers, implementation of the constitutional “special interest” of Oromia over Finfinnee (Addis Abeba), recognition of Afaan Oromoo as one of the working languages of the Federal Government, etc. Operating as a government but identifying more with the suffering public, it appropriated the language of the Oromo Revolution and functioned essentially on the logic of resistance, albeit from the top.

To all close observers of Ethiopian politics, it soon became apparent that the team is in resistance to the dominance of the TPLF and the latter’s authoritarian modus operandi both in EPRDF and in the entire country. This in turn revealed the emergence of consequential tensions between TPLF on the one hand and its hitherto junior partners, particularly OPDO and ANDM, on the other. The tension started to rock the entire federal government. Knowing the numerical advantage OPDO and ANDM have in Parliament, the TPLF started to evade or bypass formal democratic institutions of decision-making such as the Federal Parliament (formally known as the House of Peoples’ Representatives [HPR]), especially after the resignation of its Speaker Abba Duulaa Gammadaa (also from the OPDO). Tensions also started to show up within the Federal Government (e.g. between the Communications Minister and the Director of the Press Board) as well as between the Federal and State Governments (Federal Ministry of Communication and Oromia and Somali Regional Communication Bureaux; Federal Prime Minister and Oromia President).

Team Lemma. From Right: Shimelis Abdissa, Addisu Arega, Lemma Megerssa and Abiy Ahmed

These tensions put the OPDO at the center of the unfolding drama of Ethiopian politics of these latter days. Increasingly, the protesting public seemed to have found an ally in Team Lemma. Having appropriated all the languages of the protest and its logic of resistance, the team (especially its key figures, Lemma Megerssa, Abiy Ahmed, Addisu Arega, and Shimelis Abdissa) increasingly sounded virtually like, and became, political activists speaking for the people. However, beyond speech, in reality, little changed on the ground. People are still being killed arbitrarily by the military. Many are being arrested. The army and federal police roam around the states and their localities uninvited and illegally-unconstitutionally. TPLF-orchestrated “border wars” are still raging, especially between Oromia and Somali regions. Regiments of federal government soldiers are encamped in university campuses all over the country. The close to 700, 000 persons displaced from the Somali region and the adjacent border areas are yet to be resettled in proper homes. The promise of ‘economic revolution’ and the jobs and benefits thereof are yet to be delivered.  Provision of utilities and public services are not making any improvement. Economic activities are still stalled. In short, governance is conspicuously absent. And the team has yet to stop activism (which the TPLF casts negatively as a populist gesture) and start governing.

At times, the team seems to be trying to do two things at one and the same time: resisting TPLF’s hegemony in order to transform EPRDF from within and to govern Oromia legitimately and serve the regional public (the domain of the Oromo demos) properly. The first task propels the team to scale up its ambitions and act on behalf of the wider country as it also seeks to edge out TPLF, sustaining its alliance with ANDM, taking other political groupings on board, and gradually steering the country to the democratic transformation long hoped for. The second pulls it in the direction of remaining grounded in its Oromo constituency as it seeks to address all the demands of the revolution, pacify the region, secure its autonomy (or self-rule), restore displaced people, release detainees and political prisoners, make wrong-doers (officials included) accountable, and heal social wounds caused by tragedies of mass killings and other atrocities. The first pulls them in the direction of assuming new national (country-wide) responsibilities including re-configuring the Ethiopian state and its identity for the better. The second pulls them in the direction of discharging the responsibilities they are already encumbered with in the Oromia region. The first demands the envisioning of a new Ethiopia, the creation of a distinctly Oromo project for Ethiopia, as part of the Oromo contribution to the ‘nation-building’ process, if only redemptively. The second demands a nationalist self-assertion as Oromos vis-à-vis the hitherto oppressive Ethiopia.

Owing to the complex politico-moral responsibilities they shoulder as Oromos in contemporary Ethiopia, members of Team Lemma are inescapably forced to live with a tenuous irresolution, walking every day with a degree of ambivalence about which call to emphasize (and which to postpone in pro tem)—the call of the wider Ethiopia or that of Oromia?–at a particular point in time. Perhaps more than any other political groupings in Ethiopia, Team Lemma will be the most afflicted with ambivalence, the ambivalence about which call to respond to first, the call to reform, redeem and “save Ethiopia from itself” (the call to become more than oneself and to do more than resisting TPLF and traditional Ethiopian hegemony), or the call to empower its own constituency regardless of what becomes of its Ethiopian other (the call to first pursue Oromo justice vis-à-vis Ethiopia and think of Ethiopia only afterwards). The team is thus required to live under the imperative of reflexive (and agonistic) thinking. Consequently, the team is forced to play politics into the Ethiopian center. (What this center is a debatable point in itself. But that should be left for another day.)

Oromia is home to people from all the other States of the Ethiopian federation. It is also a region sharing borders with all the regions save for Tigray. Oromia also hosts the Federal Government in its capital city, Finfinne, which, as a result, draws people from all corners of the country. More than any of the States in Ethiopia today, Oromia is conscious of the presence of other peoples in its midst. This consciousness forces the leadership to practice an entirely other-regarding political ethics. This same consciousness makes the leaders mindful of the need to appeal to the political sensibilities of peoples other than the ones in their own constituency in order to bring the latter on board as they endeavor to bring about country-wide change. (Perhaps this explains Lemma Megerssa’s extravagant, if only vacuous, rhetoric in Bahir Dar about being “addicted to Ethiopianism!” Note: this is not to underestimate the symbolic significance of the speech as a gesture. But the gesture of alliance between the parties must be encouraged and given a more substantive content in order for it to be politically consequential, especially in creating new terms of relationship between the two peoples.)

Addressing all the demands of the Oromo Revolution AND leading the effort to reform the TPLF-EPRDF regime with a view to transforming the wider polity, all at the same time, is a herculean task. That is the challenge confronting Team Lemma at the moment, a challenge they seem to have taken up, with an enormous amount of care and caution not to rock the boat too much to their own peril. Perhaps this explains why the team is not pulling out of the EPRDF coalition. Or why, for example, it is so far hesitant to use the Parliamentary platform to form a new government in collaboration with ANDM, thereby automatically ending the TPLF hegemony in the Front and in Ethiopia.

Beyond vindicating the Oromo Protests: the challenge of governing of behalf of the oppressed forces, North and South

Given this is the situation, what can Team Lemma do? What can they do beyond vindicating and validating the claims and demands of the #Oromoprotests? And more particularly, what can they do to rise up to the challenge of governing on behalf of the oppressed peoples of Ethiopia, north and south? The following is a tentative list of (obvious) suggestions. I offer these suggestions fully mindful of the difference in the strategies, tactics, and positioning deployed for the different tasks of Resistance and Governing. The ‘logic of resistance’ based on which the team operates is more like the logic of oppositional politics run by groups running campaigns for democratic elections. Just as campaign strategies are different from strategies for governing in healthy democracies, so are the strategies of ‘Resistance’ and of ‘Governance’ in Ethiopia for Team Lemma. Accordingly, the team ought to learn to live with its dilemma, the Oromo dilemma in its best (with all its irresolution), and manage its priorities prudently. In so doing, it should find a happy synthesis of the work of resistance and governing, the work of critiquing and holding power at the same time, in order for them to effectuate a preferred change both for themselves, for the country, and for posterity.

The most outstanding task awaiting them now is how to bring the discussions (and negotiations) in EPRDF (and the platforms of the parties forming the Front) to the formal public decision-making institutions of the country such as the Parliament, aka, the HPR. Accordingly, they ought to:

1. Make an increasing use of parliamentary platforms for public decision-making in the country. After all, the parliament is “the highest authority of the Federal Government” (See Art 50(3) of the FDRE Constitution). Similarly, they should use the State Parliament, Caffee Oromia, and State Constitutional institutions for every public issues pertaining to state matters. In order to help facilitate a free deliberation in the legislative bodies, they should begin to relax the rules of parliamentary procedures both at the Federal level and at the State level. This should be easy in the light of the fact that theirs are all single-party parliaments.
2. Activate and exercise the parliamentary power to scrutinize the Executive at all levels, Federal and State. For far too long, the parliament’s decisional powers (legislative, financial/budgetary, and taxing) have been bypassed by the Executive which used the parliament as a window dressing. It is important to remember that the parliament’s scrutiny and monitory powers have hardly been utilized especially where it matters most, i.e., on the military, police, and intelligence authorities. The parliament’s responsibility to monitor the executive is key to the increasing (political and administrative) accountability of the latter in its duty to respect, protect, and enforce human rights at all levels of government (Art 13(2) of the FDRE Constitution). This will pave the way for, among others, making Abdi Ille, his so called ‘Special Police,’ and the complicit Federal Security authorities accountable politically (through removal), administratively (through demotion, disciplining, and dismissal), and judicially (through trials for their atrocities including mass killings, torture, gang rape, mutilations, and genocide). This will also give the Parliament an opportunity to disarm, disband, and outlaw the ‘Special Forces’ and all similar repressive security apparatuses in the country. Likewise, it will create the occasion for the Parliament to go beyond the symbolic (partisan political party) gestures to publicly resolve to release all political prisoners and to close down and outlaw all institutions of torture such as Ma’ekelawi and nameless detention centers in the military training camps. Most pressingly, this will help the Parliament to bring the country as a whole to come together and act in unison to resettle and/or restore the over 700, 000 displaced persons.
3. (In the interest of opening up the political space and freeing the country for a more open, transparent, inclusive and, hopefully, deliberative democracy, the team ought to) use its parliamentary platform for repealing all repressive laws such as the counter-terrorism law (Proc no 652/2009), Charities and Societies law (Proclamation no. 621/2009), political party registration law (Proclamation no. 573/2008), media law (proclamation no. 590/2008), and the law on freedom of assembly (Proclamation no. 3/1991).
4. Prepare the regime for a broad-based negotiation with other political parties with a view to pacifying the country, restoring political hope, especially among the youth, and creating a working consensus among a wide variety of political, social-communal, and economic actors. In order for such negotiations to happen, the regime should remove political parties from its list of ‘terrorist’ organizations.
5. Now that the TPLF anxiety over potential loss of power to the OPDO-ANDM alliance has subsided (ensuring this seems to be the deal from the long Executive Committee meeting!), Team Lemma (in collaboration with Team Geddu Andargachew of ANDM) must push for a reconfiguration of the membership and voting power and procedure of the Executive Committee in the EPRDF. This is absolutely necessary if there is to come a transition to democracy keeping TPLF-EPRDF as part of transition to come. Sooner or later, and sooner than later, TPLF-EPRDF must realize that democracy, internally and externally, is the only happy way out of the quagmire they have put themselves and the country in. Team Lemma also should know that if they can’t push for change in the Executive Committee membership and transform their own party into a democratic one, there is no way they can take the wider country into the democracy to come.

Conclusion: Any Reason to Hope for Transformation?

The foregoing must have made it clear that the transition to democracy to come from within, particularly the one that may come about through the agency of Team Lemma, is going to be an extremely controlled transition. At best, being a result of internal contestation and negotiation within EPRDF, it is only going to be a managed transition. As such, it is bound to be slow (relative to the Revolution), measured, and incremental. Team Lemma, as a protest team that is also in government, can only push for a reform that may (or may not) pave the way for a full-fledged transformation. There is a limit to a revolution sought to be accomplished through well-placed elite. (And this is precisely the reason the Oromo Revolution continues unabated to put pressure on Team Lemma or any place holder until the peoples’ demands are fully met.)  Nevertheless, quite understandably, there is a limit to what the Team can do because there is bound to be an inertia born out of the irreducible contradiction in engaging (as they do) in protest WHILE ALSO exercising leadership, in doing resistance WHILE ALSO governing, in maximizing one’s current position WHILE ALSO seeking to occupy a more powerful position (in the name of effecting the change the generation sought to see).  Here in lies the dilemma of Team Lemma, whose dilemma can also be seen as the quintessential Oromo dilemma, the dilemma of the people whose historic mission it is to critique and interrogate Ethiopia (and all that it stands for) WHILE ALSO wanting to transform, redeem, and save it from itself at the same time.

The question remains, though. Is this Lemma Moment going to last? Will it overcome its dilemma and deliver what it silently promises? Does it still offer a moment of political hopefulness? Or is it a moment of anticlimax already? These are questions for another day. AS

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The writer, Tsegaye R Ararssa, can be reached at tsegayenz@gmail.com

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January 9, 2018: As part of our responsibility to support the safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas, the Department of State is improving our communications with U.S. citizen travelers to provide clear, timely, and reliable safety and security information worldwide.

On January 10, 2018, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, which is charged within the State Department with the protection of U.S. citizens abroad, will launch a new Travel Advisory for each country of the world.  The Travel Advisories will replace the previous system of Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts with a single platform using plain language to help U.S. citizens find and use important security information.

On the Travel Advisory page, travelers will find a standard format for each country, including an interactive map.  Each country will be assigned a Travel Advisory Level from One to Four

• Level 1 – Exercise Normal Precautions: This is the lowest advisory level for safety and security risk.  There is some risk in any international travel.  Conditions in other countries may differ from those in the United States and may change at any time. (Color: Blue)
• Level 2 – Exercise Increased Caution: Be aware of heightened risks to safety and security.  The Departments of State provides additional advice for travelers in these areas in the Travel Advisory.  Conditions in any country may change at any time.  (Color: Yellow)
• Level 3 – Reconsider Travel: Avoid travel due to serious risks to safety and security.  The Department of State provides additional advice for travelers in these areas in the Travel Advisory.  Conditions in any country may change at any time. (Color: Orange)
• Level 4 – Do Not Travel: This is the highest advisory level due to greater likelihood of life-threatening risks.  During an emergency, the U.S. government may have very limited ability to provide assistance.  The Department of State advises that U.S. citizens not travel to the country or to leave as soon as it is safe to do so.  The Department of State provides additional advice for travelers in these areas in the Travel Advisory.  Conditions in any country may change at any time. (Color: Red)

While overall levels will be set for each country, some Travel Advisories may include different levels of advice for specific areas within a country.

The Travel Advisory Level will include clear reasons based on established risk indicators and specific advice to U.S. citizens who choose to travel.  These are:

• C – Crime:  Widespread violent or organized crime is present in areas of the country.  Local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond to serious crimes.  

• T – Terrorism:  Terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist.

• U – Civil Unrest:  Political, economic, religious, and/or ethnic instability exists and may cause violence, major disruptions, and/or safety risks.

• H – Health:  Health risks, including current disease outbreaks or a crisis that disrupts a country’s medical infrastructure, are present.  The issuance of a Centers for Disease Control Travel Notice may also be a factor.  

• N – Natural Disaster:  A natural disaster, or its aftermath, poses danger.

• E – Time-limited Event:  Short-term event, such as elections, sporting events, or other incidents that may pose safety risks.

• O – Other:  There are potential risks not covered by previous risk indicators.  Read the country’s Travel Advisory for details.

The Travel Advisories may be supplemented by Alerts, which will replace the previous system of Emergency Messages and Security Messages, to provide timely information to the public in an easy-to-understand format.  Alerts will inform U.S. citizens of specific safety and security concerns in a country, such as demonstrations, crime trends, and weather events.

This new system will be deployed worldwide and does not reflect a change in our security posture toward any particular country.  It was developed over the past year based on feedback about our consular safety and security messaging.

We expect the changes will improve the Department’s ability to inform the public in an efficient and comprehensive manner.  Information will be easier to find, understand, and use.  Travel Advisories will ensure U.S. citizens receive important advice for every country, applying a consistent worldwide standard.

We continue to encourage U.S. citizens traveling overseas to enroll their travel plans in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (step.state.gov), so they can receive important Alerts while traveling.  We will continue to keep U.S. citizen travelers up to date through travel.state.gov, Twitter (@travelgov), and Facebook (facebook.com/travelgov).

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ESAT Latest Ethiopian News January 10, 2018

The post ESAT Latest Ethiopian News January 10, 2018 appeared first on Satenaw: Ethiopian News|Breaking News: Your right to know!.

Liyat Fekade

Addis Abeba, January 08/2018 – In another meeting attended by members of Ethiopia’s Security Council, participants at a day long meeting on Friday January 05 have reflected on yet another daunting security assessment compiled from various parts of the country since the council’s first meeting was held, during which an alarming security assessment document was presented.

The participants on Friday’s meeting included Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Defense Minister Siraj Fegessa, who is the chairperson of the security council. Both PM Hailemariam and Siraj Fegessa have chaired the meeting which was also attended by high level federal and regional defense and security officials and members of the federal and regional police forces among others.

Two sources familiar with the meeting have told Addis Standard during the weekend that “concerns were raised by members of the national defense forces and the federal police regarding strong resistance from several parts of the public, particularly in Oromia and Amhara regional states.” Oromia and Amhara regional states are two of the biggest regional states which were hit by persistent anti-government protests in the last two years. The security council meeting was also told by participants from the federal security and intelligence forces that increasing trends of ethnic based attacks observed in various universities and cities in Oromia, Amhara and Tigray regional states have become the “most serious issues that have challenged both,” according to one of the sources who wants to remain anonymous.

The issue of “diminishing lack of public confidence in the federal army and the federal police force” was also discussed in light of the October 26/2017 killings of ten civilians in Ambo, 125 km west of Addis Abeba, and the killings of more than a dozen civilians in Chelenko, East Hararghe zone of the Oromia regional state. “It was discussed in detail as one of the reasons for this lack of public trust,” said the other source who spoke to Addis Standard. The Oromia regional government and residents of both Ambo and Chelenko have blamed members of the national defense force for the killings.

Participants of the Security Council meeting have also discussed the “difficult issue of the recent ethnic based attacks” observed in some universities, as well as the mid-December 2017 killings in Ethio-Somali and Oromia regional states that claimed the lives of close to eighty civilians. “Both were raised as examples that the work of restoring law and order was far from achieved.”

Siraj Fegessa during the press briefing late Friday Afternoon

At a press briefing he gave late on Friday, after the day long meeting of the council, Siraj Fegessa told local media representatives that the overall security situation in the country “has improved: since the Council’s meeting in October. However, he said the Council recognized that more needs to be done to consolidate the gains made so far. He also said normal teaching learning processes have resumed in the universities that have experienced disruptions following ethnic based attacks and student protests “except for three universities”. However, Siraj didn’t mention the three universities by name. He also refused to take more questions from journalists saying there will be another briefing for the media in due course.

However, answering to one questions from a local reporter, Siraj said that the security crisis in Ethiopian Somali and Oromia adjacent zones were caused by border disputes and that since the first security council meeting police forces from both regions were made to vacate contested areas which were then manned by members of the federal army.

The issue of absence of the federal government’s commitment in dealing with the Oromia-Somali crisis as well as its “lack of resolve to resettle hundreds of thousands internally displaced Ethiopians” who were “victimized” by the violence, which began showing signs of escalation as far back as December 2016, “stood out as one of the hotly debated topics,” according to one of the two sources.

Representatives from the federal defense and police forces on their turn blamed lack of cooperation from their regional counterparts, especially in Oromia and Amhara regional states, which led to “several deaths of innocent civilians” during protests.  “A senior defense official said at the meeting that the federal government’s thinly spread budget has added to the already fragile dynamics between federal and regional security and intelligence officials in terms of coordinating their acts,” one of our sources said.

The meeting has discussed the possibilities of increasing more security measures to be coordinated between federal and regional states “to contain what was agreed as the most serious of all security threats”: such as road blockages, ransacking of state affiliated properties, including army vehicles and ethnic based attacks, according to our sources.

Meanwhile, Reporter, the weekly Amharic newspaper said in its Sunday edition that the federal police has established a special task force to investigate the “Qeerroo”  (The Afaan Oromoo term for “Young man”), but who the federal police believes were “clandestine” groups responsible for impeding the federal defense and federal police forces activities in eastern Ethiopia.

It is not clear if this decision is part of the security measures considered in the first security document. But many see the news as yet another crackdown against those who have continued staging ant-government protests especially in Oromia.

AS

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Berhanemeskel Abebe Segni

Birhanemeskel Abebe Segni

Nothing describes the TPLF than a well organized criminal enterprise. All the pretentions are gone. In the attached picture, the photo shows TPLF military/police officers’ openly torturing Oromo youth on the streets in Addis Ababa.

Now, in the attached Oromia Police letter, a TPLF defense force officer intentionally and purposely overrun and killed an Oromo national by car, ISIS style. The Oromia police hot pursuit to detain the criminal was unsuccessful after the offender took refuge in the TPLF operated military camp.

The TPLF operated military camp refused to hand over the criminal who took refuge in the military camp to the Oromia justice system disobeying Oromia court order. This is yet another key evidence of TPLF lawlessness and criminality in Oromia. Oromia Regional state should protect Oromo nationals from these criminals.

No Oromo national should be handed over under any pretext to the TPLF operated Federal Police, National Intelligence, and the so-called Ethiopian Defense Force. Besides, the Oromo people should socially exclude and defend themselves including by distance themselves from these criminals.

As for the TPLF military camp that disobeyed the Oromia court order, the Oromia Regional State should order the immediate closure of the camp and the removal of those officers from Oromia Region and hold the administrators of the camp accountable.

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addisstandard 2018-01-11

The post Federal high court reverses decision to summon gov. officials as defense witnesses, angering defendants; sentences seven on contempt of court appeared first on Satenaw: Ethiopian News|Breaking News: Your right to know!.

Actress Angelina Jolie, shown at the National Board of Review Awards Gala in New York this month, adopted a child from Ethiopia. Lawmakers there voted to ban foreign adoptions of Ethiopian children. (Angela Weiss / AFP/Getty Images)

 

Associated Press

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 by Middle East Monitor

The Saudi authorities have transferred the remaining detainees being held in the Ritz-Carlton hotel to Al-Ha’ir prison, south of Riyadh, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed news site reported.

Sources told the news site that nearly 60 detainees were transferred to the most high security prison in the Kingdom. The prisoners include Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal as Prince Turki Bin Abdullah and a number of government officials who refused to make the large financial paymentsfor their release.

Saudi Arabia has used the Al-Ha’ir prison to detain political activists demanding reforms, as well as terrorism suspects. Two days ago, authorities transferred 11 princes who had gathered outside the Al-Hakam Palace in Riyadh to the prison.

Read: Twitter user reveals new details about the arrest of 11 Saudi princes

According to eyewitnesses, the security services including the police, the Royal Guards and army units which have surrounded the hotel over the past two months have nearly disappeared from the hotel’s vicinity, while online a hotels booking site listed the Ritz-Carlton as available for booking as of next month.

#MBS

The Saudi authorities detained nearly 200 princes and senior officials in an “anti-corruption” purge last year. The Saudi authorities are seeking to secure $100 billion in settlements from the detainees in exchange for their freedom.

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Teshome M. Borago

After over 2 years of courageous Ethiopian protests and thousands of innocent lives lost, the TPLF ruling party has thrown crumbs and meaningless promise at the Ethiopian people once again. This week, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn first announced that “political prisoners” will be released. Suddenly, many naive international human rights organizations and leaders praised the regime. But just one day later, his TPLF handlers told him to reverse everything, accusing the media of “misquoting” his announcement. So, Hailemariam now completely rejects that “political prisoners” even exist in Ethiopia; therefore he claims that it is due to his party’s graciousness that “imprisoned or convicted politicians and others” will be pardoned.

When have we witnessed this drama before?

It was of course in 2007 when TPLF put on a masterful show of pardoning prominent opposition officials of the CUD party who were incarcerated right after winning the 2005 national election. That was a historic election where TPLF used its OPDO Oromo cadres to defame and attack the CUD party; just like it is currently using the Somali Liyu Police to attack the Oromo-Amara (#Oromara) alliance. The strategy failed then and CUD mobilized millions to win even populated regions of Oromia and 99% of the city votes. In response, TPLF declared state of emergency in 2005, killed hundreds of protestors and held opposition leaders as hostage. When most Western Powers denounced these barbaric acts, TPLF later freed the prisoners as a diversion tactic to portray an illusion of reform and change. However, after the prisoners release, the human rights situation in Ethiopia actually got worse and the ruling party decided to kick out even the small opposition figures in its parliament, successfully becoming a one-party tyranny like its Derg predecessor.

Will the same tactic work for TPLF again?

Ten years later, the TPLF seems to be using the same tactic to save its sinking ship.

The problem is that Ethiopia is too big and too diverse to be ruled with an iron fist forever. After 2005, even after TPLF destroyed the legal opposition; diverse members of its own coalition had began to crack. Having fed narrow tribal propaganda of Oromo nationalism (OPDO) and Amhara nationalism (ANDM) for two decades as a tool to undermine cosmopolitan Ethiopian nationalists, the TPLF finally got a taste of its own medicine since 2015. Land and power disputes took ethnic dimensions and sparked regional protests that the ruling party has yet to recover from.

The turning point of these isolated protests was when mostly Amara Gondar protestors (some armed with weapons and too close to TPLF’s hometown) began to strategically coordinate with Oromo protestors who suffocated the commercial routes of the center with their bravery and unflinching determination. Such Oromo-Amara alliance was recently fueled by their desperation to spread or nationalize their isolated movements, as well as inspired by Ethiopian nationalists like Teddy Afro, whose album in 2017 was featured in every major international media and quickly became an anthem for Ethiopians worldwide. Suddenly, even Oromo diaspora activists like Jawar Mohammed began to preach Ethiopian unity and virtually abandon divisive hot topics like tribalization of Addis Ababa and defamation of our patriotic ancestors. Jawar even defended Teddy Afro against government censorship as the #Oromara alliance grew.

This yearlong unity of Ethiopian protestors has cornered the TPLF ruling party and made several pockets of the nation completely ungovernable. The regime’s divide and rule policy has faltered.

And there is no sign that the new protests will end anytime soon. Unlike the systematic suppression of the urban opposition after the 2005 election, the TPLF will not be able to stop the current rural protests. For example, during the aftermath of that election, Meles Zenawi accelerated his program of the “One-to-five” network of spies around Addis Ababa. Since then, more Tigrayans have also migrated to the urban and many have become informers in every block of the cities, especially Addis Ababa.

Ironically, the same destructive “ethnic-federalism” structure that has made the country ripe for ethnic conflicts is also the same structure that might end up killing TPLF and its spy program. The ongoing protests have now proven that TPLF is unable to keep its important 1-to-5 spy program in the rural without the full support of OPDO and ANDM. Particularly in rural Oromia, once the program collapses, it is nearly impossible to restore this “one-to-five” structure without OPDO, due to language barriers and the shear size of the state. Also, unlike the millions of Amharas and southerners living inside Oromia towns, Tigrayans are almost nonexistent in much of the rural state. Therefore, OPDO or any Oromo opposition movement (if it has courageous leadership) will be more capable of defying the TPLF authority in the coming years. If the TPLF regime thinks it can throw crumbs and easily satisfy the protestors, it will be hugely mistaken.

Therefore, addressing only the symptoms of the tyranny by tackling minor corruption cases and releasing prisoners will not be enough. Ethiopia needs a permenant systematic change by fixing its undemocratic institutions at the judiciary, civil service, federal agencies and particularly the military which lacks independence from the TPLF. So far, the TPLF ruling party seems to be uninterested in genuine reform and it might even attempt to slide back to its brutal military solution.

It is upto the protest movements to force the regime and there are three more methods.

First, the Oromo and Amara protests must somehow take their movement to the center of Addis Ababa and that requires further de-ethnicization of their end goal and rhetoric. Secondly, the “Oromara” protests must be more disciplined and avoid attacking any Tigrayan businesses and civilians. Thirdly, the Oromo and Amara protests must reach out to other ethnic groups, particularly the Somalis, whose Liyu Police gang have become TPLF’s new lifeline. This third step requires not only political leadership among Oromo and Somali diaspora communities but also discipline back home to stop ethnic clashes or revenge killings that have led to massive displacement of civilians along the Oromia-Somali borders.

All these three strategies are vital to put more pressure on TPLF and set up a foundation for a transition to democracy.

Teshomeborago@gmail.com

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“Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
Lord Acton

The new chairman of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and vice-administrator of the Tigray Region travels extensively around the world to take part in countless fancy conferences. He also makes many wonderful speeches. On such occasions, at home and abroad, “Dr.” Debretsion Gebremichael Measho, inspires audiences with his firm belief in women’s equality. He says he is committed to empowering women and creating opportunities to narrow the gender gap in Ethiopia. He speaks passionately about equipping girls with information communications and technology (ICT).-– Read More— 

Download (PDF, 1.25MB)

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ESAT DC Daily News Thu 11 Jan 2018

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Dr Abiy Ahmed on addressing a crowd of artists, writers etc in Addis

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Tepid reforms and halfhearted concessions won’t save the country’s authoritarian government from its existential crisis.

Mohammed Ademo and Jeffrey Smith

People protest against the Ethiopian government during Irreecha, the annual Oromo festival to celebrates the end of the rainy season, in Bishoftu on October 1, 2017.
An Ethiopian religious festival transformed into a rare moment of open defiance to the government one year after a stampede started by police killed dozens at the gathering. The Irreecha festival is held annually by the Oromos, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, which in late 2015 began months of anti-government protests over claims of marginalisation and unfair land seizures. / AFP PHOTO / Zacharias ABUBEKER (Photo credit should read ZACHARIAS ABUBEKER/AFP/Getty Images)

For a brief moment last week, Ethiopia seemed poised to shed its reputation as Africa’s Stasi state. At a press conference on Jan. 3, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn vowed to free political prisoners and shutter the notorious Maekelawi prison, which has long served as a torture chamber for government critics, opposition leaders, journalists, and activists.

Desalegn’s announcement shocked Ethiopian citizens and observers alike. Initial reports indicated that the Ethiopian regime had finally accepted that mistakes had been made and serious abuses had been committed on its watch. Indeed, the stark admission would have marked the first time ever that Ethiopia had acknowledged holding political prisoners in the country. (Human rights groups have estimated that they number in the tens of thousands.)

The outpouring of optimism did not last long. Within hours, an aide to Desalegn clarified the prime minister’s remarks, saying that “mistranslation” by the media was to blame for the confusion. And indeed Desalegn’s actual comments in Amharic were less clear-cut. He spoke of the need to cultivate national reconciliation and to expand democratic freedoms, adding that “some political leaders and individuals whose crimes have resulted in court convictions or their ongoing trial” would be pardoned or have their cases withdrawn. A week after the press conference, it remains unclear how many people will be freed or when, if at all.

One fact remains clear, however. Following three years of escalating anti-government protests — mostly by the Oromo ethnic group and to an extent the Amhara, who together comprise two-thirds of the country’s 100 million people — Ethiopia can no longer afford to ignore demands for political reform. For years, the regime has sacrificed respect for basic political rights and civil liberties on the altar of economic growth. And its claims of a rapidly growing economy have always been dubious at best. The status quo can no longer hold.

A staunch U.S. ally in the war on terrorism, Ethiopia is seen as a stable oasis in the troubled Horn of Africa region, which is plagued by both extremist attacks and ruthless counterinsurgency operations. This image of stability has been cultivated by well-oiled lobbyists in Washington and by an army of social media trolls on the government payroll. However, despite the outward veneer of growth and stability, all is not well in Ethiopia.

In an effort to boost lagging exports, authorities devalued Ethiopia’s currency, the birr, by 15 percent last October. The country is also struggling to mitigate the effects of massive youth unemployment, high public debt, rising inflation, and a shortage of foreign currency. The economic woes that have beleaguered Ethiopia have fueled the increasing unrest. Amhara and Oromo protesters decry economic marginalization and systemic exclusion at the hands of powerful ethnic Tigrayan leaders. The economic dividends of the country’s modest growth are not broadly shared outside the wealthy business class and associates of the ruling party. To make matters worse, a long-simmering border disputebetween the Oromia and the Somali regions has left hundreds of people dead and more than 700,000, mostly from the Oromo ethnic group, internally displaced.

Taken together, these burgeoning crises have raised credible concerns about the risk of state collapse. And there are good reasons to be worried. Western donorsand foreign investors alike are increasingly jittery about the political uncertainty and growing popular unrest. In its annual Fragile States Index, which predicts risk of state failure, the Fund for Peace ranked Ethiopia 15th out of 178 countries surveyed, up from 24th in 2016.

Adding to the creeping sense of doom is an internal power struggle that is ripping apart the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which has been in power since 1991. The EPRDF is a coalition of four unequal partners, including the Amhara National Democratic Movement, the Oromo People’s Democratic Party (OPDO), and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Ostensibly, each party is meant to represent the vested interests of its ethnic region within the EPRDF.

In theory, Ethiopia is a federation, based on decentralized ethnic representation. In practice, the federal system has for years enabled the domination of the country’s political space, economy, and security services by ethnic Tigrayans. The TPLF represents the Tigray region, home to only about 6 percent of the country’s population. Yet the party gets the same number of votes as the OPDO, which represents the roughly 40 percent of Ethiopians who are ethnic Oromos.

This inherent tension broke the surface in October 2016, when newly elected OPDO leaders began to openly embrace protesters’ grievances and calls for reform. This marked the first sign of a split within the EPRDF and set the stage for the ongoing power struggle over how to respond to the increasingly deadly and destabilizing Oromo protests.

The Oromo protest movement has amplified the OPDO’s voice within the EPRDF. At the press briefing held with Desalegn on Jan. 3, Lemma Megersa, the head of the OPDO and president of Oromia, accused TPLF officials of planting cronies inside his party and viewing political power as their own personal property. He made this claim in the presence of the TPLF chairman — a stunning public rebuke.

On the surface, the ruling coalition now appears open to correcting course. Instead of blaming its failures on terrorists, “anti-peace elements,” or diaspora-based opposition groups as the EPRDF has done in the past, Desalegn acknowledged the need for reform. To stop Ethiopia from falling apart, however, the government will need to go much further than the halfhearted concessions hinted at by the prime minister. It must undertake a host of long-overdue political and legal reforms, including dismantling the fusillade of draconian laws it has enacted over the last two decades to stifle dissent, decimate civil society, and muzzle the opposition.

A number of prominent Ethiopian opposition leaders, activists, and journalists — some of whom are expected to be freed after Desalegn’s remarks — have been unjustly detained and convicted under a noxious trio of laws, namely the Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. To ensure that prisoners who are pardoned do not end up back behind bars, and to truly reckon with the abuses committed during the EPRDF’s 27-year rule, Ethiopia’s leaders should immediately begin dismantling the machinery of oppression by repealing and replacing those laws, which have been routinely condemned for failing to meet international standards.

In addition, to turn the page on its checkered past, the EPRDF regime — which now controls 100 percent of seats in parliament — must also implement a process of national reconciliation based on the principles of inclusivity and genuine political dialogue. In his Jan. 3 statement, Desalegn cited the need for social healing as a reason for the pardon of some prisoners. It was a historic moment. But for it to translate into real change, the country’s leaders must resolve to release all political prisoners without delay or preconditions; fully implement the country’s rarely applied but progressive constitution; ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary; end unchecked impunity for corrupt officeholders and security officials; and hold to account those responsible for the death and displacement of hundreds of Ethiopians.

No one expects change in Ethiopia to occur overnight. The reform process will undoubtedly be lengthy and fraught with potential obstacles. But to rescue the country from the undue weight of its own repression, EPRDF leaders have no choice but to change course.

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Associated Press

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia –  One of Ethiopia’s most prominent opposition politicians has been sentenced to six months in prison for contempt of court along with three others after they sang a protest song during proceedings.

Bekele Gerba, former deputy head of the Oromo Federalist Congress party, protested after the court withdrew a previous ruling requiring Ethiopia’s prime minister to appear as a defense witness. The state-affiliated Fana Broadcasting Corporate says Bekele and the other defendants “wreaked havoc.”

Bekele had been arrested in December 2015 after anti-government protests erupted in parts of the East African country. He was charged with terrorism offenses that later were changed to criminal charges.

He was among the opposition figures expected to be released as part of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn’s recent announcement to free some imprisoned politicians.

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By Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam

Author’s Note: In a recent interview on Voice of America- Amharic Service (for audio of original English interview click here) former U.S. Assistant  Secretary of State for African Affairs and U.S. ambassador, Herman Jay (Hank) Cohen, called for U.S. mediation and reconciliation among stakeholders in Ethiopia to prevent the “collapse of law and order” in Ethiopia.

Ambassador Herman Cohen

Ambassador Cohen has played a critical role in recent Ethiopian history. By some accounts, he sought to play a constructive role in Ethiopia in 1991 by facilitating that country’s transition to democratic rule but was overtaken by events and crafty duplicity of rebel leaders of the TPLF and their confederates. At the time, Newsweek observed, “To avoid further bloodshed, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, who chaired the negotiations, had to jettison original plans and make unexpected alliances, backing the rebel seizure of the capital and Eritrean demands for self-determination, but warning that Ethiopia “cannot expect international cooperation without democracy.” He is also credited for “working urgently to bring about a broad-based interim government that would preserve Ethiopian unity.”

Critics have described the ambassador’s mediatory role in 1991 as “Cohen’s Coup”.

Over the years, Ambassador Cohen has been an outspoken critic of the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its monopoly on political power and domination of the Ethiopian economy.

In 2012, Ambassador Cohen said, “They [TPLF] are condemned to rule the country as a minority and that is very dangerous for [Ethiopia’s] stability.”

In December 2015, Ambassador Cohen condemned extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions by the TPLF regime. “The political leaders of the Ethiopian Government have a policy of killing all opponents who take to the streets to demonstrate against them. Other opponents who do not demonstrate but make public statements instead, are sent to jail for long periods. I fail to understand why the Ethiopian regime feels it is necessary to exercise such extreme control to the point of committing murder periodically against their own citizens.”

In December 2017 (interview below), summarizing his discussions with U.S. officials regarding the current crises in Ethiopia, Ambassador Cohen recounted, “I said that mainly there is no sharing of economic or political power, and that there was such a small group that I said very unhealthy and it would not last. It couldn’t possibly last, which I see evidence now but it is not lasting.”

In his interview, Ambassador Cohen expresses deep concern over the “breakdown of law and order” in Ethiopia, the “central government’s loss of control”, the “general feeling of disintegration” and the destructive nature of “ethnic politics” in Ethiopia. He calls for “reconciliation” through broad public participation including “women, youth, the press” and other marginalized groups. He laments the fact that the TPLF “decided to have a minority regime which did not share economic power as well as political power.”

I do not know if Ambassador Cohen has undertaken his efforts to encourage the TPLF regime to act in its own best rational interest and save itself from the error of its ways and eventual doom, or merely lending his long and substantial experience in African affairs to do what he can to avert the creeping civil war in the country. I also do not know if he reflects in one form or another American policymakers’ perceptions of events in Ethiopia and official policy orientation on the status quo in Ethiopia.

There may be some who speculate Ambassador Cohen is sending out an unofficial official trial balloon for a negotiated settlement of the country’s longstanding political problems. Is there a clear message in his interview to the TPLF regime? Is he testing the waters on behalf of the Trump adminstration? Is he striving to get informal discussions between the contending parties underway on his own initiative?

I am impressed by Ambassadr Cohen’s concern for urgent action and prevention of bloodshed in Ethiopia. In 1991, he expressed the exact same concerns until he was outwitted, outfoxed, outplayed and outmaneuvered by the late Melies Zenawi and his confederates in London. I also do not doubt his intentions to facilitate a democratic transition to Ethiopia.

In the very last sentence of his interview, Ambassador Cohen urges, “now is a good time to do the right thing and have a national reconciliation exercise.”

Is a “national reconciliation exercise” possible at this stage in the Ethiopian crises?

Is it possible to trust the words of a regime that “believes only they can know what is best for Ethiopia,” as Ambassador Donald Yamamoto observed in 2009?

Is it reasonable to even propose “reconcilation” with a regime which only knows how to play a zero-sum game?

I shall address these issues in due course.

Ambassador Cohen writes on African affairs regularly on “Hank Cohen’s Africa Blog”.

Transcript of Ambassador Herman Cohen’s English Interview With the Voice of America- Amharic Program, 12/22/2017

VOA Journalist Solomon Abate [Solomon]: Ambassador Herman Cohen, thank you very much for your time. As you know, the situation in Ethiopia is very tense currently. And you, I hope, are following up on the situation in that country. I am sorry if my expression would be wrong, but there are several people who consider you as midwife of the current government as much as the frustration of the Ethiopian people on the previous regime was. This morning, you tweeted a message on the current situation in the country and here is what you had to say on your twitter message. ‘Ethiopia’s TPLF leadership should seriously consider requesting United States government mediation to organize a conference among all parties that will produce new democratic dispensation before law and order collapse completely.’ What do you mean by this, Mr. Ambassador? Do you think law and order are collapsing in the country?

Ambassador Herman Cohen: Well, I’m listening to the US Embassy which made an announcement that they are troubled by the fact that there is so much use of lethal force against civilians. When I hear that from the US Embassy which is very friendly to the government there, I have a feeling that there is a loss of control, that the central government is losing control of various states and that the various heads of the states, I guess they call them presidents, are not listening to the center anymore. The general feeling of disintegration which is very dangerous because this is what happened under the previous regime of Mengistu. So, I think time has come to do something and since the United States Government is generally well trusted by all people in Ethiopia, I think they should be called upon to do some mediation just as we did in 1991.

Solomon: 26 years ago.

Amb. Cohen: Right.

Solomon: Mr. Ambassador, you said all parties in your statement, what do you mean by all parties?

Amb. Cohen: Well all parties you know. There’s a tendency to have parties in Ethiopia that seem to represent ethnic groups. I don’t think that is healthy, but I think also lots of organizations, young people, various civil society groups. So, when I say all parties I don’t mean political parties. I mean all stakeholders in the country.

Solomon: Who do you think the stakeholders are?

Amb. Cohen: I’m not that familiar with things now because haven’t followed it extremely closely but I think you have youth groups, you have women’s groups, you have the press. The press has been very heavily repressed, so I think they should be allowed to participate.  There are political parties you know, the leading political parties captured all the seats in the parliament but then those who wanted to be in power, they exist they should be called in as well. There is the military. There is the Civil Service. I think all of them should participate.

Solomon: Mr. Ambassador, if you’re not following up the development of things closely these days, what made you  issue this Twitter statement today and what is your concern at all concerning that country?

Amb. Cohen: Well, I follow the statements of the U.S. Government. I think I can trust that. And when they start talking about civil unrest, and use of violence by the government, I take that very seriously. And I think the US government would not say that unless there’s a serious problem. I know Ambassador Yamamoto who is now in charge of Africa, who was ambassador in Ethiopia. He knows the country well. When the US government starts getting worried about Ethiopian stability, then I start getting worried also.

Solomon: Mr. Ambassador. You worked as Assistant Secretary of State of the United States on top of the fact that you were ambassador of the United States to Ethiopia at some point, and you mediated negotiations 26 years ago before the current government came to power. Did you think anytime the situation would go down this way?

Amb. Cohen: No. Unfortunately maybe I wasn’t thinking deeply enough especially about Ethiopian culture and traditions. But after the London conference of May 1991, there was an Addis Ababa Conference of July where many different groups got together and there was a mutual pledge that there would be a democratic system established and a  new constitution written and that sort of thing. So, I attended that as an observer and they gave me hope for the future. Unfortunately, it didn’t work out that way. The regime turned out to be a very of authoritarian and very repressive regime which I regret very much. But I did have hope at the beginning.

Solomon: When you say regret, would you elaborate that please?

Amb. Cohen: Well, I regret that the power was concentrated in the hand of [muffled] when it should have been… There was a great opportunity to establish real democracy there especially after the Mengistu regime had been so repressive. So there was great opportunity there seem to be a great deal of support for it but unfortunately  the people who took over power and the military force decided otherwise, decided to have a minority regime which did not share economic power as well as political power.

Solomon: Did you have any chance at any time during the last 26 years to talk to the authorities of the Ethiopian government starting from with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi all the way down?

Amb. Cohen: I had conversation with prime minister Meles Zenawi on a lot of different subjects. I left the US Government after 1994. I was working with the World Bank on promoting good governance in Africa. They had set up a new program which I joined. So I had an opportunity to talk to Meles Zenawi. I didn’t speak to other high officials in the government. I guess I spoke to Mesfin who is now ambassador in China.

Solomon: The former foreign minister.

Amb. Cohen: Foreign minister, right. I spoke to him and we talked about a lot of these things. But I guess I didn’t have much impact.

Solomon: You mentioned your concerns to the Prime Minister and to the foreign minister openly.

Amb. Cohen: Quite openly.

Solomon: What were the points you raised with them?

Amb. Cohen: Well, I said that mainly there is no sharing of economic or political power, and that there was such a small group that I said very unhealthy and it would not last. It couldn’t possibly last, which I see evidence now but it is not lasting.

Solomon: President Obama had a good thought about you. He said some good words about you at some point even. Did you try to talk about the US officials about the situation in Ethiopia, about the way where it was heading?

Amb. Cohen: No I did not have much dialogue with the US government about Ethiopia. I was really concerned some crisis situations there much more difficult. So, I didn’t really talk much about Ethiopia. And of course you had the issue in Somalia. I think, say starting 2005, the US government considered the al-Shabaab problem in Somalia to be far higher priority than internal issues in Ethiopia.

Solomon: You advised the TPLF leadership to ask the US government to facilitate the mediation. Why did you specifically address TPLF?

Amb. Cohen: Well, they are the ones that control the power, the political power. And they are behind the use of lethal force that is currently going on plus the fact that they control the economic power. They are the ones who should initiate an exercise in national reconciliation. If they don’t do it, it won’t happen.

Solomon: So you think it is the TPLF leadership that is totally responsible for the situation in the country now?

Amb. Cohen: Yes, absolutely.

Solomon: And you ask the TPLF leadership to ask the US government to facilitate the mediation, why not the vice versa? Why you didn’t offer this advice to the United States Government to facilitate the discussions between all parties in Ethiopia before things go worse?

Amb. Cohen: Well, I am currently advising them to do that.

Solomon: You are doing that?

Amb. Cohen: Yes.

Solomon: Which medium do you use?

Amb. Cohen: I talk to them regularly. I talked to… I’m a good friend of ambassador Yamamoto. So we talk regularly.

Solomon: Do you think the US will take this initiative?

Amb. Cohen: It’s not impossible. They might do that.

Solomon: And do you think it would work?

Amb. Cohen: Well, the U.S. is not indispensable as a mediator. There are other possibilities. You have the United Nations. But I think given the history of Ethiopia and the relationships with the U.S. going back to the Second World War, I think the US is the most logical intervenor.

Solomon: What leverage do the United States government has on Ethiopia?

Amb. Cohen: They don’t have much leverage. The US provides military support.  The US provides famine support. Humanitarian assistance. But one thing the United States will never do is refuse humanitarian assistance when it is needed. So, I don’t think the U.S.  has much really leverage. So really a moral leverage between good friends.

Solomon: Do you think the Chinese have anything to do in this situation?

Amb. Cohen: Well, the Chinese have a major presence but they don’t get involved in Internal Affairs. In Africa, they might have gotten involved with the Zimbabwe regime with the departure of Mugabe. Generally they stay away from internal political affairs just do their business, do their investments and they do their trade and they do tend to stay away from  political issues.

Solomon: Mr. Ambassador, when former president Obama traveled to Ethiopia when  he was president of the U.S. gave a statement saying that the Ethiopian government was democratically elected and many activists and political analysts and especially politicians in the country, the opposition resent the president for saying that. What do you think?

Amb. Cohen: Well, President Obama is a very sincere person. I believe he must have been briefed, someone gave him a briefing that was not true because his statement was absolutely not true. It is impossible to have 100% members of parliament from one party. That cannot be democratic. So he was briefed poorly or made a mistake.

Solomon: Did you communicate this to the president by anyway, through any medium?

Amb. Cohen: Well, I spoke to State Department people about that. They acknowledge that it was a mistake.

Solomon: But the president the former president never acknowledged or apologized for what he said then?

Amb. Cohen: Not to my knowledge.

Solomon: Mr. Ambassador. Is there anything you would advise the Ethiopian government, its allies that they should do so things go better?

Amb. Cohen: Well, I think Ethiopia has a great future. It has wonderful resources. It has a great enterprising people. So, I think if they could have a national reconciliation, investments will pour in and there would be great increases in employment and they can have a very bright future. But while the current situation goes on, and there is deterioration, there will be no new investments coming in. There will be growing unemployment and great misery. So, I think now is a good time to do the right thing and have a national reconciliation exercise.

Solomon: Mr. Herman Cohen, former ambassador and assistant Secretary of the United States, thank you very much for your time.

Amb. Cohen: Ok. You are very welcome. Good luck to Ethiopia.

//

Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam teaches political science at California State University, San Bernardino. His teaching areas include American constitutional law, civil rights law, judicial process, American and California state governments, and African politics. He has published two volumes on American constitutional law, including American Constitutional Law: Structures and Process (1994) and American Constitutional Law: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights (1998). He is the Senior Editor of the International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, a leading scholarly journal on Ethiopia. For the last several years, Prof. Mariam has written weekly web commentaries on Ethiopian human rights and African issues that are widely read online. He blogged on the Huffington post at  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/ and later on open.salon until that blogsite shut down in March 2015.

Prof. Mariam played a central advocacy role in the passage of H.R. 2003 (Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007)  in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2007. Prof. Mariam also practices in the areas of criminal defense and civil litigation. In 1998, he argued a major case in the California Supreme Court involving the right against self-incrimination in People v. Peevy, 17 Cal. 4th 1184, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998)  which helped clarify longstanding Miranda rights issues in California criminal procedure. For several years, Prof. Mariam had a weekly public channel public affairs television show in Southern California called “In the Public Interest”. Prof. Mariam received his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota in 1984, and his J.D. from the University of Maryland in 1988.

The post TPLF Monopoly “on Economic and Political Power in Ethiopia Could Not Possibly Last” – Ambassador Herman Cohen appeared first on Satenaw: Ethiopian News|Breaking News: Your right to know!.

ESAT Latest Ethiopian News January 12, 2018

The post ESAT Latest Ethiopian News January 12, 2018 appeared first on Satenaw: Ethiopian News|Breaking News: Your right to know!.

People protest against the Ethiopian government during Irreecha, the annual Oromo festival to celebrates the end of the rainy season, in Bishoftu on October 1, 2017

A court in Ethiopia has sentenced more than 30 people to long prison terms for belonging to an outlawed group.

They were allegedly members of Ginbot 7, a group the authorities say is committed to overthrowing the government.

The Ethiopian government designated it a terrorist group in 2011.

The move comes just two weeks after the government announced it would free some politicians who have been convicted or facing various charges in court.

Members of the Ginbot 7 group, founded by an Ethiopian-born British citizen, Andargachew Tsege, will now serve sentences of between 15 and 18 years.

Dozens more have been jailed by the courts over the past weeks due to their association with the group.

Meanwhile, a leading opposition figure and his co-accused have been sentenced to six months in prison for contempt of court.

Bekele Gerba, an official of the Oromo Federalist Congress, was jailed after he protested against the non-appearance of defence witnesses in the court trying his case.

The judge was angered after he reportedly sang a protest song in court.

He is among politicians who would have charges against him dropped following the announcement by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, many Ethiopians believe.

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Terrorists or activists?

By Emmanuel Igunza, BBC Africa, Addis Ababa

The government would say there is no contradiction between its recent statement on freeing prisoners and these sentences.

Although their supporters are hoping they will be released, the authorities here see Ginbot 7 members as terrorists, not political activists.

Both its current leader Berhanu Nega and its founder Andargachew Tsege have been sentenced to death in absentia by an Ethiopian court for trying to overthrow the government. They both deny the charges.

Andargachew was arrested in Yemen and taken to Ethiopia in 2014 while Berhanu’s whereabouts are unknown.

Berhanu, a former university professor in the US, has previously threatened to march to Addis Ababa to remove the current government from power.

The government says the US-based group is sponsored by Eritrea and accuses it of trying to infiltrate the country.

Most of its members live in exile but authorities says some are active – but in hiding in Ethiopia.

It is highly unlikely that if any prisoners are released, Andergachew would be one of them as the government has previously taken a very strong stand against his release, despite pressure from human rights groups.

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Up until now, the government has not followed up on its promise or issued a clear timeline on when those politicians jailed would be set free, reports BBC Ethiopia correspondent Emmanuel Igunza.

Ethiopia has always denied that there were any political prisoners in the country, as alleged by human rights and opposition groups.

The country has been hit by a wave of political unrest in recent years.

In December, social media users staged a day of action to remember those held behind bars.

Correction: This story has been updated to remove the suggestion that the UK government has campaigned for Andargachew’s release.

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